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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The current project attempts to construct a modest version of natural theology with the 
aid of Confucian axiology and American Pragmatism. Its main thrust is to map out several levels 
of integrative valuation moving from nature and society into the innermost part of the human 
core. It envisions a Confucian axiological cosmos where values are scattered ubiquitously in the 
universe and its myriad presences. The pragmatic theories of Charles S. Peirce and William 
James are employed to construct methodological mechanisms by which natural values are to be 
recognized, semioticized, transferred and integrated into the human equilibrium as valutional 
core. Nature, society and the human valutional core are envisioned as three major value hubs that 
are intricately intertwined and mutually reciprocal. The levels of integrative valuation consist of 
a series of evaluative steps spread along the history of Confucianism. Beginning with an 
objective observation of Investigation of Things (格物), it reaches the semiotic stage of 
Rectifying the Name (正名), which followed by physical participation in the Unity of Knowledge 
  
vii 
 
and Action (知行合一), and eventually arrives at the grand stage of Ritual Appropriateness (禮). 
The Protestant churches with Chinese cultural background are considered as the communal basis 
of this project. The rival coexistence of both naturalistic and anti-naturalistic tendencies makes 
them an apt sample for this axiological project of reconfiguring a natural theology. If 
accomplished successfully, this project will establish an axiological type of natural theology by 
means of integrating resources from Confucianism, American Pragmatism and Christian 
Theology. It will demonstrate a way of engaging nature alternative to those of logical positivist, 
materialistic or even ecological approaches. This project may help conservative Protestant 
Christians redress their obsession concerning special, direct, salvific grace by redirecting them 
towards natural values that are profoundly rich and nourishing by reconciling the cultural and 
religious dimensions of their lives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Need for a New Type of Natural Theology 
 
 Nature as a theological topic has been trivialized and marginalized in modern times. 
Moreover, current Western Christianity has been charged with an attitude characterized by 
neglecting, if not being hostile toward, nature. Lynn White Jr., in his 1967 article, accused 
Christianity of being “the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen,” and blamed 
Christianity, primarily in its Western forms, as “the historical root of our ecologic crisis.”1 Many 
scholars since then have concurred with this Lynn White thesis, and have continued to upbraid 
Christianity’s depreciatory handling of nature.2 The sour relationship between nature and 
theology can be traced back to the Enlightenment, when Kant, with his sweeping criticism, 
dismissed all traditional arguments for natural theology as fruitless.
3
 Hume’s skepticism and 
Kant’s dualism created insurmountable difficulties for ensuing theologians to make any 
metaphysical claim based on nature and natural values.  
 Classic natural theology in its logical, rational, Aristotelian presentation had encountered 
an impasse. Since the Enlightenment, then, nature had had ceased to be a vital topic in 
theological discussions until a recent revival of interest stemming from ecological and feminist 
                                                 
1
 Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” Science 155 (10 March 1967), 1203-7.  
 
2
 Such as Donald Worster in his Nature’s Economy: The Roots of Ecology (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor 
Press, 1979), and H. Paul Santmire in his Brother Earth: Nature, God and Ecology in Time of Crisis (New York, T. 
Nelson, 1970) and The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1985).  
 
3
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 583-589.  
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concerns.
4
 The current project constructs an alternative version of the theology of nature with the 
aid of Confucian axiology and American Pragmatism. Its purpose is to develop a modest 
theology of nature based on an analysis of levels of integrative valuation moving from nature and 
society into the innermost part of the human core. The levels of integrative valuation consist of a 
series of evaluative steps scattered along the history of Confucianism. Beginning with an 
objective observation of Investigation of Things (格物), it reaches the semiotic stage of 
Rectifying the Name (正名), which followed by physical participation in the Unity of Knowledge 
and Action (知行合一), and eventually arrives at the grand stage of Ritual Appropriateness (禮
).
5
 Nature, society and the human valuational core are envisioned as three major value hubs that 
are intricately intertwined and mutually reciprocal.  
 With theoretical tools borrowed from Process Thought and American Pragmatism, I will 
try to build an axiological continuum in which values may arise, transfer, and be assimilated. 
Whiteheadian Process Thought conceives a value-laden universe, within which all actual entities 
                                                 
4
 Such as James Nash, Loving Nature: Ecological Integrity and Christian Responsibility (Washington D.C.: 
Abingdon Press, 1991); Max Stahhouse, Christian Ethics in a Global Era (Nashville: Abingdon, 1991); John Hart, 
Sacramental Commons: Christian Ecology Ethics (Lanham, MD.: Roman & Littlefield, 2006); D. Hessel and R. 
Ruether, Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-being of Earth and Humans (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); Rosemary R. Ruether, Sexism and God-talk: Towards a Feminist Theology (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1983).  
 
5
 As to these Confucian terms, they come from a variety of resources. Investigation of Things (格物) comes 
from The Great Learning (大学), Rectifying the Name (正名) from Analects (论语). Both terms can be found in 
Analects, the Great Learning & Doctrine of the Mean translated by James Legge (New York: Dover Publications, 
Inc., 1971). The third term Unity of Knowledge and Action (知行合一) had its origin in the Ming philosopher Wang 
Yang-ming (1472-1529). An excellent scholarly work on this concept can be found in Warren G Frisina, The Unity 
of Knowledge and Action, Toward a Nonrepresentational Theory of Knowledge (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2002). As to the grand concept of Ritual Appropriateness (禮), resources are too broad to be pinned 
down to any specific text, because it constitutes a central concept in Confucianism. Primary resources this article 
employs come from 十三经注疏 Thirteen Classics, with Commentary and Subcommentary, edited by Ruan Yuan 
(中华书局 1950). Of these thirteen Confucian Classics, three sections serve as primary texts for the concept of 
Ritual Appropriateness (禮): 周禮(Rituals of Zhou), 禮記 (Ritual Records), 儀禮 (Ceremonial Rituals).  
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function as instantiated value processing centers that prehend all other entities with feelings.
6
 
This Process cosmological model is strikingly similar to that of Confucianism. Both classical and 
Neo-Confucianism perceived a universe with values scattered ubiquitously in its myriad of 
entities. Human equilibrium as the center of feelings appreciates and absorbs these natural values 
as ingredients that feed into the process of self-cultivation. The Peircean notion of interpretants 
sketches out the process through which external values are appreciated and apprehended.
7
 When 
applied in a Confucian context, the notion of interpretant plays an essential role in the practices 
of Investigation of Things (格物) and Rectifying the Name (正名). As a result, a variety of signs 
emerge as embodiments of natural values. Value transactions go further in Confucianism to the 
stage of Unity of Knowledge and Action (知行合一), where repetitive practices give rise to 
habits and character in individual life. William James’s neurophysiological analysis of habits 
offers still a different theoretical tool from Pragmatism, with complements Peirce’s semiotics.8 
                                                 
6
 For Whitehead’s discussion on valuation and feeling, see Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology 
(New York: The Free Press, 1978), Part III, Chapter II, p.236-243. For a good exposition of the related part of  
Whitehead’s theory, see Elizabeth Kraus, The Metaphysics of Experience: A Companion to Whiteheard’s Process 
and Reality (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1979) Chapter 5, The Structure of a Concrescence, 107-134  
7
 Peirce’s definition on interpretant scattered in a variety of his articles. Major clusters include “A Letter to William 
James” in The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings vol. 2 (1893-1913), edited by the Peirce Edition 
Project (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998) p.493-494; “New Elements” in The 
Essential Peirce vol.2,300-325; and “A Letter to Lady Welby” in Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence 
Between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. Ed. by Charles S. Hardwick & J. Cook (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1977) 80-83. A good interpretation on Peirce’s notion of interpretant can be found in John J. 
Fitzgerald, Peirce’s Theory of Signs as Foundation for Pragmatism (New York: Humanities Press, 1966) Section 
IV: Theory of Signs: Interpretants, 71-105.  
 
8
 William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1918). The parts 
pertinent to this project are vol. 1, Chapter IV, Habit p.104-127.; vol. 1, Chapter VIII, The Relations of Minds to 
other Things, 199-223.  
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Finally, value transaction reaches the grand stage of Ritual Appropriateness (禮), where natural 
values are accepted and condensed as communal behavior codes.
9
 
 The theology of nature is modest in the sense that it does not make ontological claims on 
existence and the attributes of God as does the classical natural theology. Rather, this project 
takes an empirical approach that aims at the possibility and manner of value transactions between 
nature, society and the human valuational core. This new theology of nature operates under 
multiple theological premises such as a theistic cosmogonic view of the universe, an 
acknowledgement of some certain type of affinity between the Creator and the created order,
10
 
and the innate Imago Dei of the human being as a value sensible subject. The current project falls 
also in the category of Theological Aesthetics, if aesthetics is to be conceived in a broader sense 
that includes sensation, feeling and imagination. It also gives Theological Aesthetics an 
axiological twist with a preoccupation on values. This project shares a lot of similarities with 
Robert S. Corrington’s Ecstatic Naturalism in bringing together Semiotics, Pragmatism and a 
fervent admiration of nature and its values.
11
 It differs from Corrington, though, with a 
Panentheistic outlook that affirms a transcendent dimension beyond nature. This should not be 
considered a Confucian project even though I borrow a lot of terminology and concepts from 
Classic and Neo Confucianism. Nevertheless, the project makes an authentic contribution to 
                                                 
9
 An elegant expression of the communal function of Ritual Appropriateness can be found in Fingarette, 
Herbert Confucius, The Secular as Sacred (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Vaveland Press, Inc., 1972) especially part 1: 
Human Community as Holy Rite and Part 3: The Locus of the Personal.  
 
10
 Traditional theology acknowledges three possible type of analogy of being – univocal, equivocal and 
analogical. This project adopts the analogical stance.  
 
11
 Robert S. Corrington authored two books that are closely relevant to this project: 1) Ecstatic Naturalism: 
Signs of the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); 2) A Semiotic Theory of Theology and 
Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
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Confucian studies by mapping out with considerable detail a series of axiological stages in the 
historical course of Confucianism.  
 This axiological approach to nature may appear to be unique to many Western thinkers, 
yet it has been quite standard in many Eastern ways of thinking.
12
 Even within the Western 
tradition, it is not without precedent. Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, with his apophatic and 
cataphatic method, recognized the theological value of natural entities as symbols that are 
illustrative and yet inadequate to express divine attributes.
13
 The theological connotation of 
nature and its myriad entities was articulated also by thinkers such as Spinoza, Henry David 
Thoreau, Santayana, Dewey and several Chicago theologians including Wieman, Meland and 
Loomer. Recent notable religious naturalists are represented by Charley Hardwick, Henry 
Levinson, and Jerome Stone, to name a few.
14
 Many methodological elements of this project 
were inspired by Robert C. Neville, whose axiological trilogy sets up a framework within which 
this essay operates.
15
 
 
                                                 
12
 Thomé H. Fang was one of those distinguished scholars who articulated this kind of approach to the 
West. His representative works include: The Chinese View of Life: the Philosophy of Comprehensive Harmony 
(Taipei, Taiwan: Linking Publishing Co., 1980) and Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development (Linking 
Publishing Co., Ltd., Taipei, 1981). 
 
13
 Clarence Edwin Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite: On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology 
(Montana: Kessinger Publishing Company, 1940), the third section “Its Relation to Creation” 9-17.  
 
14
 For example, Charley D. Hardwick, Faith and Objectivity, Fritz Buri and the Hermeneutical 
Foundations of a Radical Theology (Martinus Nijoff / The Hague, 1972) Section IV on Symbol, Myth, and the 
Dialectic of Objectivity and Non-Objectivity, p.110-129. Henry Samuel Levinson, Santayana, Pragmatism and the 
Spiritual Life (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), Chapter I, Pragmatic Naturalism and the 
Spiritual Life, p.3-19. Karl E. Peters, Spiritual Transformations: Science, Religion and Human Becoming 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008).  
 
15
 Neville’s trilogy and their pertinence to the current project: 1) Reconstruction of Thinking (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1981), Part I, Section 3: Axiological Cosmology, p.67-85. 2) Recovery of the Measure (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1989), Division One, Section 3: Truth: An Axiological Hypothesis; Division II, Section 7: Value. 3) 
Normative Cultures (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), Part 5, Section 5: Ideal Norms; Part 5 Section 7: Ritual and 
Normative Culture.     
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The Unique Role of Chinese Christian Churches in North America 
 As discussed in the proceeding sections, Confucian axiology offers a promising resource 
in the reconstruction of a new type of Christian Natural Theology. The Protestant churches with 
a Chinese cultural background in North America are communities that embody both traditional 
Chinese culture and Christian convictions, and thus are able to integrate the two. I deliberately 
choose this multi-cultural population as my existential and communal context for four main 
reasons. First, this is a vast topic that needs to be treated within a manageable scope. Second, 
these overseas Chinese Protestant churches in North America are situated in a social 
environment that is free of pressing religious persecution, and are thus privileged with an 
amicable context for theoretical discussion and reconstruction.  This is in contrast to the 
Protestant churches in mainland China, many of which, due to their struggles in a hostile 
environment, assume apologetics as their dominant theological task. Third, being culturally and 
ethnically Chinese, these communities have access to the Chinese logography, a semiotic system 
with deep axiological and naturalistic roots. Fourth, as Protestant Christians, they tend to keep a 
distance from naturalistic elements that are usually considered antithetical to divine salvific 
grace. The rival coexistence of both naturalistic and anti-naturalistic tendencies makes the 
Chinese Protestant Christian an ideal communal sample for this theological project.  
 The Protestant Chinese churches in North America are characterized by an interesting 
compartmentalization. On the one hand, the heritage of traditional culture endows them with rich 
axiological resources; while on the other hand, these Protestant churches are loathe to employ 
raditional symbols, especially those of a religious type, to express their newly acquired Christian 
faith. In other words, their cultural and religious identities have never been fully reconciled, 
despite the fact that there were many attempts, or even movements, to reconcile the two. The 
7 
 
 
 
external or social expression of the fervent tension between the two was the cause of numerous 
cases of religious riots (教案) throughout the history ever since Christianity encountered Chinese 
culture. The internal expression of such tension results in an anti-syncretistic sentiment among 
conservative Chinese Christians.  
 Yang Fenggang, a Professor of Sociology at Purdue University, offered a pertinent case 
study in his monograph Chinese Christians in America. The book was written after his three-year 
field study in a Chinese Protestant church in the suburban area of Washington D. C. According 
to Yang, the Diaspora Chinese suffered what he called the “exilic syndrome”. It is brought on by 
an essential loss that usually endangers the stability of the identity structure, sometimes leading 
to identity collapse. The Diaspora Chinese, Yang observes, are usually characterized by a 
psychological vulnerability that urges them to open to other sources of transcendence and 
ultimacy. Yang invented the term “adhesive integration” as the ideal model of reconstructing the 
stratified multi-layers of identity for the Chinese American Christian.
16
 “Adhesive integration”, 
as Yang defines it, is adding two or three identities together without losing the distinct 
characteristics of each identity. People who have adhesive integration can function fully in two 
or three cultures.
17
 It is in such a manner that the three layers of identity  -- the ethnic-cultural 
identity as Chinese, the geographical and cultural identity as American, and the religious identity 
as Christian – are fused into one. However, these multiple identities are not always compatible 
with each other, but rather charged with tension and conflict. Hence, in many cases, the 
integration is segmented, even after going through a process of selective assimilation and 
                                                 
16
 Fenggang Yang, Chinese Christians in America: Conversion, Assimilation, and Adhesive Identities 
(University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1999), 183-186. 
 
17
 Ibid, 194. 
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selective preservation. Yang’s field study indicates that the typical attitude of Protestant 
Christians in North America is characterized by “… consistently preserv[ing] Confucian moral 
values, selectively accept[ing] some Daoist notions, and categorically reject[ing] Buddhism.”18 
Moreover, most of these Chinese Christians regard their Christian identity as more essential than 
the earthly Chinese and American identities. In other words, the Christian faith constitutes the 
foundation of their identity reconstruction, and also serves as the criterion by which they 
selectively reject or accept certain elements that are either Chinese or American.  
 Professor Yang’s case study echoes my own experience. Having served as a pastor 
among Protestant Chinese Churches in North America for about 15 years,
19
 my observation is 
that many of these Chinese Christians demonstrate a certain degree of deliberately alienating 
themselves from their own Chinese culture. Generally speaking, they would far prefer to be 
identified as “Christians” than to be identified with their “pagan” Chinese cultural background. 
Hence, within their mindset, “Chinese” culture represents the pagan past, while “Christian” 
stands for their new identity. This kind of schizophrenic compartmentalization gives rise to a lot 
of psychological and existential confusion. The success of the current project should help to 
alleviate, moderate or even reconcile the identity struggle of this particular ethnic and religious 
group. As a matter of fact, traditional Chinese culture and Christianity as two major vibrant 
traditions could engage each other in mutually beneficial dialogue.   
 Confucian elements are singled out as representative of component of traditional Chinese 
culture for the following reasons. First, its long-standing orthodoxy made it the backbone of 
                                                 
18
 Ibid. 160. 
 
19
 My pastoral experience includes first as an Assistant Pastor in Dresher PA from 1999 to 2001, and then 
as Pastor and Leading Pastor in Worcester MA from 2001 till the current moment. 
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traditional Chinese culture. Many of the Confucian values, such as filial piety, have been the de 
facto ritual context in which the average Chinese person is molded. Second, Confucianism, as 
compared to Daoism and Buddhism, is believed to bear less religious connotations, making it an 
optimal partner for those Protestant Christians that hold a sensitive aversion to religious 
syncretism. Third, even though the naturalistic tendency of traditional Chinese culture finds a 
more direct expression in Philosophical Daoism, Confucianism, in both its classical and neo 
versions, shares with Daoism a naturalistic ontology. What makes Confucianism a more 
preferable partner in this discussion is that, unlike Philosophical Daoism’s ineffable approach 
which sometimes ends up in mysticism, Confucianism strives to rectify its terms with definitive 
semiotic content.  
 The main direction of this thesis is to channel the rich naturalistic resources in 
Confucianism, both classical and neo, into Christian theology, with the goal of reconstructing a 
new version of Natural Theology with an axiological thrust. However, before the Confucian 
naturalistic elements can be effectively ushered into the Chinese Protestant churches in North 
America, there are some major obstacles need to be overcome. The theological orientation of 
these Chinese Protestant churches displays a strong tendency toward fundamentalism, and is thus 
unfriendly, or even hostile, to any type of natural theology.  
 Professor Yang gave a social and cultural account of the theological composition of the 
Chinese Protestant churches in North America. For a better understanding of this theological 
tradition, we might need to examine the historical condition under which it was shaped. As a 
matter of fact, most founding members of the Chinese Protestant churches in North America 
were Christian immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan or Southeast Asia. Their mother churches 
10 
 
 
 
inherited a heavy dose of conservative and fundamental theology from the foreign missionaries 
who were very active in China for the first half of the 20
th
 Century. Dr. Xiyi Yao did a study to 
uncover and clarify the roots of the fundamentalist movement among Protestant China 
missionaries.
20 
Dr. Yao focused his study on the fundamentalist-modernist controversy among 
the missionaries from 1920 to 1937. According to Yao, the progressive missionaries like 
Timothy Richard, along with other liberal missionaries, played prominent and important roles in 
China’s social and cultural reforms,21 while the fundamentalist missionaries exerted greater 
influences than their modernist counterparts on the growth and the character of the Chinese 
Protestant community. 
22
 In their battle against modernists, conservative missionaries from the 
China Inland Mission (CIM), American Presbyterian missions, and other mission societies 
organized a series of inter-denominational institutions including the Bible Union of China, the 
League of Christian Churches, the North China Theological seminary and the China Sunday 
School Union.
23
 These institutions formed an anti-modernist network on the common ground of 
conservative theological convictions.  Some prominent church leaders in China such as 
Watchman Nee (Ni Tuo-sheng 倪柝声) were tremendously influenced by Margaret E. Barber, a 
free-lance missionary with fundamentalist leanings. Fundamentalist organizations like the Milton 
Steward Evangelistic Fund were enthusiastic in sponsoring retreats and training conferences that 
featured Wang Ming-dao (王明道), Wang Zai (王载), and other famous conservative Chinese 
                                                 
20
 Kevin Xiyi Yao, The fundamentalist movement among Protestant missionaries in China, 1920-1937 
Thesis (Th. D.) 2000 (Boston University, School of Theology Library)  
  
21
 Ibid., 5. 
 
22
 Ibid., 364. 
 
23
 Ibid., 354. 
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evangelists.
24
 Through the North China Theological Seminary (华北神学院) and other 
educational institutions, fundamentalist missionaries made a very significant contribution to the 
emergence of generations of conservative leadership within Chinese churches. Such prominent 
conservative leaders as Jia Yu-ming (贾玉銘) and Yang Shao-tang (杨绍唐) worked side by side 
with the fundamentalist missionaries, fighting together for the faithfulness of missions and 
churches.
25
 
 A fundamentalist, as defined by George Marsden, is “an evangelical who is militant in 
opposition to liberal theology in the churches or to changes in cultural values mores, such as 
those associated with ‘secular humanism.’” 26  In other words, fundamentalists are conservatives 
who are willing to take a stand and to fight.  
 Fundamentalists’ militant hostility against their liberal rivals implies their negative view 
on natural theology. According to the description of William Hutchison, some major traits of 
liberal thinking include the tendency to undercut the exclusivity of Christian claims to truth, the 
enthusiasm for inter-religious dialogue and cooperation, the confidence in the coming Kingdom 
of God on earth and zeal for social service oriented missions.
27
 The Hutchison definition applies 
very well to modernists both in North America as the mission base and China as the mission 
field. Obviously, these Christian modernists display an amicable attitude towards themes of 
natural theology. It was anticipatory for them to appreciate, or even to adopt, natural and cultural 
                                                 
24
 Ibid., 363. 
 
25
 Ibid.  
 
26
 George Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1991), 1. 
 
27
 William R. Hutchison, Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). 102-11. 
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symbols that fall beyond the biblical realm. It is true that, if handled inappropriately, they might 
be vulnerable to religious syncretism. Yet their less militant approach proved to be effective in 
those mission fields with great indigenous civilizations such as China. The theological 
approaches of fundamentalists, on the contrary, struggled to maintain their religious identity by 
fighting against the erosion of modernism. The theoretical hallmarks that characterized the 
fundamentalists, according to Marsden, include the inerrant authority of the Bible, dispensational 
premillennialism, an uncompromising emphasis on the utmost importance of personal salvation, 
as well as an emphasis on moral and theological purity.
28
 Overall, the central doctrine of the 
fundamentalists can be summarized as the authority of Christian Scripture and the supernatural 
nature of the Gospel. Their exclusive position manifests a tone that is unfriendly to symbols of 
indigenous culture, even though some conservative missionaries made sincere attempts to 
assimilate into the local cultures by altering their clothing style or changing their diet.  
 If analyzed on a methodological level, the fundamentalist-modernist controversy boils 
down to different approaches to the media of grace. Generally speaking, the conservative camp, 
out of their concern of doctrinal purity, tends to minimize or bypass media, having an urgent 
desire for immediate access to pure grace. Such a tradition usually preoccupies itself with special 
salvific grace, with typical doctrinal expressions such as the five solae.
29
 Protestant conservatism 
displays a persistently negative attitude toward a variety of natural and cultural symbols, 
epitomized by Karl Barth’s antagonistic refutation of Emil Brunner’s proposal of retaining a 
                                                 
28
 Marsden,.4-8. 
 
29
 The Five Solae are Sola Scriptura, Solus Christus, Sola Gratia, Sola Fide, Soli Deo Gloria. For a 
succinct contemporary expression, refer to Michael Horton, “Reformation Essentials – Five Pillars of the 
Reformation” in Modern Reformation, March/April 1994.    
 
13 
 
 
 
place for natural theology in Neo-orthodoxy.
30
 The question that constantly challenges Barth, as 
well as all conservatives, is whether it is possible to have pure grace without the mediation of 
natural and cultural symbols. Even the original Gospel message has Hellenistic culture as its 
medium, just as Old Testament revelation is intricately mediated by the Jewish culture. There are 
some traditions that are unwilling to make any distinction between the medium and the mediated. 
Islam, for instance, regards the Koran as verbal revelation from the divine. The Koran as the 
medium of revelation shares revelatory authority that is equal to the content itself. Such a rigid 
doctrine of revelation leaves almost no room for created creativity to play any significant role in 
the mediation of the divine message. There is a media pluralism built in the original Gospel 
message. The oral language that Jesus used was Aramaic, which differs from the Gospels as 
written language in Greek. The four Gospels offer plural accounts for the life stories of Jesus 
from various perspectives, targeting different audiences. A stronger indication of disjunction 
between the Gospel message and its media comes from the biblical description of Pentecost. In 
Acts 2:1-12, the biblical narrative describes the Spirit of God came as “tongues of fire that 
separated” and “rest[ed] on each of them”, that “all of them were filled with the Holy Spirit and 
began to speak in other tongues as the Spirit enabled them” (Acts 2:3-4). The plural form of 
tongues signifies a built-in diversity of the revelatory message. The author of Acts also recited all 
native languages that were present at the scene. It is obvious that the revelatory message was 
given to all nations, and can be translated into all languages. No linguistic or cultural group has 
monopoly over the Pentecostal message.  The Pentecostal manner of revelation presupposes a rift 
between the media and the message. The adaptability of the Gospel message has been proven in 
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its expansion from Jerusalem, to all Judea, and Samaria, and ultimately to the ends of the earth 
(Acts 1:8). Vigorous missionary enterprises in China in the 1920s and 1930s can be regarded as 
another chapter that follows the Pentecostal spirit. When taken faithfully and seriously, the 
Pentecostal spirit requires the message bearer to take seriously the linguistic and symbol system 
of the recipient culture. This divine urge was reinforced in Peter’s vision in the tenth chapter of 
the book of Acts, when Peter was instructed by the divine voice to “kill and eat... all kinds of 
four-footed animals, as well as reptiles of the earth and birds of the air”, most of which were 
considered impure or unclean in the eyes of an orthodox Jew (Acts 10:9-16). The divine voice 
addressed Peter’s concern of doctrinal purity by a repetitive affirmation: “Do not call anything 
impure that God has made clean” (Acts. 10:14-15). This divine assurance should also put to rest 
all kinds of conservative phobia about religious syncretism. The Gospel message can and should 
be expressed by means of all kinds of “pagan” languages and symbols. Those conservative 
missionaries followed the Great Commission by volunteering themselves to the mission field in 
China, yet they failed to follow the Pentecostal spirit. It is not surprising that, as Yao concludes, 
the fundamentalist foreign missionaries exerted far less impressive influences on China’s cultural 
and social transformation than their modernist counterparts.
31
 
 The Pentecostal spirit opens up a new relational paradigm between the message and the 
media. In this model, divine revelation broke away from close affinity with one single language 
by scattering itself pervasively among a variety of ethnic languages. We may interpret this 
revelatory model in the following lines. First, in the post-resurrection era, all cultural and 
linguistic groups have equal and direct access to the salvific message. Second, it implies a divine 
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urge to push the divine revelatory message into all kinds of cultural and linguistic groups by 
employing indigenous resources. Third, the unique character of each individual culture should be 
respected and preserved without the necessity of conforming to any one particular type. In other 
words, theology in the post-resurrection era should go beyond parroting and translation, and 
venture into creative adaptation. The fear of syncretism, the haunting phobia of conservative and 
fundamental churches, should be dismissed as unnecessary according to the Pentecostal 
paradigm.  The Pentecostal message was not given in Hebrew. Neither was it given in Aramaic, 
the language Jesus spoke, nor Greek as the lingua franca of that time. Rather, the divine message 
was delivered through the Galileans to all God-fearing Jews “from every nation under heaven” 
(Acts 2:5b), to the point that “each one heard them speaking in his own language” (Acts 2:6b). 
There was no way for these “unschooled, ordinary” Galileans (Acts 4:13) to learn so many 
dialects “from every nation under heaven”. The only possible explanation is that those believing 
Galileans stand for the emerging church, to whom was entrusted the mission of spreading the 
Gospel message in the tongues of the recipient groups. Hence, the fear of syncretism should not 
block the implied mandate of employing indigenous cultural and linguistic symbols in 
missionary endeavors.  
 Do cultural and linguistic symbols serve only an instrumental role as temporally 
convenient before the advent of the heavenly reality? Or will they persist in existence as 
indispensible ingredients of the new era? Conservatives and fundamentalists devoted themselves 
wholeheartedly to their mission of saving souls, which indicates their faith in the existence of a 
soul that is abstract and atemporal. Within this scenario, souls are considered both equal and of 
tremendous eternal value. However, when purged from ethnicity, language and other existential 
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details, what is left of this abstract, supernatural soul? Will the souls in a new era be able to 
distinguish themselves? If not, then how can the conservative version of salvation be 
distinguished from the Neo-platonic idea of the individual soul’s returning to the cosmic 
universal soul like a drop of water going back to the sea?
32
 
 Whether such a message can be conveyed without mediation is a question as perennial as 
that of the relationship between soul and body. If we believe in the human being as the integrated 
wholeness of body and soul,
33
 then we may argue for the indispensable nature of medium in any 
revelation or communication. Within the phenomenal realm, it is unimaginable for any message 
to exist or to be transmitted without involving any medium. Furthermore, it is almost without 
exception that the message is shaped by the medium. In other words, medium penetrates the core 
of message. In the hypostatical union of Christology, the physical body of Christ had 
unprecedentedly been elevated to the divine ousia, which implies an elimination of the 
distinction between medium and message. Medium, since then, acquired immortal and eternal 
attributes in Christian theology. Conservative Protestantism, if scrutinized through this lens, is 
susceptible to a docetistic inclination. The general tendency is to bypass media as much as 
possible, and to have direct access to the essence. Natural theology, on the contrary, recognizes 
the value of media as indispensible to the essence. It is through the media, rather than by 
avoiding them, that essence is to be conveyed and perceived. The Pentecostal paradigm affirms 
this model. Those then available vernaculars are the media by which the Gospel was carried. All 
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vernaculars at Pentecost had direct access to the Gospel. If language is to be interpreted as 
human creation, then the divine message didn’t obliterate these man-made media, but 
consecrated them as indispensible media that carry the divine message. The inclusive tone of the 
Pentecostal event suggests that this principle should apply to all languages that encounter the 
Gospel message at a later time. Each cultural and linguistic system comes with particular motifs 
that may help to unfold some particular aspect of the divine message. If, as we discussed, the 
particularities of the media bear significance also in the nominal realm, then divine salvation has 
a built-in multiplicity at its core. The spirit of Pentecost, hence, meets the culture where it is, and 
addresses its specific concerns. That particular culture, in response, brings out certain aspects of 
the divine message with the particularity of its mediation. Not only cultural and linguistic 
systems as human creations are indispensible media that will leave their traits in the new era, 
nature as the first creation, too, will make its way into eternity.  
 In conclusion, the linguistic and symbolic systems of Chinese culture can partake in the 
Pentecostal spirit as indispensible particular media, so as to unfold some particular dimension of 
the divine message. The Chinese culture from which I have emphasized classical and neo 
Confucian traditions, is extremely diverse. The infinite dimensions of the multiplicity of the 
Gospel message do not stop at the fourth account. Instead, there is always a “Fifth Gospel”, 
which is reserved as the authentic expression of any particular semiotic system. This project 
attempts to work out a Confucian version of the “Fifth Gospel”. Due to the enormously rich 
resources of its natural and cultural symbols, this Confucian account of the divine message is 
configured with a special thrust on natural theology.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION 
 
Introduction 
 
From an axiological perspective, what lies at the center of spirituality is value 
transactions between the individual equilibrium, the society and the natural environment. Values 
are apprehended first as aesthetic stimulations during the equilibrium’s direct interaction with 
nature. Once values are encapsulated in semiosis and enter semiotic circulation, their power 
increases dramatically. When values appear at the horizon of the equilibrium, they move towards 
the core of the equilibrium by means of repetitive practice, which result first in habit, and then as 
disposition. Furthermore, humans as social and semiotic beings are always driven by the impulse 
of codifying values in rituals and ethos, which serves as the given environment for the 
generations to come. The axiological cycle starts from aesthetic encounter with natural entities, 
is followed by being empowered with semiosis in the realm of ethics, and then distills itself 
either as characters of individual equilibrium or normative patterns for a given society. 
It might be necessary to give some explanatory notes on the concept of human 
equilibrium. The innate Human valuational core depicted as equilibrium has its origin in the 
classic Confucian text of Chung Yung, in which the equilibrium was rendered as the “center”:  
Pleasure and anger, sorrow and joy: 
before they emerge they are called centered; 
emerging by the proper rhythms they are called harmonious. 
Centered: this is the great root of the world. 
Harmonious: this is the ultimate Dao of the world. 
Reaching centered harmony, heaven and earth take their proper  
places and the things of the world are nurtured thereby.
1
 
 
                                                 
1
 Translated by Robert Eno, Indiana University, Early Chinese Thought [B/E/P374] Fall 2010 
http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Doctrine_of_the_Mean.pdf 
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The above text indicates that, according to Chung Yung, the human center is expected to 
respond to surrounding stimulations with harmonious sensory patterns, even though it takes 
tremendous efforts for the center to accomplish harmony. The best modern explanation on the 
equilibrium, however, was found in Dewey’s Experience and Nature. According to Dewey, the 
fallacy of Greek science “… lay not in assigning qualities to natural existence, but in 
misconceiving the locus of their efficacy. It attributed to qualities apart from organic action 
efficiencies which activity of life and mind.”1 Here, what Dewey meant by “life and mind” can 
be perceived as a complex and active organism that is susceptible to selective interactions with 
surrounding environment. It displays the quality of equilibrium in the sense that it seeks 
saturation of needs or desires through balance and responsive judgment. With an emphasis on the 
constant interactions between the subject and the surrounding objects, Dewey’s concept of 
equilibrium breaks the Cartesian dualism of body and mind.
2
 As a foundational anthropological 
model, the concept of equilibrium will be gradually unfolded in the coming sections of this 
project.  
Beyond the definition which I proposed in the above paragraph, spirituality in 
Christianity also assumes a supernatural dimension. This supernatural dimension unfolds itself in 
three aspects. The first and most direct aspect is about the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. 
Functioning as divine counselor, the Spirit works within, or alongside, the equilibrium, so as to 
provide guidance, to re-adjust the direction, or to inculcate divine characters into individual 
equilibrium. This falls within the realm of Pneumatology in traditional Christian theology. The 
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 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Dover Publications, Inc.: New York, 1958), 265. 
  
2
 Ibid. 252.  
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second aspect of spirituality is unique in Christianity. It concerns Christology, or more 
specifically, the model of Jesus Christ that sets normative standards for both divinity and 
humanity. At this level, the sages and saints produced in Chinese history functioned similarly, 
only that Jesus Christ had irreducible distinctive features that, once empowered, may lead to 
renovative, or even revolutionary, effects to the traditional paths of spirituality. The third aspect 
is to re-envision the naturalistic perceptions of traditional Chinese culture in light of cosmogony, 
or the Christian doctrine of creation. Natural entities, thus, exist not merely as sources of 
aesthetic appreciation, but can also be rendered as symbols and icons that lead to the supernatural 
realm of the Creator. I am aware of the fact that these supernatural constructions might not be 
convincing for all readers. Yet for the targeted communities of Chinese Christian churches and 
their members, the supernatural resources provided by Christian faith cannot be neglected. If 
implemented properly, these supernatural resources may push traditional Chinese spirituality to a 
new level.  
Given the above, I would like to propose a working hypothesis of spirituality, which 
includes a cluster of topics, so as to engage various authors of contemporary academia with a 
focus on value transaction in traditional Chinese culture. Here is my hypothesis: Human 
spirituality can be boiled down to value transactions when the equilibrium, semiotic of its nature, 
engages and interacts with nature and its entities on an aesthetic level, with other equilibriums on 
ethical and social levels, and with the Ultimate on a spiritual level. This process is to be 
understood in as dynamic, in the sense that value transactions on various levels feed each other 
in a delicate and systematic fashion. Any bit of value transaction may bear consequences to 
various connections on the axiological web, and thus brings changes to the whole system. The 
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process should also be understood in a cyclic fashion, in the sense that ideally the value 
transaction initiates at the aesthetic level, reaches the ethical and social level with semiosis, and 
then pushes further into spiritual level, and then starts a new cycle. Yet in real existential 
occasions, value transactions can be initiated at any level, with complicated ripple effects to the 
whole system. The end results will be human equilibriums with refined taste after values being 
put into repetitively habitual practice, and an emerging cosmos with experiencing equilibrium as 
the instantiation center.  
The above hypothesis presupposes a universe laden with values that are susceptible to 
apprehension, a semiotic model of anthropology with feelings as its basic component, an 
interpretative community consisting of equilibriums that dynamically interact with each other, 
and some version of the Ultimate as the creative source of values. With these four working 
categories in mind, I hereby conduct a survey of the literature of contemporary scholars on 
Chinese philosophical traditions and spirituality. Some explanatory notes might be necessary for 
the interpretative community which serves as the existential matrix within which the 
equilibriums are molded. Any culture, no matter how primitive it might be, has customs and 
rituals that attune the emerging equilibrium with some default tastes before purposeful 
transformation even starts.  
1. Value-laden Universe and Cosmology 
 
Under the above-stated primary hypothesis, I would like to propose a series of sub-
hypotheses, of which the first one is about nature and its myriad entities being infinite sources of 
values that can be apprehended by feelings of the human equilibrium. Every single natural entity 
contains infinite facets with which human feelings may engage. Various facets of natural entities 
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make up occasions that can be harmonized for value production. The axiological spirituality that 
is advocated by this project affirms nature and its entities as sources and criteria of value making 
and traction processes. Every value needs to root concretely on a natural basis to safeguard its 
truthfulness, no matter how subtle and twisted some values may be in light of their natural basis. 
This axiological cosmos may serve as a remedy to sterilization of meaning and value in a 
scientifically interpreted cosmos which has been dominant ever since the Enlightenment. The 
correlative anthropological model depicts human beings as equilibriums that are susceptible to 
value stimulations, whether aesthetical, ethical or spiritual. 
Daoist Appreciation of Nature 
Under the guidance of such premises, contemporary scholars that displayed most 
deferential attitudes towards nature are not the New Confucianists, but the Daoist who represent 
Chinese intellectuals’ connection with nature. If Confucianists were believed to center on 
humanistic and social spheres, the quintessential focus of Daoism is unmistakably nature. All 
Daoist works display a profound appreciation of nature and its entities. Two prominent 
contemporary scholars who embody the Daoist spirit are Chang Chung-yuan and Wu Kuang-
ming. In Creativity and Taoism, Chang Chung-yuan illustrat Taoists’ immersion into nature with 
an art piece by Huang Kung-wang (1269-1354), the most famous artist in Yuan Dynasty: 
 [Huang] used to wander for days in the depth of the mountain, watching the play of light 
and shadow on the cliffs and peaks mornings and evenings. Sometimes he meditated in 
the deep bamboo grove and sometimes by the side of the roaring waves of the sea. 
Having penetrated into the nature of things he was able to bring out their spiritual reality 
in his brush-work.
3
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 Chang Chung-yuan, Creativity and Taosim, A Study of Chinese Philosophy, Art and Poetry (The Julian 
Press, Inc., New York), Introduction.  
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Daoists’ infatuation with nature does not seek explicit expression with verbal symbols. 
Rather, they prefer to express their version of ecstatic naturalism with poems and art works. 
Chang selected a piece of art work by Shi Tao (1641- c. 1717), featured with an explanatory 
colophon by the author: “Art work is comparable to Chan Buddhism. The master does not quest 
for conscious explanation. Bare essentials of the firstness are enough, whereas secondness is 
unnecessary.”4 Here, the notions of “firstness” and “secondness” resonate with the Peircean 
epistemology, only that Shi Tao deliberately constraints feelings from being expressed further 
with semiotics for fear of twisting and reducing those feelings. This is very typical of Taoist 
appreciation of nature as tranquil unity between the subject and the object, which made verbal 
expressions seem to be noisily redundant. Chang Chung-yuan also selected four pieces of 
bamboo pictures by various artists. Bamboo being a favorite theme of these Taoist artists 
conveys effectively their subjective ideality. As in contrast to the Neo-Confucianist Wang Yang-
ming’s futile and unpleasant practice of investigating the bamboo,5 we may provisionally 
conclude that while the Taoists are more concerned with expressing aesthetic inspiration with a 
primordial form of art work, the Confucianists, with their social concerns, tend to articulate 
aesthetic inspiration with signs and symbols. Furthermore, the Taoists seem to have 
accomplished deeper aesthetic appreciation of nature than that of the Confucianists.  
Chang advocated an intuitive, immediate interfusion with nature where words are 
dissolved as of no use (1963, 19-20). Unlike the Confucian notion of sympathy which creates 
differentiation of superiority and inferiority, the Daoist notion of sympathy as an ontological 
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Chang Chung-yuan, Creativity and Taosim. Introduction, plate 5, Shih t’ao, Trees and Rock Bank. The 
colophon reads as “論畫者如論禪相似, 貴不存知解, 入第一義方為高手, 否則即入第二義矣…”  
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experience synthesizes subject with object, one with many, human being with universe (1963, 
21). It even goes beyond myriad natural existences and reaches the Daoist essence of 
nondifferentiation (1963, 51) by penetrating into the realm of nonbeing (1963, 49). Dao thus 
described is equivalent to the Whiteheadian notion of a primordial source of creativity (1963, 
55). Noticeably, both Chang Chung-yuan and Wu Kuang-ming employed Zhuang Zi’s butterfly 
metaphor to illustrate the notion of nondifferentiation (Chang, 1963 20; Wu 1990, 4). The Daoist 
way of self-cultivation involves a return to the basic, foundational origin from which all entities 
emerged, in which differentiation is unnecessary. Stark philosophical topics such as subject and 
object, life and death, are all dissolved in the primordial Dao of creativity. This is how Wu 
interpreted Zhuang Zi’s metaphorical story of dreaming butterfly and talking with a roadside 
skull (Wu, 1990, 4-5). Both Chang and Wu quoted Tao Qian’s (陶潜) (372-427 A.D.) poem on 
“Enjoying Wine” as an example of an imaginative ideal in which nature and human beings are 
mutually penetrating, and the meanings are actualized in an ineffable way (Chang 1963, 19-20; 
Wu 1990, 364-365).
6
 Juxtaposing with, immersing in, or being identified with nature became 
standard methology in Chinese poetic literature. Bursting out from a naturalistic ontology, many 
classic Chinese literary works displayed profound appreciation of nature that is almost 
unparalleled in its height and depth. This theme will be picked up in the third section of this 
project as a channel through which values in nature are transferred and integrated into human 
equilibrium, though this project focuses primarily on the Confucian and Neo-Confucian 
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 陶潜《饮酒》：I gather chrysanthemums at the eastern hedgerow; And silently gaze at the southern 
mountains. The mountain air is beautiful in the sunset; and the birds flocking together return home. Among all these 
things is a real meaning, Yet when I try to express it, I become lost in “no-word.” (translated by Chang Chung-yuan, 
1963), 19. 
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tradition, in which the paradigmatic expression of naturalistic sensitivity is to be found in Zhang 
Zai’s (1020-1077) West Inscription. (Chan 1969, 497-500; Chang 1963, 63-65).  
Daoist silent appreciation of artistic beauty of nature was captured by Thomas Fang 
(1899-1977), whom I consider the greatest philosopher in modern China. Fang studied 
philosophy at the University of Wisconsin in 1920s. He was able to integrate Bergson’s intuitive 
life philosophy and Whitehead’s process theory with his persistent fascination with traditional 
Chinese philosophy. He managed to discover the common ground between the West and the East 
in a dynamic axiological cosmology that envisions a value-laden universe, with which human 
beings may achieve ecstatic unity in aesthetics and morality.
7
 The more I strive to appreciate 
traditional Chinese philosophy, the more common ideals I found myself sharing with Thomas 
Fang. Fang will hence be engaged as one of the major dialogue partners in the discussion of 
axiological understanding of traditional Chinese cosmology. 
Nature and Confucian Spirituality 
As a great contemporary sinologist, William Theodore de Bary devoted most of his 
attention to a micro-psychological study of the Confucian and Neo-Confucian model of 
anthropology.
8
 His detailed analysis of the intricate inner components of the individual 
heart/mind appears to be commensurable to the feeling/emotion model of anthropology adopted 
by the current project. Yet I deliberately refrain from extensive dialogue with de Bary due to the 
consideration that the major loci of this project anchors on dimensions that are different from 
those of de Bary, such as nature, community and behavior theories.  
                                                 
7
 Thomas Fang, The Chinese View of Life (The Union Press, Hong Kong, 1956), 65-71.  
 
8
 For instance, these two works offer good taste on de Bary’s scholarship: The Message of the Mind in Neo-
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New York, 1991). 
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  Among contemporary New-Confucianists, Tu Wei-ming represents a leading figure that 
carries the orthodoxy tradition of the Si-Meng School (思孟学派). Tu devoted a significant 
portion of his literature specifically to the topic of spirituality, or, using his own term, “self-
cultivation”. He edited a two-volume series entitled Confucian Spirituality with Mary Evelyn 
Tucker, in which they launched a forceful argument that claims Confucianism as a prestigious 
world religion vibrantly alive in the later 20
th
 century. According to Tu and Tucker, what 
distinguishes Confucian spirituality among the world’s religious traditions is its world-affirming 
orientation for humanity. Confucianism is not a tradition that seeks liberation outside the worldly 
mundane life; rather it affirms worldly undertakings as a concrete path of spirituality that makes 
us more fully human within the world (Tu & Tucker 2003, introduction). Tu refers to this as 
“immanent transcendence”, which, according to him, is the unique Confucian way of 
overcoming the existential alienation of human beings (Tu, 1989, 97). Immanent transcendence 
as a spiritual path, in Tu’s theoretic structure, presupposes an affinitive relationship between 
humanity and the Confucian version of the Ultimate, be it Tian (天), Dao (道) or Taiji/Wuji (太
极/无极). This is exactly the foundation Tu intends to lay down for his theoretic construction. Tu 
followed Mencius in affirming the original goodness of human nature that finds expression in 
five cardinal virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, intelligence and faithfulness. 
Chung Yung as the core text of Tu’s academic endeavor, confirms the affinity between heaven 
and humanity in its very first sentence (Tu, 1989, chapter 4). In Humanity and Self Cultivation 
(1979) and in Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (1985), Tu emphasizes 
the creative capacity of Ren (humanity, goodness, or love) as the creative source of self-
cultivation. From the very beginning of his academic career, Tu has been continuously following 
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Wang Yang-ming, the famous Ming Neo-Confucianist, in the direction of turning inward so as to 
recover the heavenly principle with which humanity is endowed (1976, 141; 1989, 69, 77; 1978, 
80-81, 140-141).  
Tu’s view on immanent transcendence as the path of self cultivation establishes a direct 
and immediate connection between humanity and the Ultimate. From the standpoint of the above 
stated sub-hypothesis, this path appears to be both mystical and reductive. It is mythical in the 
sense that the affinity between humanity and heaven is given as a presupposition that needs no 
further explanation. It is also characterized by an overly optimistic view on human nature. 
According to Tu’s ontological scheme, humanity has never fallen into a kind of depravity that 
alienates itself irremediably from its ontological ground. Several significant implications are 
ushered in when Tu’s theory of self-cultivation is set abreast with some doctrines that are 
accepted by major Christian denominations. Both Confucianism and Christianity assert some 
kind of alienation between humanity and the Ultimate, only that the kind of alienation proposed 
by Confucianism is not that critical and can be overcome by mobilizing the resources within 
human sphere, whereas in Christianity the damage is too severe to be remedied without the 
external intervention of divine grace. Tu’s scheme of intimate affinity between humanity and the 
Ultimate also made his method of self-cultivation to be capable of bypassing nature and its 
myriad entities. Such a scheme does not require strenuous engagement with natural entities as 
symbols that lead to reality in piecemeal fashion. It relies too much on the intuitive function of 
human nature, namely, the liang-zhi (good conscious, 良知), on which Tu and Wang Yang-ming 
agree. The Tu-Wang path works well even if the whole world is eliminated. It is hence, 
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reductive, and needs to be corrected with aesthetic and semiotic theories that take natural world 
more seriously. 
  Tu’s approach, representative as it is, is by no means exhaustive in contemporary 
scholarship on Confucianism. Cheng Chung-ying, a student of Thomas Fang, another leading 
Confucianist, exhibits a more receptive attitude towards Daoist romantic naturalism. Nature and 
its entities are much more seriously engaged, and human experience in this world is irreducible 
in Cheng’s works. According to Cheng, “… a human being experiencing and thinking of the 
world and the world being experienced and thought of by a human being constitute real 
processes and natural relationships that function as rationales for being real and natural.
9
 
Moreover, Cheng over the years has demonstrated persistent fascination with Yijing, the Book of 
Change, and published more than ten related articles in the journals for which he serves as chief 
editor.
10
 Yijing, as I believe, embodies a system of symbols that feature the Chinese culture’s 
primordial engagement with nature. Its function in Chinese culture is comparable to that of the 
book of Genesis in Judaism. Pertaining to the sub-hypothesis we proposed at the beginning of 
this section, Yijing epitomized an axiological cosmology of ancient Chinese understanding of the 
universe as quarry fields abundant in values that can be encapsulated with signs and symbols. 
Due to Cheng’s serious engagement with nature and his acquaintance with Peircean semiotics11, 
I will engage him as dialogue partner in the third section on the topics of Investigation of Things 
and Semiosis Formulation.  
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 Cheng Chung-ying, New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosphy (New York: SUNY 
Press, 1991) 2.  
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 Cheng’s articles on Yijing cluster especially in two of the journal volumes: Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy, volume 36 (2009), and its supplement published in the same year.  
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 Cheng’s doctoral thesis was on Dai Cheng and Charles S. Peirce: Tai Chen’s Inquiry into Goodness: A 
Translation of the Yuan Shan, with an Introductory Essay (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1971).  
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2. Semiosis, Community and Ritual 
 
Semiosis 
 
As I have pointed out in the previous section, Daoist deep aesthetic appreciation of the 
nature yields fruits in poetry, music, fine arts and other artistic expressions of values that are 
apprehended from obsessive immersion into nature which oftentimes leads to ecstatic unions. 
While Daoists tend to appreciate nature in the form of ineffable nondifferentiated quietude, 
Confucianists undoubtedly share the same appreciation of natural values, yet managed to express 
them in effable ways. It appears that in the Chinese tradition, Confucianists contributed more in 
the areas of semiosis, social engineering and ritual formulation. The second sub-hypothesis that I 
am about to propose involves the realm of ethics. The unique qualification of the term ethics in 
this project stands between the aesthetics and the spiritual. It covers a wide scope of topics. Once 
natural values are appreciated and encapsulated by semiosis, such as pictographies, hieroglyphics 
or ideographies, they enter the realm of ethics. Humans are by nature semiotic social beings. 
Semiosis is the condition of our existence, both internally and externally. This semiotic nature 
finds fullest expression in Confucianism in the Chinese context. Once embodied by semiosis and 
entered in the semiotic market, values assume dramatic portability, flexibility and adaptability, in 
the same way monetary currencies function in a financial market, which enable them to be 
carried afar geographically and handed down subsequently into the future almost in an infinite 
fashion, though, in many occasions, vulnerable to abuse or misuse. Ethics thus defined requires a 
community, within which values get semioticized, transferred, interpreted and apprehended. This 
semiotic community extends and shrinks along with the vicissitudes of the civilization it carries. 
Some semiotic communities, such as that of the Canaanites, died along the course of history, 
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with only limited elements being apprehended and carried down by other semiotic communities. 
Within these semiotic communities, certain values are highlighted as desirable and purposefully 
encouraged, and from these values, certain behavior patterns are socially engineered. These 
behavior patterns coalesce gradually in the form of ethos, customs and rituals. When the semiotic 
community develops to a certain stage, ethics displaces aesthetics as the dominant form of value 
transaction. Ethics in the first place may appear to be dependent upon aesthetics. Yet we cannot 
categorize it as merely second-hand. Ethics is, by itself, infinite for two reasons. The first reason 
is that ethics continuously draws inspiration from aesthetics, which links it indirectly to nature as 
the creative source of value. The second reason is that ethics ties itself closely to human 
equilibriums, which themselves make sources of creativity. Most Daoists prefer ineffable 
aesthetic union to explicit semiotic expressions. Even their texts sever supplementary functions 
from aesthetic appreciation. Most Confucianists, on the contrary, are inclined to follow semiotic 
nature by participating in and contributing to the semiotic community.  
The above descriptive definition of ethics can be boiled down to three categories, namely, 
the semiotic rendition, the interpretive community, and the rituals. With these three basic criteria, 
we will conduct a brief survey of relevant contemporary academic works. By semiotic rendition, 
I mean the intellectual inclination of construing values with explicit and definitive semiotic 
expressions. Interpretive community as a criterion examines what kind of role the community 
plays in the paths delineated by various scholars. I will also try to assess the role and function of 
ritual in some of the contemporary scholarly works.  
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Community 
 
Among all contemporary Confucian scholars, Tu Wei-ming stands out as the one who 
places significant emphasis on community as the incubator of self cultivation. Tu proposed the 
concept of fiduciary community as the social context that cultivates the profound person (Tu, 
1989, 40-41). As a follower of orthodox Confucianism, Tu identifies the concept of “filial piety” 
(xiao 孝) as the fundamental value around which the fiduciary community is established and 
organized (48). According to Tu, the book of Chung Yung exemplifies the notion of filial piety 
through various sage figures in ancient China (44-46). Fulfilling one’s filial piety with sincerity 
leads to the innate good nature endowed from Heaven, from which other virtues flow (54-55).  
Tu’s keen observation leads to an insightful deduction that many ritual arrangements of the 
fiduciary community were designed as sincere expressions of these universal virtues. Bit by bit, 
ritual ceremonies multiply around these virtue concepts, and thus gradually evolve into a whole 
system of established rituals of the fiduciary community. Tu, however, did not offer any 
convincing explanation of the abrupt jump from a nepotistic community to a political community 
which is of much broader scale. In addition, it is highly doubtful whether a hierarchical model 
based on filial piety can be applicable to the relationships with contemporary democratic civil 
society. Another sharp critique on Tu is that he omitted rituals of social function which curb and 
contain the selfish, depraved and destructive nature of the human being, and save the society 
from sliding into war and chaos.  
Ritual 
Compared with Tu’s Si-Meng tradition, Xun Zi offered more insightful and sensible 
explanations on the origin and function of ritual. With reference to Tu Wei-ming at Harvard, 
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Neville and his colleagues at Boston University represent another branch of Boston 
Confucianism, which unfolds their scholarly interest more along the line of Xun Zi. As Neville 
illustrates, Xun Zi considered it impossible to achieve individual perfection or social harmony 
without the help of ritual (Neville, 2008, 29). Neville adopts a much broader definition of ritual 
than that of Tu Wei-ming. According to Neville, the scope of ritual includes “the highest sense of 
morality, duty, and social order as well as the most minor rules of good manners, the minutiae of 
polite forms, and insignificant… details of costume and dress” (28). More importantly, Neville’s 
definition of ritual covers also “… semiotically coded signs such as language and gesture, sign-
shaped behavior the very exercise of which constitutes social institutions, manners regarding the 
playing of socially defined roles, the cultivations of personal relationship, and the practices of 
etiquette, and then explicit ceremonies themselves” (28). Such a semiotically orientated 
definition fits squarely with the central theme of this project. Neville will thus be engaged as 
dialogue partner regarding ritual as the path of spiritual cultivation in the third section of this 
project.  
David Hall and Roger Ames, under the rubric of their signature argument of an 
“immanental cosmos”, offered some insights pertinent to the proposed sub-hypothesis. With 
theoretic tools borrowed from Existentialism and Pragmatism, they claimed that the emerging of 
the Confucian self is related to the self-conscious appropriation of the world of experience of 
which the major content is not transcend objective knowledge, but is rife with representative 
expressions of human community (Hall and Ames, 1987, 73). Even though their dominant 
orientation concerns self-conscious individuality, they do argue forcefully for the social nature of 
Confucian self (76). Following Dewey, they admit, “Language, discourse as a ‘social habit,’ is 
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one of the natural events that originate thoughts and feelings. The emergence of linguistic 
communication significantly challenges any denial to human beings the authorship of 
experience.” (Dewey, 1958, 13; Ames and Hall, 1987, 77) These statements support the thesis of 
the current project that views spirituality as value integration into the human core by means of 
repetitive ritual habits within the context of a semiotic community. It is noteworthy that Hall and 
Ames point out the phonic connection between Li (Ritual 禮) and Li (to tread a path 履), 
emphasizing the necessity of enacting and embodying the cultural tradition that is captured in 
ritual action (Hall and Ames, 1987, 87). In addition, as Peter Boodberg observes, Li (Ritual 禮) 
and Ti (體 body) are the only two common Chinese characters that share the Li (豊),12 which is 
the Chinese character for “ritual vase”. These scriptural and phonic connections evidently point 
to the interpretation of human beings as vessels carved and shaped in ritual context (Fingarette, 
1972, 71ff), as well as ritual as semiotic meaning-carrying vessels that await physical 
embodiment—a theme be picked up in next section on action.  
Not too many modern scholars take the Confucian concept of ritual seriously. Most of 
them interpret classical Confucian texts in a secular, humanistic and rationalistic way (Waley, 
1938, 32-33; Leslie, 1961, 40-41; Chan, 1963, 15; H.G. Creel, 1960, 120; Liu, 1955, 154-156). 
Herbert Fingarette is the one who caught the spirit of Confucian rituals by revealing its magic 
and holy power. According to Fingarette, it is possible for a “… specific person to accomplish 
his will directly and effortlessly through ritual, gesture and incantation” (Fingarette, 1972, 3). 
Fingarette cut apart the essence of Li as “… the specifically humanizing form of the dynamic 
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relation of man-to-man” (7). Fingarette’s genuine insight is also displayed in the assertion that 
some of the linguistic ritual talk is to be understood as “performative utterance” (Austin, 1961, 
220-239; Fingarette, 1972, 11; Goldin, 1999, 55-56). It was Fingarette who helped to overcome 
decisively the Western readers’ contemptuous attitude towards Confucian Ritual by pushing it 
back into the core of human ethical nature. Suddenly, the Confucian emphasis on ritual became 
intelligible to Western world as philosophically significant beyond mere spiritless formulaic 
expressions. Neville picked up the theme of Fingarette, and drove home the semiotic 
implications of Confucian ritual. According to Neville, Fingarette drew upon notions associated 
with John Searle to show how ritual is a performative act. The significance of Fingarette’s thesis 
is that it showed that the Confucian notion of ritual makes social relations possible and is the 
medium of ethics. Fingarette is respected by Neville as “perhaps the most effective bridging 
philosopher so far” (Neville, 2000, 45). 
3. Action, Habit, and Character 
 
The current project proposes mainly four main value transference and integration 
channels in spirituality. The first channel consists of aesthetic appreciation, which covers both 
the Daoist tendency of ineffable, nondifferentiating appreciation of the nature in ecstatic union, 
and the Confucian tendency of explicit articulation usually known as “rectifying the name”. The 
second channel consists of ethical components, and is continuous with the first as it expresses 
natural values through semiotic processing, which usually results in signs, symbols and rituals 
within certain social contexts. The third channel focuses on a specific aspect of the ethics: the 
assimilation and integration of the external values into the human core through action. The 
argument is that repetitive behaviors, either consciously or unconsciously, will give birth to 
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habit, and multiple habits will synergize into character traits that become second nature. These 
character traits can be concretized in a physical form, so as to be handed down through media 
such as ritual, cultural or even biological means. The fourth channel concerns the supernatural, 
the concept of the Ultimate, and the envisioning of the ideal world. This aspect is not only for the 
primitive, religious orientated tribes, it is also of indisputable importance for the secular, 
agonistic, or even atheistic culture, except that they assume more generic forms such as what 
Tillich called “Ultimate concerns”, or what is known as “questing for meaning” in more popular 
terminology. The concept of the Ultimate is how people make sense of the world, the 
environment, and their own lives. The academic review in this section focuses on the third 
channel value transaction and integration, which consists of repetitive behaviors, habits and 
their resulting character traits.   
Quite a few contemporary scholars devote themselves to the study of Wang Yang-ming’s 
notion of the unity of knowledge and action. Antonio S. Cua did a brilliant interpretation of 
Wang Yang-ming’s moral psychology. He attempted to illustrate Wang’s moral philosophy by 
means of aesthetic and psychological analogy (Cua, 1982, 9). According to Cua, the 
epistemological structure of aesthetic appreciation and psychological understanding presupposes 
the enmeshing and inseparability of knowledge and action (13). In reference to action, moral 
knowledge can be divided as prospective and retrospective (Cua, 1978, 4; 1982, 15). Anyone 
with Augustinian or Calvinistic trainings will become suspicious about Cua and Wang’s 
approach because the issue of sin and human depravity was not taken seriously enough; and 
surely it was not sufficiently treated. Both Cua and Wang, along with most of the Si-Meng 
scholars, project a version of human nature that is dominated by goodness. Evil is defined merely 
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as aesthetic blindness or the self impulses (私欲) that block the moral action. The volitional 
portion of man according to Cua and Wang was never ruined by sin. Overcoming evil was 
depicted as some tasks that can be easily accomplished by the “active power” of the will (Cua, 
1982, 22), or as he put in a more theoretical way, “… the notion of moral knowledge that 
contains within itself an intrinsic feature of actuation” (Cua, 1978, 29). In other words, the power 
of moral actuation comes intrinsically from the moral agent. This feature groups Cua, Tu and 
other contemporary scholars as members of the New Lu-Wang School (新陆王心学). 
Spirituality under the framework of such an anthropological model involves only an awakening 
from the illusions of self impulses, retrieving the innate good conscious (致良知), and then 
accomplishing virtue in action. In contrast, I adopt the Xun Zian anthropological model which 
assumes a human nature that’s closer to Augustine and Calvin. Spirituality under the Augustinian 
and Calvinistic anthropological model is a much more strenuous a task that requires constant and 
persistent efforts of practice with repetitive actions, which lead to habit, and then to character as 
second nature. Pertinent discussions were carried out in Aaron Stalnaker’s work on a 
comparative study on Augustine and Xun Zi.
13 
 
Tu Wei-ming argued with his teacher Mou Zongsan that the Confucian orthodox Si-
Meng tradition was carried down not through Zhu Xi, but by Wang Yang-ming.
14
 In fact, Tu 
himself has been considered as the contemporary representative that carries the historical line of 
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Confucian Religiousness is a commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1989), 
Humanity and Self-cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought, (Boston, MA, Asian Humanities Press 1979), 
Confucian Thought: Self as Creative Transformation (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1985), and Way, learning, 
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Confucian orthodoxy. His professed interest in Mencius and Wang Yang-ming unmistakably 
reveals the Mencius version of anthropology as the basis of Tu’s theoretical construct (Tu, 1989, 
Chapter 4, p.67ff). Tu embarked on a study of Wang Yang-ming’s youth as the starting point of 
his academic career.
15
 In this study, Tu lays the groundwork that shapes the general tone of much 
of his ensuing works. Tu sketches the Confucian endeavor of becoming a sage by means of the 
following paths: 
From the Confucian point of view, the ultimate basis of and actual strength of becoming a 
sage are located in the very nature of man, which is imparted, but not created, by Heaven. 
The path to sagehood is therefore an unceasing process of self-transformation, with the 
existential situation of man here and now as its point of departure. The process is one of 
gradual inclusion, a process that seeks to integrate the structure of the self with that of 
man, with that of nature, and eventually with that of the cosmos… The self becomes truer 
to its original structure when it is ultimately identified with the cosmos, or the great self. 
(Tu 1979, 86-87) 
 
Even though Tu in the proceeding quote did mentioned the union of nature with “the 
great self”, the general structure of Tu’s description of becoming a sage being a self-cultivating 
project displays two different weaknesses. The first weakness is that Tu’s method appears to be 
anthropocentric, or to be more specific, egocentric. The ultimate moral resources come from the 
human self. Without an elaborate semiotic theory, the external natural values are like 
surrounding oceans, yet can provide not the least bit of nutrition to the moral agent who lives in 
their midst. Tu’s vision thus falls into a reductive fallacy that overlooks nature and its myriad 
entities as value sources. Without sufficient importation of external natural values in concrete 
and solid fashion, the so-called innate effort of self-cultivation deteriorates into abortive labors, 
like a clacking machine, running yet without inflow of raw materials, all efforts ending in 
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 Tu Wei-ming, Neo-Confucian Thought in Action: Wang Yang-ming’s Youth (1472-1509), Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976. This was the theme of Tu’s doctoral research when he was at the age of mid-
thirties.  
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futility. The second vulnerable point of Tu’s model comes from his weak version of the 
Ultimate. Tu’s remote, impersonal and nominal version of the Ultimate does not look like a 
dynamic source of transcendent values. Rather it looks more like a sacred canopy that stands 
aloof as a background to the humanistic project of self-cultivation. Moral cosmology of this kind 
does not take seriously enough the created order. Neither does it give sufficient account of the 
power of evil that is rooted deeply and with influence both in the world and in the human being. 
Without sufficient treatment and efficacious remedy of the problem of evil, the validity of a 
proposed spiritual path suffers severe devaluation.  
Philip Ivanhoe devoted a monograph on the study of Wang Yang-ming in a comparative 
narrative alongside Mengzi.
16
 He, too, identified Wang as creative heir of Mencius tradition, 
only through a lens filtered by Buddhism (Ivanhoe, 2002, xvii). Ivanhoe, however, managed to 
distinguish the difference between Wang and Mengzi on the issue of human nature. The major 
difference, according to Ivanhoe, is that Wang believed in an original, pure, and fully formed 
inner nature hidden beneath an impure physical nature (Ivanhoe, 2002, 58), a notion that has 
been infused heavily with Buddhist flavor. Whereas Mengzi conceived a version of human 
nature with nascent moral sprouts that can be brought into fruition under cooperative efforts of 
the human moral agent. As to the way to achieve sagehood, the keyword for Mencius’ path is 
“development”; whereas in Wang’s system, it is “discovery”. Wang’s Buddhist influence is thus 
very obvious. What distinguishes Ivanhoe from other contemporary Confucian scholars is his 
extensive treatment of the nature and origin of “Wickedness”, a topic that seldom receives 
independent attention other than in the Xun Zian line of Confucianism. Just as Christian theology 
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has been constantly puzzled by the lingering issue of theodicy; Confucian moral philosophy, 
with its predilection for the original goodness of human nature, is constantly challenged to offer 
a sensible explanation of the origin of the evil which is so obviously prevalent in existential 
reality. Ivanhoe’s close study of original texts leads to some of the explanations proposed by 
Mencius and Wang Yang-ming. Mengzi employed an agricultural metaphor of heaven’s five-
hundred-years alternative cycles of flourishing and decaying. The ultimate source of evil, 
according to Mengzi, is attributed to the cosmological cycle of nature. Unlike Mencius’ 
cosmological explanation, Wang confined his theory on the origin of evil to the sphere of 
individual psychology. As Wang believed, the innate perfect moral nature became obfuscated 
and tainted when being combined with qi (气, energy power). This degrading movement gives 
rise to both good and bad thoughts. Yet, meanwhile, the good conscious (liang zhil 良知) 
remains intact and hidden in the human substance (Ivanhoe, 2002, 86). Ivanhoe did not offer too 
much insight on action as a method of moral cultivation, other than the process development 
model of bi you shi yan (必有事焉, pay constant attention to the task) that he shares with Mengzi 
and Wang (107-108).   
Julia Ching’s systematic study on Wang Yang-ming amounts to an attempt to see Wang’s 
philosophy as a “way” of acquiring wisdom alternative to the state supported “orthodoxy” of the 
Cheng-Zhu (程朱) norm. Ching pointed out that the notion of “knowledge” in Wang’s doctrine 
is not the knowledge of particular truth, but that of the innate perfect knowledge of xing (性), 
which is one with the Dao, the Tian and the Ultimate. Neither can Wang’s notion of “action” be 
understood as implementations of knowledge for the sake of verification. Rather, Wang’s action 
is to be perceived better along the line of retrospective attempts to rectify the xing (性) within 
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(Ching 1976, 169). According to Ching, only after his enlightenment in 1508, did Wang start to 
advocate the doctrine about the unity of knowledge and action. Moreover, this doctrine 
subordinates itself under other major doctrines such as xin (心) and li (理) are one and the same, 
or the universal capacity for sagehood. The doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action serves 
only as a technical method of rectifying the heart-mind by eliminating the eclipsing effect of 
selfish impulses. Not only does Wang promote the unity of knowledge and action, he also 
exhorts his students to practice sitting in meditation as an alternative way of attaining the original 
principles innate in the heart-mind (本心，良知) (Ching 1976, 52ff). Even though Wang’s 
doctrine on knowledge and action differs strikingly from the view of the current project, Ching’s 
research provides a rich context for further dialogue with Wang. I will embark on a complex 
discussion with Wang’s doctrine in the third section.   
Among the modern scholars, Warren G. Frisina offered a discussion that is most relevant 
to the current project. Frisina’s monograph, the Unity of Knowledge and Action (Frisina, 2002), 
combined resources from Wang Yang-ming, John Dewey, Alfred North Whitehead, along with 
some contemporary scholars such as Charles Taylor, Richard Rorty, Daniel Dennett and Robert 
Neville, to probe the possibility of establishing a nonrepresentational model of knowledge. With 
insights drawn from Neo-Confucianism, American Pragmatism, and Process Philosophy, Frisina 
argues for a thesis that knowledge and action are really one thing (Frisina, 2002, 99). Frisina’s 
contributions will surely be discussed in the third section about action as one of the channels of 
value internalization.  
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4. Spirituality and the Ultimate 
 
Until now, we have reviewed on contemporary scholarships on the first three channels of 
value transaction: the aesthetic, the ethic of semiosis and the ethic of action. We now come to the 
fourth channel-- that of engagement with the Ultimate for the sake of spiritual transformation. It 
is a major topic that runs across almost all major religious and spiritual traditions around the 
world. It also serves as a portal for many comparative studies in religion and sociology. The sub-
hypothesis I would like to propose in relating to this topic is that the concept of the Ultimate 
plays a vital role in all types of spirituality. Humans, as meaning seeking beings, are incurably 
motivated by the desires to stretch towards and engage with some type of Ultimate. Whether by 
divine initiated revelation or by the engineering of mere human imagination, the concept of the 
Ultimate, once it assumes an authoritative position, exercises immense power upon all members 
of the community which it governs, even for the members who engage it negatively. The 
Ultimate is usually identical to the source of creativity, from which values emerge. In the 
Confucian and Neo-Confucian context, the concepts that assume the authoritative position as the 
Ultimate are the Heaven, the Earth and the Dao. In addition to these three concepts, humanity 
also occupies an important position as one of the major sources of creativity. A Trinitarian union 
in the Chinese context consists of Heaven, Earth and Human Being, with Dao as a penetrating 
principle, permeating and flowing among the three.  
The Confucian concept of the Ultimate is characterized by several distinctive features. 
First, the concept of the Ultimate displays an increasing tendency towards an impersonal, 
naturalistic, pantheistic interpretation that is constantly receding into the remote horizon along 
the course of historical development. The resulting effect is that humanity sticks out, and 
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gradually occupies the center of the stage. In other words, the Renaissance-Enlightenment turn 
from divinity to humanity, from the celestial to earthly also happened in Chinese culture only 
that its course of development appears to be much more gradual and smooth, stretching 
throughout the course of Chinese history. Second, when compared with other major religious 
systems such as Judaism, Islam and Christianity, the concept of the Ultimate played a much 
more indirect, supporting role in the process of individual spirituality. Moreover, the Chinese 
concept of the Ultimate does not proactively break into the realm of the human psyche, let alone 
override individual volitional intention. It is completely up to the human self to decide whether 
one intends to pursue the way of sagehood. We may define the Confucian path with a Japanese 
Buddhist term of Jirika, which is a model of spiritual cultivation that relies solely upon self 
effort which contrasts with other major religious paths which contain, to a greater or lesser 
extent, Tariki elements
17
, of which the Wesleyan doctrine of grace is a typical representative. 
Third, the Confucian Jirika tendency provides room and opportunity for some Christian 
doctrines, especially Soteriology, to be adapted to, grafted onto and infused into Confucian 
teachings as complementary elements that complete and enhance Confucian spirituality.
18
  
However, the Christian doctrine that is most temperamentally compatible with the 
Confucian style is that developed by modern philosophers and theologians such as Alfred North 
Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, John B. Cobb Jr. and other Process thinkers. Process theology, I 
believe, offers the best version of Pneumatology among various contemporary religious thinkers. 
The Whiteheadian envisioning of God as a creatively alluring, poetically persuasive, friendly 
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fulfilling figure sketches out some fundamental characters of the image of Spirit in the 
contemporary context which conjoins well with the Confucian notion of engaging the Ultimate 
in personal spiritual practice. I will endeavor in the last section of this project to establish a 
version of Christian Pneumatology by integrating the Confucian elements with those of Process 
theology.  
As to the issue regarding the religiosity of Confucianism, the most forceful arguments 
among contemporary scholars are made by Rodney L. Taylor. With both of his monographs 
(1978, 1990) devoted to the topic, Professor Taylor built his scholarly construction upon a 
foundational premise that Confucian tradition is profoundly religious (Taylor 1990, 1). Taylor’s 
argument for the religiosity of Confucianism comes from two of his observations. First, 
according to Taylor, the Confucian concept of Heaven, or the Principle of Heaven, as the 
absolute Ultimate qualifies it as religious (Taylor 1990, 2). Second, Taylor borrowed a 
theoretical tool from Frederick Streng, who defined religion as a means towards ultimate 
transformation (Streng, 1985, 1-8), and pointed to a commonly accepted feature characterized in 
both Classic and Neo Confucianism, that the soteriological relationship between the Ultimate 
and the practitioners has been obvious and vibrant (Taylor 1990, 3-4). Taylor’s view received 
strong support from many experts in this area, among them James Legge (Legge, 1880), Max 
Weber (Weber 1951), C. K. Yang (Yang 1961), Julia Ching (Ching 1977), Tu Wei-ming (Tu, 
1979, 1985), John H. Berthrong (Berthrong, 2000). Robert Neville, too, affirmed the religiosity 
of Confucianism with an analysis of its ritual, myth, cosmology and cultivation of self (Neville 
2000, 61-62; Forward to Taylor 1990, ix-x).  
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The Chinese Academy of Social Science defined Confucianism as a form of humanism 
which is devoid of religious character. This is an argument compatible with some modern 
Chinese philosophers, such as Liang Shu-ming (梁漱溟), who assigned Confucianism to the 
category of Ritual (礼教), rather than Religion (宗教).19 Such an assertion, as Neville points out, 
reflects the anti-religious milieu of the modern Chinese intelligentsia and its desire to give a 
more honored status to the traditional Chinese Confucian way of life (Neville 2000, 57). Roger 
T. Ames and David L. Hall stand out among contemporary Western scholars, with their 
pervasive arguments against the imposition of Western religious categories upon Confucianism 
(Ames and Hall, 1987, 1998). According to Ames and Hall, one of the most striking features of 
Chinese intellectual culture from the perspective of the Western interpreter is the absence in any 
important sense of transcendence in the articulation of its spiritual, moral, and political 
sensibilities (Ames and Hall 1998, 189; 1987, passim). The ontological structure underlying 
Confucianism is the one defined by Ames and Hall as “immanental cosmos” (1987, 16-17), the 
kind of thinking that requires no reference to an extra-mundane creative event as in Judaea-
Christian tradition. Neither does it refer to any ontic substantial categories as in Greek 
philosophy. The non-polarity, mutual immanent, dual structure between complementary 
counterparts defines the meaning of existence without the necessity of making reference to 
transcendence. With such a postulate in place, Ames and Hall believed that there is no ground to 
claim Confucianism as a kind of religion in the Western sense. Neville challenged Ames and 
Hall’s approach as “infelicitous”, because, for Neville, the Confucian notion of Heaven, Earth 
and Dao are all transcendent in the strict sense (Neville 2000, 149).  
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My own standpoint about this issue differs from the above two views. I do not agree fully 
with the Chinese Academy of Social Science in their assertion of Confucianism as a purely 
humanistic tradition, because Confucianism does display religious characters such as ritual, 
cosmology and spiritual cultivation. Neither did I find myself comfortable fully endorsing the 
view held by Taylor and many other Confucian scholars for the full affirmation of religiosity in 
Confucianism. I regard Confucianism as an affinity to religion, yet not being a full-fledged 
religion in a typical sense. Historically, Confucianism in its primitive form did worship Shang Di 
(上帝), a personal, sovereign deity with full religious implications. Duke Zhou reformed it by 
setting it on a rational track with the concept of De (德). From that time on, Confucianism 
gradually purged its religious flavor, and became the wreckage of an old religion which has been 
thoroughly secularized. Hence, my first assertion regarding the religiosity of Confucianism is 
that it is the wreckage of a secularized religion. Theoretically, Confucianism should not be 
considered as a complete religion due to the practical considerations of some of its teachings. 
Neither classic Confucianism nor Neo-Confucianism worships any personal deity that is 
anywhere close to an omnipotent, omnipresent or omniscient deity. Other than moral teachings 
and rational method, Confucian spirituality offers no direct, indwelling help from any 
supernatural agent anywhere close to the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, let alone the 
administration of unmerited grace along the line of Tarika assistance. In addition, Confucius as 
the founder or major exponent of Confucianism deliberately refrained from extensive discussion 
about transcendent categories, thus leaves Confucianism with no sufficiently lucid teachings on 
the spiritual, supernatural or after-life. My interpretation of this situation is that Confucius was 
frustrated by ancient mythical teachings which lacked certainty, and so he re-oriented 
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Confucianism away from primitive folk religion. In this sense, Confucianism can be considered 
as post-religious. Practically, when the Jesuits in 17th-18th century China took the stand that 
Confucian rituals had no religious implications, they took their position not simply out of 
doctrinal discernment; rather, there were also practical concerns out of missiological 
consideration. For those mission-minded Jesuits, as well for any contemporary Evangelical 
missionary, Confucianism, as naturalistic, non-religious ideology, provides rich semiotic 
resources that are non-contradictory to Christianity’s religious ideology. From their perspective, 
Confucianism is pre-religious, needing only to be fulfilled with complementary teachings from 
religious teachings such as Christianity. Out of historical, theoretical and practical concerns, I 
regard Confucianism not as a religion in the typical sense, but as the wreckage of a thoroughly 
secularized primitive religion, or as both pre-religious and post-religious. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE AXIOLOGICAL NATURE OF CHINESE TRADITION 
 
 
Value-laden Character of the Traditional Chinese Cosmology  
 
Spirituality, if perceived axiologically, can be understood as cycles of value transmitting 
processes between an internal human value processing center and values that are ubiquitous in 
the universe. It involves the process of value internalization whereof external values are 
apprehended and internalized, which leads to an axiologically refined value processing center. 
By means of observation and interpretation then, the altered value processing center accords 
more values to the external world with its capacity of creativity. Every natural entity bears 
intrinsic values that are independent from human interpretation. Such intrinsic values can be 
apprehended and encapsulated with the aid of signs, symbols and languages, which enable them 
to enter and circulate on the axiological market as semiotic currency. Such apprehended, or 
semioticized, values are closely related to, yet not identical with, intrinsic values in the universe. 
Intrinsic values serve as the source and the norm of the apprehended values. The intrinsic values 
are primordial, unthematic and multi-layered, just as elements of materials might be scattered 
over the minerals in a quarry. Apprehended and semioticized values are the ones that have 
already been extracted and refined for particular purposes. Average, modern people usually have 
contact with these mature products, namely, the apprehended and semioticized values, while 
experts, especially linguists, function as portals through which intrinsic values enter the semiotic 
market. The metaphor of mineral refinement also indicates the fact that intrinsic values are 
usually raw, rich, multi-faceted, and thus, complex, in contrast to the apprehended and 
semioticized ones which are dense, defined, thematized and accessible for communication. Just 
as monetary currencies can be fraudulent, semiotic currencies, too, can be replete with signs and 
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symbols that are void of sensible meaning. The semioticized values should, thus, be subjected to 
verification by intrinsic values.  
The current project embarks on the study on Protestant Spirituality for which the Chinese 
Christian churches in North American culture serve as concrete, existential settings. The plan is 
to show value processing models that are typical to Chinese (especially Confucian) spirituality 
and Protestant Christianity on the same plane, with the hope of sorting out a complimentary 
model that synthesizes the two. Major emphases of this project include the source and norm of 
values, and the process through which values are apprehended and internalized, examining the 
semiotic and axiological nature of human beings as value processing centers. The corresponding 
theoretic tools include Neville’s axiology which affirms the ubiquitous existence of value in the 
universe, the Peircean semiotics that illustrate the birth and the structure of signs and symbols, 
and the Whiteheadian process philosophy that understands the human being as a feeling 
processing center.  
The thesis of this project is that external values are to be internalized through three main 
channels, namely, the aesthetic appreciation of natural beauty, the ethical aspiration of social 
goodness and the spiritual imitation of the divine character. This essay is directed toward an 
argument that the traditional Chinese axiological endeavors can help to repair Protestant 
spirituality of its empty loftiness by providing it with a ladder which has two major rungs: 
aesthetic beauty and ethical goodness. The Protestant spirituality, in turn, pushes the traditional 
Chinese axiological experience to a higher, more complete level than before possible: to the 
theological virtue of holiness. With its direct and special revelation in the life of Jesus, Protestant 
spirituality provides Chinese spirituality with a center, a norm, and a diamond on the crown. 
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Hence, the two involved traditions actually complement, rather than conflict with one another. 
This study is significant on three levels. First, on the personal level, this essay intends to provide 
a wholistic model of spirituality that integrates aesthetic, ethical and theological elements. Its 
success will accomplish a purge of the anti-tradition sentiments of Chinese Evangelical 
Christians who sometimes exhibit fundamentalist characteristics. This wholistic model may 
enable them to reconcile with their cultural background without raising serious doubt about their 
new identity which they assumed in the born-again religious experience. Second, on the 
communal level, this work will help to reconstruct the identity of Chinese Evangelical Christians 
in North American cultural settings, contributing to the spiritual and mental well-being of this 
community. Third, on the cultural level, this essay endeavors to reactivate creativity from both 
the Neo-Confucian tradition and Christianity. It reaches back to the Ritual Controversy of Ming 
Dynasty, and with the aid of new methods, such as the Peircean semiotics and Neville’s 
axiology, this essay attempts to push Matteo Ricci’s theory to a new horizon. With China arising 
as a super power, perpetual world peace demands collaboration, rather than confrontation, 
between Confucianism and Christianity as two major approaches to civilization. 
The Nevillian Axiology 
 
Robert C. Neville is an architectonic thinker who, with his sweeping thrust, intends to 
reconstruct the foundation and structure of thinking for the contemporary West. His grand 
system, “Axiology of Thinking”, consists of four integrated components—imagination, 
interpretation, theory and responsibility. According to Neville, the Renaissance synthesis of 
thinking failed to recognize valuational thinking, and thus deprived moral, aesthetic and political 
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thought of proper status. The concept of thinking in the West, hence, needs to be reconstructed at 
its foundations. As a solution to this problem, Neville proposed an axiological model of thinking: 
A contrary hypothesis is that thinking is founded in valuation. Valuation, in several 
related senses, underlies both qualitative and quantitative thinking and their integration. 
Valuation supplies and justifies the norms that guide thinking to be rational when it is; 
therefore, valuation, in several senses, is the foundation of reason.
1
 
 
Neville continues to argue that values are to be conceived of as the universal character of 
everything. Axiology as the study of things with regard to their value dimension lies at the very 
foundation of thinking.  Neville is not the first modern philosopher interested in axiology. There 
were forerunners in valuation theory such as Robert S. Hartmann and John Dewey. The 
uniqueness of Neville’s axiology is that valuation is regarded as the most fundamental part of 
human thinking. In other words, valuation is not merely foundational to normative sciences -- 
logic, ethics and aesthetics, but also to all other types of science. Valuation, according to Neville, 
is what human beings can’t help but do all the time. It reaches the deepest root of all types of 
thinking. This approach distinguishes itself from former axiological thinkers by placing valuation 
on the deepest level of thinking, as well as stretching it broadly to a cosmological level.  
It is worth noting that Neville’s system is itself founded upon a naturalistic cosmology. 
This foundation serves as the solid objective basis for valuation. Values are thus not merely 
wishy-washy inventions of the human mind. They have to be in accord with nature. The mere 
causal components of nature serve as the basis and norm of value synthesis. Any hyperactive 
mental fabrication of value processing that deviates too far from nature, as we will see in the 
Chinese theory of Five Proceedings (五行), is doomed to collapse. As it is stated by Neville, “… 
                                                 
1
 Robert C. Neville, Reconstruction of Thinking (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1981), 12. 
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axiological hypothesis is embedded in a naturalistic cosmology. Its cosmology of thinking is but 
a subset, or specialization, of a larger cosmology of nature.”2 
Neville’s attempt to reconstruct the very foundation of thinking breaks down into four 
dimensions: imagination, interpretation, theory and responsibility. Imagination is the synthetic 
activity that grasps the manifold components into a field of focused attention. Beauty is the 
dominant norm for the valuations involved in imagination. Interpretation, according to Neville, is 
a triadic synthesis that takes the form of judgment. It involves reference to an object and the 
assertion of the meaning of the object. The dominant norm for interpretation is truth. Theory, as 
a dimension different from interpretation, can be perceived as envisionment that grasps the 
subject, the world, or the experience with one view. Unity is the transcendental value for 
theorizing. Neville endorses the Peircean fallibilism with an outspoken claim that all theoretical 
hypotheses are subject to being improved if they are not clearly superseded. Responsibility as a 
dimension of axiological thinking comes from the fact that the human subject is implicitly 
obligated to engage when facing various form of values. Engaging good is the guiding norm of 
responsibility.
3
   
As described above, Neville’s axiological hypothesis dovetails surprisingly well with the 
traditional Chinese way of thinking. These two systems reinforce each other in that the Nevillian 
theory is like a western expression that revitalizes traditional Chinese thinking which has been 
marginalized since the colonial period, while the traditional Chinese way of thinking serves as an 
embodiment of Neville’s theory, offering a forceful endorsement of its validity. The current 
project intends to employ Neville’s theory as underpinning paradigm which provides both 
                                                 
2
 Ibid. 20. 
3
 Ibid. 17-29. 
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methodology and terminology. For imagination, the first element of the Nevillian quartet, it 
espouses Bi (比) and Xing (兴), two common forms of expression in the Book of Poetry (诗经), 
where some definite image which the mind sliced out from nature stirs up the empathic function 
of the heart, and, in turn, results in some ecstatic union between the subject and object. This 
process is by and large aesthetic, in the sense that it is the union between the human subject and 
stimuli from nature. The Chinese notions of Bi and Xing, though, distinguish themselves slightly 
different from the Nevillian scheme with an emphasis on the aspect of human emotion.  
The Peircean Semiotics 
The Nevillian interpretative activity finds its counterpart in traditional Chinese thinking 
in the notion of Ge Wu, the investigation of things. Ge Wu stands for the strenuous practice of 
sorting out the unique and definitive characters of any given natural entity, with the purpose of 
contriving valuative interpretations pertinent to its unique character. The interpreting intention is 
predominantly valuative because the traditional Chinese cosmology is generally axiological. 
Once a valuative interpretation is codified after being accepted and circulated, it becomes a sign 
or symbol with semiotic value. This delineates roughly the emergence of and evolving of a 
hieroglyphic system in China. Clusters of process trails can be clearly discerned in ancient 
etymological dictionaries such as Shu Wen Jie Zi (说文解字). Most of the Chinese hieroglyphic 
characters are still in use today, serving as overwhelmingly convincing evidence that value 
interpretations were common practice in ancient China. One step further to a more primitive 
value interpretive model can be found in the book of I Ching (易经), where natural processes 
were simplified with a dyadic system of broken and unbroken lines. Both I Ching and Shu Wen 
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Jie Zi (说文解字) may serve as vivid illustrations of Peircean semiotic theory, showing that the 
“interpertants” in traditional Chinese thinking were axiological in general. The fact that the 
Chinese hieroglyphic system, along with its valuative interpretations, has endured almost five 
thousand years, and is still thriving today, testifies to its efficacy and truthfulness by its 
acknowledged popularity in the infinite community of interpreters.  
The Peircean fallibilism of theoretic hypothesis also finds a perfect example in traditional 
Chinese value theory. As valuative interpretations accumulated to a certain stage, several 
theoretic hypotheses, such as the theory of Wu Xing (五行 Five Processings) and Telepathy 
between Heaven and Human (天人感应), were contrived and developed with more rigidity. Such 
grand theories grew as they attempted to unify more and more spheres of human experiences. 
Unity was the guiding norm of these grand theories. However, when they grew to a certain scale, 
they deviated from nature, which is the cardinal norm of any axiological theorizing. These 
theories depleted their relevancy and credibility along the way, and finally collapsed. The fall of 
these theories can be easily explained, if not anticipated, in the scheme of Neville’s theory. Yet 
the case was different in China. Along with the fall of these grand theoretical hypotheses, the 
model of axiological thinking itself suffered a credibility crisis in China. The current condition of 
thinking in modern China affiliates more with the western mathematical model than its own 
axiological origin. Value reasoning had been blamed as one of the cultural barriers blocking the 
way to modernity. Now, with the Western culture stuck in dilemma, and non-Westerners 
gradually regaining confidence, it might be time to reconsider the Chinese model of value 
reasoning. Peirce’s concept of fallibilism on theoretic hypothesis will certainly be of a great 
service in the process.  
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 The notion of responsibility, another essential dimension of Neville’s system, was the 
characteristic feature for Chinese intellectuals. The prototypical expression was made by Zhang 
Zai (张载): “To ordain conscience for Heaven and Earth; to secure life and fortune for the 
people; to continue lost teachings for past sages; and to establish peace for all future 
generations.” 4 Grandiose as it seems to be, the Chinese intellectuals’ responsibility in facing 
values actually breaks down into concrete and practical steps that had been developed along the 
course of historical development. The genuine aspiration of internalizing external values as De (
德) emerged as the center and at the beginning of Chinese value reasoning. Prehending values 
and incorporating them into the human core stands as the initial momentum of the practice called 
Investigation of Things (格物). Once values as De are apprehended, it is necessary to put them 
into practice, as Wang Yang-ming suggested in the doctrine of unity of knowledge and action. 
Confucianists of all generations were characterized by proactive participation in political 
endeavors and social constructions. Their goal was to build up a society of musical harmony and 
ritual propriety, as a matrix that would nurture all members of the society, especially the younger 
generation. The idea was to institutionalize value as normative way of life, by means of ritual as 
a codified rule of practice. Responsibility, both ethical and political, is thus exemplified in 
traditional Chinese thinking.  
Hence, the Nevillian quartet of axiological theory finds perfect embodiment in the 
traditional Chinese way of thinking. The general orientation of Chinese culture features an 
integration of fact and value. The following two sections will focus on the objective and 
subjective aspects of the valuation. The objective side of valuation depicts the universe as replete 
                                                 
4
 http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/12.11/10-wenspeech.html 
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with values. Whereas the subjective side of valuation envisions the human heart-mind as an 
equilibrium that contains infinite sympathetic feelings, which both absorbs and produces values 
simultaneously.    
An Explanatory Note on De (德)   
 
Axiology is the way traditional Chinese philosophy perceives the whole universe and its 
myriad entities. The prevalent existence of value characterizes the traditional Chinese 
cosmology. What lies at the center of value theory is the concept called De (德), which is usually 
translated as virtue. There are several folds of meaning encoded in this ancient Chinese 
character. Firstly, De (德) can be etymologically dissected into three major components:  彳(chi), 
目(mu) and 心(xin). 彳(chi) stands for a group of people walking slowly, and can thus be 
interpreted as “communal practice”. 目(mu) is the hieroglyphic symbol for eye, which can be 
interpreted as “observation”. 心(xin) is the hieroglyphic symbol for heart, which is usually 
understood as subjective consciousness, or the inner emotional/feeling equilibrium of the value 
processing center. To combine all the components, De (德) means keen observation, 
apprehending the external value with sensual organs, accredited through communal practice. 
Secondly, in Shuo Wen Jie Zi (说文解字), an Eastern Han Chinese Lexicon, Xu Shen (许慎 58-
147) interpreted De (德) as ascension (升), which implies that De (德) carries with it the ability 
to refine the human subject and enable that subject to ascend to a higher moral realm. Thirdly, 
De (德) in ancient China also had a variant form: De (悳), which was interpreted by Xu Shen (许
慎) in Shuo Wen Jie Zi (说文解字) as “an internal apprehension of self, and an external 
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apprehension of others”5. Fourthly, De (德) is interpreted by Kong Yingda (孔颖达 574-648), a 
scholar in Tang Dynasty, as equivalent to another Chinese concept with the same pronunciation 
– De (得), which can be interpreted as apprehension, obtaining or receiving. Kong’s exegetical 
notes indicate, “De (德) can be rendered as De (得), which means internally apprehended with 
heart-mind (心 Xin), and at the same time the external apprehension of things (物). To heart-
mind (Xin 心), it is De (德); when applied, it is action (行, Xing). De (德) is what accumulates in 
the heart-mind before being exercised.”6  
If we summarize and re-phrase the above notion in axiological terms, the concept of De   
(德) bears the following shades of meanings. First, it indicates that the traditional Chinese 
worldview perceives a value-laden universe. In other words, the universe and its myriad entities 
carry with them all kinds of rich values, ready to be observed, apprehended and integrated into 
the human center. Second, values are capable of being transferred into the human heart-mind, 
and then of being absorbed, assimilated, and internalized as integrated properties of the heart-
mind. It also suggests that the human heart-mind (心 Xin) is a value processing center that is 
sensitively responsive to axiological stimuli. The heart-mind feeds on values as our physical 
body feeds on nutrition. This essential feature of the human heart-mind will be elaborated on in 
the following section. Third, external values can be absorbed by the human heart-mind, and 
reside as moral properties of the heart-mind. These moral properties also refine the aesthetic and 
moral taste of the heart-mind, enabling it to ascend to a more sublime status. With a more 
                                                 
5
 “外得于人，内得于己”。参见董莲池著《说文解字考正》，作家出版社 2006. 415. 
 
6
 《十三经注疏》，上海古籍出版社 1997 年第 1 版，第 1741 页。原文为：“德者，得也。谓内得
于心，外得于物。在心为德，施之为行。德是行之未发者也…”. 
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refined, sublime taste, the human subject accordingly attunes its behavior pattern, with which it 
incessantly continues value interchanges with the surrounding environment. Fourth, De (德) also 
carries with it a communal dimension, in which the individual value change process is extended 
as a collective effort, which leads to communal ethics and politics. The communal aspect of De   
(德) is usually codified as conventions, ritual proprieties, or even laws. They form the molding 
matrix that regulates and nourishes the heart-minds emerging within the group, thus creating a 
community of similar minds.   
De (德) as value exists ubiquitously in the universe and its myriad natural entities, ready 
to be caught, absorbed and assimilated into the human heart-mind. Basically, there are two major 
types of value mentioned most often in traditional Chinese literature, namely, the aesthetic value 
and the ethical value. Aesthetic value represents the first level of exchange between heart-mind 
and natural entities, which involves mostly imagination, feelings and emotions. Ethical value, on 
the other hand, represents a more sophisticated level of exchange, involving investigation, 
interpretation, theorizing and responsibility. 
Bi (比) and Xing (兴) as Two Literary Techniques 
The categorical expression of aesthetic value in ancient Chinese literature is pertinent to 
two figures of speech, namely, Bi (比) and Xing (兴), which are two common artistic techniques 
in the Book of Poetry (诗经). Bi (比) can be roughly rendered as simile or metaphor, where there 
are visible or invisible connections between internal feeling and external entity. It triggers the 
heart-mind’s discursive, unthematic, hidden feelings for an expression, which is called Xing (兴). 
The function of the heart-mind that’s involved in this procedure is imagination. There is a cycle 
between the internal and the external. What initiates the process is the internal primordial feeling, 
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seeking formation and ventilation. Then, some external entity or scene comes into view, which 
bears similarities with the feelings that have been entrapped in the heart-mind. With the aid of 
the imagination, that flow of internal primordial feelings rests on the external stimuli that may 
serve as simile or metaphor. The cycle moves forward when the internal feelings are projected on 
external entities or scenes. Once embodied, that cluster of feelings enriches, deepens and 
expands until it reaches mature expression. Some of these mature expressions are coined into 
symbols, serving as linguistic media with their semiotic values. The above process of Bi (比) and 
Xing (兴) involves an ecstatic union between nature and the human subject, which is common in 
aesthetics.  
The rhetorical techniques of Bi (比) and Xing (兴) are pervasive in The Book of Poetry     
(诗经), and open up a tradition with which Chinese culture can ascribe aesthetic values to a 
myriad of scenes and natural entities. Here is an illustration using an analysis of Guan Ju (关鳩), 
the first poem of the Book of Poetry:  
Guan-guan go the ospreys, 
On the islet in the river. 
The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady: 
For our prince a good mate she. 
Here long, there short, is the duckweed, 
To the left, to the right, borne about by the current. 
The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady: 
Waking and sleeping, he sought her. 
He sought her and found her not, 
And waking and sleeping he thought about her. 
Long he thought; oh! long and anxiously; 
On his side, on his back, he turned, and back again. 
Here long, there short, is the duckweed; 
On the left, on the right, we gather it. 
The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady: 
With lutes, small and large, let us give her friendly welcome. 
Here long, there short, is the duckweed; 
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On the left, on the right, we cook and present it. 
The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady: 
With bells and drums let us show our delight in her.
7
 
 
This, obviously, is a love poem. It depicts a young lad who’s being attracted by a young 
lady. Let’s just imagine this as the first love that the young man ever experienced in his lifetime. 
He’s not familiar with such a feeling, nor does he know how to express it. However, his love 
intensifies to a degree that his mind is occupied by that lady, and he becomes sleepless during the 
night. This young man has been tortured by love until one day he meets the girl again near the 
riverside. There in the middle of the river is a pair of ospreys, quacking back and forth 
intimately. The girl is picking the duckweed. All of sudden, this young man is inspired by the 
scene, with an outburst of his feelings towards that girl. This, one might guess, is how the poem 
came into existence.  
All entities in the scene, such as the ospreys, the exchanging of their quacking, the islet in 
the middle of the river, the duckweed, the current, are ascribed with aesthetic values. They are 
rendered as stimuli that help bring out the unthematic, primordial feelings hidden in the heart-
mind of this young lad. The blocked feelings creatively found their way out by figuring out 
equivalences with the external scene and natural entities. Similes and metaphors are successfully 
established between the joyful quacking intimacy of the osprey pair and the young man’s strong 
desire to espouse that young lady. His imagination was triggered by the scene and the sound. 
Furthermore, the imagination of this young man was deepened and expanded by the duckweed, 
which first remained in the current, fickle and uncertain, just as the heart-mind of that young lady 
                                                 
7
 The original texts read as 關關雎鳩、在河之洲。窈宨淑女、君子好逑。參差荇菜、左右流之。窈宨
淑女、寤寐求之。求之不得、寤寐思服。悠哉悠哉、輾轉反側。參差荇菜、左右采之。窈宨淑女、琴瑟友
之。參差荇菜、左右芼之。窈宨淑女、鍾鼓樂之。The English translation comes from The Chinese Text 
Project: http://ctext.org/book-of-poetry/guan-ju. 
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was unsure and wavering. And then the duckweed was gathered, cooked and presented, 
signifying the young man’s hope that the young lady gathered into his world through marriage. 
With his imagination further awakened and expanded, the quacking sound of the ospreys is 
envisioned as the sound of bells and drums on the wedding ceremony.  
The above analysis demonstrates that the aesthetic value of the natural scene and its parts 
can be established and affirmed by means of Bi (比) and Xing (兴). The Book of Poetry was so 
influential for the Chinese culture that Bi and Xing became the common practice of writers for 
ensuing generations. This aesthetic value was recognized by Confucius, who once commented on 
the Guan-ju poem as “… expressive of enjoyment without being licentious, and of grief without 
being hurtfully excessive."
8
 Confucius also complimented the whole book: "In The Book of 
Poetry are three hundred pieces, but the design of them all may be embraced in one sentence - 
'Having no depraved thoughts.'"
9
 Confucius also encouraged his disciples to get acquainted with 
The Book of Poetry, because:  
“… The Odes serve to stimulate the mind. They may be used for purposes of self-
contemplation. They teach the art of sociability. They show how to regulate feelings of 
resentment. From them you learn the more immediate duty of serving one's father, and 
the remoter one of serving one's prince. From them we become largely acquainted with 
the names of birds, beasts, and plants."
10
 
 
Hence, the aesthetic value of natural entities was built into the origin of Chinese culture. 
It serves as the first layer of traditional Chinese culture’s axiological cosmology. All of nature is 
                                                 
8
 《论语 八佾》子曰：「關雎，樂而不淫，哀而不傷。」 
 
9
 《论语  为政》子曰：「詩三百，一言以蔽之，曰『思無邪』。」 
 
10
 《论语  阳货》 子曰：「小子！何莫學夫詩？詩，可以興，可以觀，可以群，可以怨。邇之事父，
遠之事君。多識於鳥獸草木之名。」 
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open to the heart-mind. Every natural entity can be rendered as a medium through which feelings 
take shape and then blossom. Such a tradition of figurative expression became the norm of 
Chinese art and literature. The highest form of Chinese art is to become immersed in nature, and 
to be one with nature.  
If aesthetic values are characterized by the human subjects’ going out of the self, to be 
immersed in nature, thereby achieving an ecstatic union with nature, ethical values, then, in 
contrast, represent the human subject’s investigation and meditation upon nature and its myriad 
entities, to appropriate ethical values according to the distinctive properties of the entities, to 
extrapolate ethical values into the human subject, and to extend ethical applications into 
communal and political life. In Neville’s rubric axiology, this process combines the stages of 
interpretation, theorizing and sharing responsibilities.  
Attributing De (德) to Nature and Its Entities 
Attributing De (德) as an ethical value to nature and its myriad entities was a common 
practice in ancient China. It was such an essential feature that it made the Chinese civilization 
idiosyncratically axiological. If we regard the Book of Change (易经) as the Genesis of Chinese 
civilization, then, from the very beginning, when Fu Xi (伏羲) and King Wen (文王) invented the 
diagrams, all efforts of semiotic codification and elaboration resulted in the rich fruition of a 
value-laden cosmos. A discussion of the ethical connotations of Tian (天), Di (地), along with 
other natural elements, illustrates this type of cosmos. This value theory was later on theorized as 
an ideology, and expanded further into political theory. By means of this expansion, it gradually 
depleted its validity, collapsed, and was abandoned by the modern age. Subjecting this concept 
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of the value-laden cosmos to the analysis of semiotics and symbolism can revitalize this theory 
by making it once again relevant and valid on a moderate scale. 
 To begin, Tian (天) and Di (地) as a set of creational sources embodied essential ethical 
qualities of perpetual generating (生生不息) and generosity (厚德) of accommodating/sustaining 
(载物) the myriad existences. On the image (象) of Qian Diagram (乾卦) which stands for Tian  
(天), Confucius commented, “The movement of heaven is full of power. Thus the superior man 
makes himself strong and untiring.”11 Correspondingly, Confucius commented on Kun Diagram 
(坤卦) as representing the De (德) of the earth, “The earth’s condition is receptive devotion. 
Thus the superior man who has breadth of character carries the outer world.”12 Thus, to be truly a 
virtuous person, one must internalize the De (德) of Heaven and Earth, so as to match their 
superiority (德配天地). It is especially important for rulers to embody such virtuous 
characteristics, because the embodiment of these character traits is a sign of their being authentic 
heirs of the divine superior authority. It is worth noticing that these strands of virtues were not 
granted or imparted as birth rights to the rulers. Rather, anybody could proactively initiate the 
process of acquiring and obtaining these virtues by means of self-cultivation. If rendered in 
theological terms, the concept of De (德) signifies a major paradigm shift from Calvinistic 
predestination to the Armenian free effort of self-cultivation. Such a shift stresses malleability 
and moral responsibility on the human side. In Analects, Confucius explicitly expressed his 
admiration of the virtue of Tian (天), “Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their 
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 The I Ching, translated by Wilhelm/Baynes (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 6. Original 
text reads as “天行健，君子以自强不息”。 
 
12
 The I Ching. p.12. Original text reads as “地势坤，君子以厚德载物”。 
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courses, and all things are continually being produced, but does Heaven say anything?"
13
 Again, 
the emphasis was placed on the generating power of Tian (天), with which even the most 
excellent sage was not on par.  
  The above axiological interpretation on the virtue of Tian (天) and Di (地) illustrates 
some basic features of moral philosophy in traditional Chinese culture. First, ethical valuing is 
based on aesthetic appreciation, yet goes beyond it by means of contemplative investigation and 
meditation. Second, the original orientation of this kind of contemplation is ethical, in the sense 
that it secures the natural entity with the purpose of extrapolating from it ethical values. In other 
words, the human subject approaches the natural object with a desire of achieving ethical union 
with the natural entity. Third, the ethical values extrapolated from the natural entity are directly 
related to the unique properties of that entity. In the case of Tian (天) and Di (地), the pertinent 
aspects are the energetic creativity and the benevolent receptivity respectively. Such properties 
though they seem like and actually are simple common sense, as in reality not easy to attain. It 
takes the collective efforts of generations of sages to accomplish this kind of understanding. The 
actual procedures of this sign making process are actually quite complicated. I will discuss them 
in a more detailed fashion with the help of Peircean semiotic theory in the following 
methodology section. Pierce’s semiotic theory is helpful in understanding these procedures as 
seen in the following methodology section.  
The traditional Chinese mind was, obviously, very good at ethical reasoning, to the point 
that they were so fascinated by the ethical theories they invented that they no longer bothered to 
investigate the nature for other factual details. This probably accounts for China being unable to 
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 《论语 阳货》:” 子曰：「天何言哉？四時行焉，百物生焉，天何言哉？」” 
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make advances in the field of natural sciences. Their obsession with extrapolating values from 
nature overshadowed the joy of and need for objective research for new facts. The Chinese 
axiological epistemology, after all, was developed in a pre-scientific era, and still awaits 
adaptation to become more compatible with the explosion of scientific discoveries in the modern 
age. Nevertheless, the general orientation of this model of axiological epistemology is still valid. 
Once it is applied to the discoveries of the scientific age, it surely will yield rich fruit in 
humanitarian studies. This axiological approach will serve as an antidote to the confused, 
meaningless, sterile culture of the West which has been at an impasse in these late modern times.  
The Theory of Five Processing Elements (五行) 
The above axiological reasoning practiced sporadically in ancient China was later 
developed into a sophisticated interwoven theory called the Five Processing Elements (五行). 
According to this theory, the whole universe, along with its myriad entities, were made up of 
various configurations of five basic elements, namely, metal, wood, water, fire and earth.
14
 
According to the unique character of each element, a pertinent virtue was assigned. Metal (金) 
appears to be hard, solid and cold, and can be molded into weapons. Weapons are usually 
associated with killing, war, rebellion, and punishment, from which the virtue of righteousness    
(义) is derived, just as the god of justice is usually portrayed with a sword in his hand. Wood 
stands for trees, flowers, grasses and other vegetation, representing the natural power of thriving, 
aspiring to go higher, as well as the vitality of life that cannot be easily suppressed. The virtue 
that corresponds to wood is benevolence (仁) through which one constantly cultivates and 
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 The original Chinese character: 金、木、水、火、土。 
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supports oneself and others. Water finds a way wherever it goes. It fits the shapes of utensils of 
all kinds. It is both amorphous and metamorphic. Its swiftness, flexibility and adaptability bear 
much similarity to the virtue of wisdom (智). Confucius once acknowledged the affinity between 
water and wisdom, “The wise find pleasure in water; the virtuous find pleasure in mountains.”15 
Fire brings with it illumination and warmth, and thus represents propriety (礼). The connection 
between fire and propriety is actually fickle and unsubstantial. It shows the weakness of this 
theory. If the affinity between the basic elements and basic virtues attenuates at certain places, 
the credibility of its derivative inferences is also watered down dramatically along the way. Earth 
as another creative source produces myriad things. When a seed is planted in the earth, it absorbs 
nutrition from the earth and grows. The earth incessantly produces, sustains and supports, it is 
thus respected as the embodiment of the virtue of faithfulness (信).  
The theory of five basic elements and their correlative virtues emerged first in The Book 
of Documents, in which Qi Zi (萁子) recommended this theory to King Wu (武王) as one of the 
principles that would help the king to govern well. 
16
 The theory then evolved into a type of 
philosophy that accounts for some universal principle that covers the hugely varied natural 
world. According to this theory, every natural entity is composed of the five basic elements. 
Their differences lie only in the proportion and composition of these elements.
17
 The theory was 
later expanded into an organizing principle, which, in turn, constituted a grand theory that 
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 《论语 雍也》：知者樂水，仁者樂山. 
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 《尚书》:《甘誓》、《洪范》 
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 《尚书 洪范》: 五行相杂以成百物 (The mingling of five elements gives birth to various existences.) 
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permeates almost every aspect of Chinese intellectual structure, such as music, medicine, art, and 
politics. Here is a chart that briefly sketches the system
18
: 
Five Elements 
五行 
Metal 
金 
Water 
水 
Wood 
木 
Fire 
火 
Earth 
土 
Five Virtues 
五德 
Righteousness 
义 
Wisdom 
智 
Benevolence 
仁 
Propriety 
礼 
Faithfulness 
信 
Five Colors 
五色 
White 
白 
Black 
黑 
Green 
绿 
Red 
红 
Yellow 
黄 
Five Sounds 
五音 
Shang 
商 
Yu 
羽 
Jia 
角 
Zheng 
徵 
Gong 
宫 
Five Tastes 
五味 
Acrid 
辛 
Salty 
咸 
Sour 
酸 
Bitter 
苦 
Sweet 
甘 
Five Facial 
Features 
五官 
Nose 
鼻 
Ear 
耳 
Eye 
目 
Tongue 
舌 
Mouth 
口 
Five Functions 
五事 
Word 
言 
Ting 
听 
Appearance 
貌 
Vision 
视 
Think 
思 
Five Internal 
Organs 
五脏 
Liver 
肝 
Kidney 
肾 
Spleen 
脾  
Lung 
肺 
Heart 
心 
Five Directions 
五方 
West 
西 
North 
北 
East 
东 
South 
南 
Center 
中 
Five Seasons 
五季 
Autumn 
秋 
Winter 
冬 
Spring 
春 
Summer 
夏 
Midsummer 
长夏 
Five Crops 
五谷 
Rice  
稻 
Bean 
豆 
Wheat 
麦 
Millet 
黍 
Grain 
粟 
  
Such a grandiose theory stretches even beyond the areas indicated in the above chart, serving as 
the organizing principle for primitive natural science, art and humanities in traditional Chinese 
civilization.  
Another essential dimension of this theory is that all the elements, along with their 
correlative virtues, are not to be understood as isolated or static. Rather, all the elements are 
dynamically interrelating with each other. The original name of the theory was Wu Xing (五行), 
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 参看《史记 乐书》http://www.guoxue.com/shibu/24shi/shiji/sjml.htm. 
《左传 昭公元年》《昭公二十五年》之注疏 [清 阮元主持校刻] http://gs.cclawnet.com/shisanjzs 
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which, translated literally, is Five Processings, or Five Marchings. According to this theory, the 
five basic elements were believed to be intricately related with each other with various relational 
patterns such as reinforce (生), inhibit (克), conflict (冲), consume (耗), support (帮扶), and 
transform (化). For example, metal reinforces water, yet inhibits wood; water reinforces wood, 
yet inhibits fire; wood reinforces fire, yet inhibits earth; earth reinforces metal, yet inhibits water. 
The source of these patterns goes back to the natural relationships between these natural 
elements. For instance, metal reinforces water because wells and cannels were dug with tools 
made of metal; and metal inhibits wood by cutting it down or splitting it apart. Other relational 
patterns can be deduced from commonsensical observation of nature. Thus, nature serves as the 
norm for traditional Chinese moral reasoning. The Chinese concept of De (德) can be understood 
as miniature bionics, with an axiological thrust. Original inspirations can be boiled down to 
nature and the relationships between natural entities. 
 This cyclical system of Five Processings epitomizes some typical features of eastern 
thinking, in which none of the single elements occupies the dominant position. Each one is at the 
same time dominating and being dominated. What prevails is the system, or the principle behind 
the system. Such a model also implies the dynamic nature of De (德). Values are constantly 
moving and being reintegrated. Hence, the internalized De (德) needs a structure, assembling 
various aspects into an organic whole, which gives rise to the notion of Cheng (成). Cheng (成) 
started as a musical term; when one single instrument plays a solo piece it is called Mini Cheng   
(小成), when all instruments play harmoniously together as a symphony it is called Grand 
Cheng (大成). In a similar fashion, De (德) can also be distinguished between Mini De (小德) 
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where one single sort of virtue was attained and assembled into the heart-mind, and Grand De (
大德) where various kinds of virtue were internalized harmoniously within a structure. 
Furthermore, as the sound of music is always flowing, and can be appreciated only during the 
process, the very nature of De (德) as Processing or Marching (行) also points to the fact that 
values are to be observed, captured and achieved only during the process of acting. Hence, the 
traditional Chinese concept of De (德) places its emphasis on two essential foundations, namely, 
the investigation of nature and its entities, and action. Investigation of things (格物) was 
amplified in the Great Learning (大学), while the emphasis on action was carried on by Wang 
Yang-ming (王阳明) in Song (宋) Dynasty. Both themes will be expounded upon in greater 
depth later in this project.  
The Limitation of Moral Reasoning 
The theory of the Cyclic of Five De (德) was employed and developed into a political 
ideology which has been popular for more than two thousand years in China. Zou Yan (邹衍, 
305-240 B.C.) reinterpreted history by matching each dynasty with a particular kind of De (德): 
the Yellow Emperor (黄帝) bore the virtue of earth, Xia (夏) wood, Shang (商) metal, Zhou (周) 
Fire. Zou Yan inherited the original motives that lay at the root of this grand theory of De (德) 
from the Duke of Zhou (周公)—to work out a theory for regime transitions and to defense the 
legitimacy of current regime. Zou Yan, however, developed beyond the foundation of the Duke 
of Zhou, and made the application more radical by not only interpreting the change in the past, 
but foretelling new regimes in the future. Just as the Five Elements are constantly flowing with 
the newly emerged replacing the former, dynasties, too, come and go according to the flow of the 
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Dao of Heaven (天道). A dynasty that bears one set of De (德) is bound to be replaced by 
another dynasty when its corresponding De (德) triumphs over the De of the former one. Zou 
Yan lived the time of the Warring States, when numerous war lords endeavored to defeat the rest 
and to unite China. His theory of Cycle of the Five Virtues can be regarded as a theoretical 
preparation for the emergence of the next unified dynasty. Zou Yan’s theory was gradually 
acclaimed with growing popularity till it served as propaganda for both the rulers and the rebels. 
Chin (秦), as one among the warring states that finally unified China, assumed the De (德) of 
water, which, according to Zou Yan’s theory, was the one successive to fire, the De of Zhou (周). 
This theory was adopted and extended by scholars of later generations. The rise and fall of 
dynasties were interpreted as the cyclical flow of the Five De—Han (汉) fire, wei (曹魏) earth, 
Jin (晋) metal, Northern Wei (北魏) water, Northern Zhou (北周) wood, Sui (隋) fire, and Tang  
(唐) earth. It is noticeworthy that the paring of De with Dynasties was sometimes modified or 
altered according to specific political concerns. For Instance, during the short-lived Xin (新) 
Dynasty (9-23), Wang Mang (王莽) changed the De (德) of some former dynasties, and switched 
from the reinforcing sequence to the inhibiting sequence, which disclosed the fact that the theory 
was nothing but a series of artificial arrangements. This theory reached a hyperbolic stage under 
the reconstruction of Dong Zhong Shu (董仲舒), who attempted to establish unequivocal 
correlations between Heaven and humanity with a telepathy model.  
The theory of Five Elements was not without critics. Xun Zi (荀子) was among the 
scholars who doubted the validity and after effect of this theory. Xun Zi dismissed this theory as 
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vicious and unreasonable, obscure and inexplicable, twisted and unintelligible.
19
 Xun Zi also 
discredited this theory as fabricated by Zi Si (子思) and Meng Zi (孟子), saying it had nothing to 
do with the original teachings of Confucius. Xun Zi’s reprimand was well stated; it was an astute 
antidote to those trite anecdotes which dome to us through false analogies. The Chronicles of 
Han (汉书) dedicated a special chapter to the recording of various incidents with weird 
interpretations as illustrations of the theory of telepathy between Heaven and humanity. For 
example, the disrespectful manner of a ruler was pointed out as the cause of perpetual rain in the 
capital city.
20
  
As I have already pointed out, the affinity between Fire as an element and its 
corresponding virtue of propriety was unsustainable; such systematic theorizing between the five 
basic elements and their respective virtues is, in some sense, artificial. Any ensuing theories that 
built upon this foundation are thus unstable.   
The monolithic tone of the five elements theory accounts for the fact that it is bound to 
collapse along the way. Each natural element is like a semiotic diamond, bearing within it 
infinite aspects to be engaged as signs. Each aspect points to its own interpretant in the mind of 
the interpreter. Just as aspects of one single element are infinite, so are the interpretants in the 
mind of the interpreter. For example, fire, the weakest link in the theory, may stir up the power 
of devouring everything for an interpreter who once survived a fire. Within the intellectual 
environment of this interpreter, fire stands for killing and destroying, or something to fear, or to 
be avoided, rather than anything related to propriety. Fire may also evoke an interpretant of life 
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 《荀子 非十二子》：“案往舊造說，謂之五行，甚僻違而無類，幽隱而無 說，閉約而無解。案飾其辭，
而祇敬之，曰：此真先君子之言也。子思唱之，孟軻和之。世俗之溝猶瞀儒、嚾嚾然不知其所非也，遂受而傳之，以為
仲尼子弓為茲厚 於後世：是則子思孟軻之罪也。” 
 
20
 《汉书 五行志》http://www.guoxue.com/shibu/24shi/hansu/hsuml.htm 
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for someone who travels in dark cold weather. Fire stands for illumination and civilization in the 
Greek mythological figure of Prometheus. Therefore, one essential characteristic of moral 
reasoning is that it is diffusive, in contrast to the linear hierarchical structure of scientific 
reasoning.  
The theory of De constructed too rigid a cosmology to be verified by nature. It thus 
drifted so far from nature that it became irrelevant and absurd. The cosmos painted by the theory 
of De is too docile a universe, the terror of that world was callously covered up. The theory was 
so rigid that it became blind to the irrational force of nature that has barely been restrained by 
human effort. The fragile forms of the human imagination were disproportionately reinforced to 
the point of defying the normative check of nature. In summary, the Chinese theory of Wu Xing (
五行) has been idolized to a degree that it can no longer serve as an icon of the truth.   
The theory of Wu Xing (五行) must be demythologized just as Christianity was 
demythologized by Bultmann. Confucianism needs to go through a similar process; some 
examples follow: the political system must be changed from monarchic to democratic; locations 
without distinguishable seasonal changes must be taken into consideration in order for it to be 
applicable to peoples in tropical lands. In short, new scientific data must be accounted for within 
the theory, and this can be done with the method of axiology.  
Axiological explanations are by nature metaphorical or allegorical. They never enjoy the 
same precision and concreteness as scientific inferences do. Theories beyond the second level 
never come with concrete validity. The credibility of moral reasoning deteriorates by geometric 
progression as it gets further away from the center of semiotic innovation. That is the nature of 
71 
 
 
 
axiological reasoning, which on the one hand, is hard to build up a gigantic system with 
universal validity; while on the other hand, it always demands new beginning with novel 
creativity. It needs to take into consideration all environmental and historical details. Every 
generation should create its own ethical system. Or to put it more succinctly, every generation 
should recast a new version of the ethical vision based on that of the former generation, while 
simultaneously taking into consideration scientific advances of its own time. Since the time of 
the Enlightenment, ethics has been discredited, distorted even to the point of complete depletion 
of validity only because the hard, cold standards of science are imposed upon it. The integrity of 
ethics has been distorted by this ill-fitted imposition.  
It is time to renew the study of ethics respecting its true nature and integrity. Ethics 
should be considered an empirical theory that has its own course of development. It should build 
on the basis of previous ethical theories on the one hand, and take into consideration newly 
discovered facts, and newly arisen demands with the aid of practical wisdoms that are usually not 
universally valid. Both individual human beings and human communities and societies are alive 
and changing. So must be their ethical theories. Even though the actual system of Wu Xing (五行) 
collapsed, its methodology of moral reasoning endures.  
A Call to Return to Nature 
Engaging nature and its entities with a predominantly axiological thrust constitutes the 
most unique character of traditional Chinese culture. Value reasoning lies at the very root of the 
civilization. The universe was perceived as a query field with values scattered all around. It is the 
mandate from Heaven to discover those values, and to internalize them. This axiological 
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reasoning defined the general orientation of the Chinese civilization which gives rise to three 
unique characteristics of this culture. First, virtue as De serves as transcendental currency that 
circulates with a recognized value both human and divine. The degree to which an individual or 
a group of people is found pleasing to the divine depends on the amount of De they have earned 
for themselves. Some specific individual or group managed to accumulate sufficient moral 
currency to earn for them the heavenly mandate, and become chosen rulers with divine 
endorsement. De becomes the means by which human beings communicate with the upper 
world. This explains the reason explicit religious practice was never very popular in indigenized 
Chinese culture, because moral reasoning actually assumed the function, and thus effectively 
gave vent to the religious urge. Only with this understanding can we effectively interpret some of 
the classical texts. For example, in one of the occasions when Confucius was sick, Zi Lu (子路), 
one of Confucius’ disciples, advised him to pray. Confucius replied, “My praying has been for a 
long time.”21 Obviously, what Confucius meant was that praying to the divine was not something 
being carried out separately. A virtuous person communicates with the divine constantly with his 
way of life. In other word, the practice of De (德) amounts to religious practice in mundane life. 
There is no need to set apart religious practice and compartmentalize it from other dimensions of 
human life. The sacred and the secular are meant to be blended into one. In this sense, traditional 
Chinese people can be regarded as the most religious type.  
Second, the axiological root of traditional Chinese thinking leads to a comparatively 
optimistic reading of human nature. According to the Si Meng branch of Confucianism (思孟学
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 《论语 述而》子疾病，子路請禱。子曰：「有諸？」子路對曰：「有之。誄曰：『禱爾于上下神
祇。』」子曰：「丘之禱久矣。」 
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派), the nature of human beings is endowed with sprouts of four cardinal virtues, namely, 
benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and faithfulness. Apparently, what Zi Si (子思) and 
Meng Zi (孟子) identified as moral sprouts are actually the heart-mind’s potential of recognizing 
and internalizing the De (德) of natural entities. However, Zi Si (子思) and Meng Zi (孟子) 
apparently confused potentialities with realities. Xin (心), as heart-mind, might come with the 
potential to obtain and absorb the De (德) that is scattered in nature. This would mean that the 
human heart-mind comes with De (德) as inscribed apriori. As I will unfold in greater detail in 
later sections, De (德) as a moral construction of the human heart-mind lies neither in nature 
alone, nor in heart-mind alone. Rather it comes into existence during the interpreting process. 
The innate moral impulses within the human heart-mind are vague and primordial. It serves only 
as the conceptual norm that measures the reality, which is almost always unsatisfying. The 
inevitable tension between the conceptual norm and reality constitutes the idea of original sin in 
Chinese thinking. Among various interpretations about original human nature, I would rather go 
with Xun Zi (荀子), recognizing it as evil, selfish, or void of De (德). This paves a common 
ground with the Augustinian or Calvinistic notion of human nature, which makes the project of 
internalizing the De even more necessary and urgent.  
Third, such structure of De (德) loads much of the moral responsibility onto the human 
side. Human beings are believed to be co-creators along with the Heaven and the Earth. On a 
spectrum ranging from Jiriki (self effort) to tariki (other effort), the concept of De (德) falls 
definitely on the Jiriki side. Along the historical process, more emphasis has been placed on 
human side, to the extent that the deity has receded gradually as a vague remote canopy. Human 
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beings have assumed the main role on the stage of history. Such structure nullified the necessity 
of direct, or special, revelation, which, in turn, leads to the nullification of the divine absolute as 
the norm.  
As I have pointed out, the Chinese axiological cosmology has its limitations. Yet this 
cosmology should still be respected, especially if we want to amend the aftermath of modernity. 
In the next chapter, I will argue the validity of value reasoning from three aspects—human heart-
mind (Xin 心) as a center of equilibrium between value generating and value processing; the 
correspondence between nature and Xin (心); and the concept of creativity in Chinese 
philosophy. First, an anthropological model with a special emphasis on feeling must be 
constructed, for which Whitehead’s process philosophy will be employed as theoretic tool. 
Second, there must be a movement towards an archeological study of the human heart-mind, 
with the hope of establishing commensurability in light of the original status of the heart-mind. 
Finally, the limitation of axiological imagination will be illustrated with a comparison between 
cosmological and ontological creativity.  
Human Equilibrium as Value Processing Center 
 
Espousing the view of a value-laden cosmos, I would like to propose a type of 
anthropology that anchors on feeling. This type of anthropology leads to an epistemology that 
avoids the Cartesian dualism from the very beginning. Every bit of feeling can be dissected into 
three major components, namely, the external stimulation, the internal sensation, and the initial 
form that comes with the sensation. If we render bit as the most basic unit of feeling, then each 
“bit” of feeling contains at the same time the objective stimulation, the subjective apprehension, 
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and the value judgment which is the harmonizing principle imposed upon both ends. Thus, every 
bit of feeling integrates the external, the internal and the subjectivity. To put in axiological terms, 
each bit of feeling is the external value being apprehended by the human subject accompanied 
with an evaluation that comes inseparably with the apprehension. Each bit of feeling presupposes 
the subject as the value processing center, the objective value from a value-laden universe and 
the action of value judgment.  
The Notion of Feeling in Peircean Semiotics 
A single feeling is comparable to the Leibniz’s “monad”, or the Whitehead’s “actual 
entity”. The most definitive definition, however, comes from Charles S. Peirce, who defines 
feeling as “something that refuses further division”. It belongs to the category of “firstness”, 
which, in the Peircean epistemology, stands for the “suchness” prior to the arousing of reaction 
or synthetic theorizing. Here is what Peirce defines as “a feeling”:  
By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which involves no 
analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in part of any 
act by which one stretch of consciousness is distinguished from another, which has its 
own positive quality which consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is, 
however it may have been brought about ; so that if this feeling is present during a lapse 
of time, it is wholly and equally present at every moment of that time.
22
 
 
The difference between my definition of a “bit” of feeling and that of Peircean “a 
feeling” is quite subtle and slim. It seems that the Peircean notion emphasizes the dyadic nature 
of feeling that bridges the subject and object, whereas mine appears to be more triadic. In 
addition to the Peircean dyadic, my definition places an emphasis on a third dimension of the 
initial value judgment from the subject. Nevertheless, on another occasion, Peirce also stresses 
the “conscious element”: “… by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort of element of 
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 Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), 152. 
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consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else.” Or, more 
directly, feeling is “… an immediate consciousness”, and “… entire consciousness at any one 
instant is nothing but a feeling…”23 In a word, the Peircean notion of feeling also involves the 
subject, only that it is a first impression on a static consciousness. My definition, in contrast, 
involves the evaluative activity of the human subject as a value processing center. The 
adjustment is made due to a consideration of the very nature of axiological epistemology. I 
consider the evaluative activity as immediate and inevitable when an aesthetic stimulation is 
impressed on the conscious. It is more sensible to let the cycle of feeling complete itself, and 
then define it as a basic unit, a “bit”. Even though I do not follow Peircean categories strictly, the 
Peircean theory of semiotics will be employed heavily in the following discussion of value 
transference.  
This axiological definition of feeling bears some similarities to Whitehead’s definition. 
First, feelings in both definitions are non-representational. Both affirm experience not as a 
representation of ideas but as vehicles whereby a subject grasps external values and incorporates 
them as components of their own constitution. Second, Whitehead’s feeling as positive 
prehension comes with a subjective form that appropriates datum towards satisfaction. In other 
words, both definitions imply value judgment and preference, either in the evaluative activity or 
during a concrescent process. Nevertheless, feelings as defined in this project are narrower than 
those of process theory, as that theory centers on the human subject as actual occasion with self 
consciousness. In addition, the prehension of data is also narrowed mostly to value 
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appropriation.
24
 Other than the narrowing of scope, the general structure and terminologies of 
Whitehead’s philosophical work apply extensively in the current project. In fact, the human 
heart-mind as the feeling equilibrium is to be perceived as an actual occasion that’s incessantly 
prehending external values and appropriating it with certain structure.   
Modern western ways of thinking value rational and volitional models rather than this 
feeling model. From a positivistic or mathematical standpoint, feelings are usually dismissed as 
superficial, fickle and blind. Yet a practical examination of thinking indicates that feelings not 
only precede reason but also sink much deeper into the human core. Compared with feelings, 
reason is a later add-on. Reason belongs to the Peircean category of “thirdness”, or comes not 
until the level of “theory” in Neville’s epistemology. It is with feelings that we first prehend the 
world around us. Experience comes first from feelings. Reason comes only as feelings are 
organized and structured. Reason shifts and adapts itself as feelings incorporate novel data from 
the external world. Both the human subject and the world display accidental/incidental 
characteristics beyond what reason can predict. The real world and real life are replete with 
creativities and novelties for which reason cannot claim credit.   
This feeling model of anthropology finds strong support in the Confucian way of 
thinking. The Confucians have long interpreted the human heart-mind (xin, 心) as a synergy of 
feelings. Among the first several lines of Chung-yung, there are expressions as follows:   
Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused it is called centrality. 
When the feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called 
harmony. Centrality is the great foundation of the world, and harmony is its universal 
path. To cultivate centrality and harmony with thoroughness is the way to being heaven 
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and earth to their proper place and all things their proper nourishment.
25
   
 
Chung Yung depicts for us an axiological model of anthropology, in which the human 
subject is perceived as an equilibrium with innate feelings and emotions. When each bit of 
feelings is defined, as above, as the equilibrium’s evaluative activity in responding to external 
stimulation, then there is obviously a continuum that weaves together the value-laden cosmos 
with the equilibrium as the value processing center. In other words, the human heart-mind, as 
feeling equilibrium, lays down at the subjective side a foundation of axiological epistemology. 
De (德) as objective value scattered in myriad entities can be apprehended by and transferred 
into the feeling equilibrium. De (德) as a clustered bits of feelings are absorbed by the 
equilibrium. The equilibrium, after absorbing the De (德), evolves to a new condition with a 
refined taste. The refined equilibrium then serves as the source from which subjective forms well 
up, which set up another round of value projection and transference. Of course, this ideal process 
can be carried out in real axiological practice only by means of semiotic vehicles such as signs, 
symbols, and concepts. The essence of spirituality encrypts itself in the process of this 
axiological interaction. Sages, or saints, as prototypes of spiritually advanced figures are those 
who embody De (德) with great abundance, and with harmonious patterns and structures. They 
are also characterized by extremely refined tastes that may serve as a paradigm of the value 
generating or sign making process. Many of their value generating endeavors produce signs and 
symbols that enter public circulation as semiotic currency. This anthropological model of 
axiological equilibrium depicts spirituality as a dynamic value making and value exchanging 
process between the value-laden cosmos, the feeling equilibrium and the semiotic public.  
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The Confucian Way of Self-Cultivation 
According to the above analysis, spirituality bears both a private and a public side. 
Individual, private spiritual cultivation involves the refinement of equilibrium under external 
stimuli. This is an indispensable effort that can only be performed by an individual human 
subject. Chung-Yung advocates “self-watchfulness when alone” (Shen Du, 慎独) as a way of 
personal cultivation. To be “cautious over what he does not see” and “apprehensive over what he 
does not hear”26, and to let the consciousness examine the subtle manifestations of the feelings 
that are innate to the equilibrium, is suggested by Professor Tu Wei-ming, as the profound 
person’s process toward an ever-deepening subjectivity.27 Such a private mode is immediately 
superseded by the public mode the moment semiosis becomes involved. Semiotics is the way 
through which most values are encapsulated and apprehended by the equilibrium. Even when we 
do receive aesthetic stimuli directly from the external world, what they arouse is usually second-
hand values the equilibrium inherited from semiotic currency. It is significantly less common for 
a well cultured equilibrium to invent new types of values directly responding to the raw stimuli 
from the external world. Even that kind of novelty almost inevitably involves semiosis that is 
public by nature.  
According to Professor Tu Wei-ming, the profound person’s ever deepening subjectivity 
is to be cultivated by means of self-watchfulness in the context of a fiduciary community. Both 
Professor Tu and Wing-tsit Chan rely heavily on the human subject’s internal sincerity (Cheng 
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誠) as the metaphysical basis upon which human morality is accomplished and fulfilled. Both 
Chan and Tu share unreserved confidence in human nature, as indicated in the opening lines of 
Chung Yung: 
What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow human nature is called 
the Way. Cultivating the Way is called teaching. The Way cannot be separated from us 
from a moment. What can be separated from us is not the Way.
28
 
 
Both Chan and Tu, hence, affirm sincerity as “… not just a state of mind, but an active 
force that is always transforming things and completing things, and drawing man and Heaven 
together in the same current.”29 This anthropology presupposes the innate goodness of human 
nature, which, in turn, diminishes the necessity of searching for values from external sources. 
This undue confidence characterizes the Confucian spirituality with an unbalanced emphasis on 
subjectivity, which finds its iconic expression in Wang Yang-ming’s “Achieving the Good 
Conscious” (致良知). What I believe is that both Chan and Tu, as well as Zi Si (子思) as the 
original author of Chung Yung, confused potentiality with reality. In other words, the axiological 
equilibrium does bear infinite potentiality towards perfect harmony, which can be realized to 
various degrees only with the aid of objective values.  
It is true that human equilibrium is endowed with infinite potentialities. Chang Chung-
yuan, in his remarkable book Creativity and Taoism, illustrates this feature with two apt 
concepts, the “invisible ground of sympathy” and the “immeasurable potentialities of 
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creativity”.30 Chang originally designates these two basic characters to Dao. Yet I find it applies 
perfectly to equilibrium as human innate Dao. By “invisible ground of sympathy”, Chang refers 
to a fundamental ontological condition of the equilibrium, that it contains within it the entire 
universe. Sympathy in Chang’s context is equivalent to the notion of feeling in my definition. 
The equilibrium contains the universe by “feeling with” the universe. In axiological language, 
the human equilibrium contains the potentiality of prehending and embodying all possible values 
of this universe. This constitutes the ontology of human equilibrium. It might be easier to 
understand Chang’s point of view by rendering it with Whiteheadian language. Human 
equilibrium as an actual occasion prehends the whole universe with its feelings; and serves as a 
portal through which eternal objects come into being. However, Whitehead didn’t confuse the 
potentiality of eternal objects with actual entities with experiential datum. Neither did Chang blur 
the distinction between reality and the “immeasurable potentialities of creativity.” 
 
Human Equilibrium as Depicted in Chung Yung (中庸) 
How is the potentiality of the equilibrium actualized? There are two preconditions for this 
process: the objective existence of values in the axiological cosmos and the transcendental nature 
of the human equilibrium. So far, we’ve already pinned down the objective existence of value in 
the axiological universe. It is time for us to examine carefully the transcendental nature of the 
equilibrium. The human equilibrium is nowhere close to the Lockean tabula rasa. Pre-existent 
tendencies, tastes, desires, emotions, appetites, always exist in the equilibrium as transcendental 
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forms that shape the value exchanging process. Whitehead, for instance, defines feelings as 
constituent to subjectivity, from which we cannot retreat,  
Anger, hatred, fear, terror, attraction, love, hunger, eagerness, massive enjoyment, are 
feelings and emotions closely entwined with the primitive functioning of “retreat from” 
and of “expansion towards.” They arise in the higher organism as states due to a vivid 
apprehension that some such primitive mode of functioning is dominating the organism. 
But “retreat from” and “expansion towards,” … are merely reactions to the way 
externality is impressing on us its own character. You cannot retreat from mere 
subjectivity; for subjectivity is what we carry with us.
31
  
 
Whitehead is in harmony with Chung Yung here, in that the equilibrium is also portrayed 
with innate modes of feelings such as pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy. I call these feeling modes 
transcendental for two reasons. First, these modes come as innate categories within the 
equilibrium as a value processing center. As Whitehead puts it, there is no way to escape them 
because they are part of our subjectivity. Second, both our value experience of the external world 
and the refinement of equilibrium depend on these categories. Without these transcendental 
categories, the equilibrium may not be able to impart the subject form in the value making 
process, and our entire axiological experience will lose subjective grab. Where do the 
transcendental categories come from? Chung Yung proposes a hypothesis that they come from 
Heaven, as the very first line of the text reads, “What Heaven imparts to man is called human 
nature”.  
If, as shown, all transcendental categories are the same and common to all equilibriums, 
what is the purpose of self-cultivation? How can we differentiate qualities of equilibriums? How 
can we measure the progress of spiritual endeavor? What is the norm by which we evaluate 
equilibriums? The answer lies in the two concepts advocated by Chung Yung, namely, 
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Commensurability (Zhong jie 中节) and Harmony (He, 和). As suggested by Professor Tu Wei-
ming, the very title of Chung Yung can be transliterated as Centrality and Commonality. 
Commonality carries with it the notion of equilibrium as common to every human subject, along 
with the innate transcendental categories. Furthermore, the axiological nature of equilibrium 
determines also the valuative practices as common to all human subjects. As Chung Yung claims, 
“The way of the profound person functions everywhere and yet is hidden. Men and women of 
simple intelligence can practice; and yet in its utmost reaches, there is something even the sage 
cannot accomplish.”32  
Centrality as virtue of the equilibrium denotes two basic shades of meanings. On one 
hand, centrality denotes a condition of the equilibrium before feelings and emotions have been 
aroused. It is an unbiased condition when the haecceity of the world is perceived as a mirror 
reflection, without any twist or ambiguity. It is the ideal condition of the mind Wang Yang-ming 
struggled to achieve with his notion of Achieving the Good Conscious (致良知). It is the repose 
of the equilibrium in its tranquility without any valuative activity. On the other hand, centrality 
connotes also the ideal condition where all external stimulis are appropriated with 
commensurable feeling bits of pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy. In other word, it stands for the 
harmonious exercises of transcendental categories in responding to external stimulis with perfect 
precision. The equilibrium works like a perfect scale that weights the external situation with 
exact accuracy, and then attributes to it the accurate amount of the right feelings, except that all 
these evaluative activities are carried out in an ever-changing dynamic process. This centrality 
requires an equilibrium that’s highly tuned, without the least bit of torque. Such equilibrium is 
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not value free. It actually embodies abundant virtues with proper structure. Furthermore, such 
equilibrium also attains elegant dexterity in praxis. 
  This kind of equilibrium and praxis represent the ideal norm of Confucian spirituality. 
Cultivating equilibrium of this kind is a strenuous task that every serious Confucian scholar 
embarks on as life-long project. In order to pave practical paths that help to lead to such a 
seemingly impossible height, Confucian scholars dissect the ideal equilibrium into various slices, 
and employ musical concepts as metaphorical explanations. In traditional Chinese terminology, 
one individual musical instrument finishing one piece is called “small achievement”. When 
many musical instruments play together in a harmonious way, and finish one piece, it is called 
“great achievement”. Metaphorically, when a single type of De (德) is prehended, absorbed and 
incorporated into the equilibrium, and being exercised smoothly and elegantly, the equilibrium 
reaches the stage of “small achievement”. When various kinds of virtues are integrated into the 
equilibrium with proper structure, and are exercised with maturity, the equilibrium is then 
believed to have reached the stage of “great achievement”. During thousands of years of Chinese 
history, very few Confucians have reached the stage of “great achievement”, with few 
exceptions, such as Confucius himself.  
Now, as with all other aesthetic or ethical prehensions, “great achievement” serves as the 
ideal norm of axiological practice. Though extremely difficult to attain in reality, it seems to be 
implicitly built in as the ideal common to all equilibriums. This, probably, is what Chang Chung-
yuan means by “immeasurable potentialities of creativity.” A major portion of Orthodox 
Confucian scholars misplaced the concreteness of their academic and practical endeavors upon 
this innate ideal of perfect harmony. This includes Zi Si, Mencisu, Zhu Xi, Wang Yang-ming 
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and many others through many generations. Only scholars with practical minds, such as Xun Zi 
and Wang Fu Zhi, understood the seriousness of primordial chaos in uncultivated equilibriums. 
These are the scholars who have recognized the necessity and urgency of laws and rituals as 
indispensible mechanisms of maintaining social harmony.  
Equilibrium as Value Judging Center 
The above analysis advocates a proper handling of nature. Peirce, however, reversed the 
direction with a discussion in which human subjects are classified in terms of the ways they 
handle nature. The Peircean discussion of the human subject leads to novel insights on the notion 
of equilibrium. He divided human subjects into three categories.  
If we endeavor to form our conceptions upon history and life, we remark three classes of 
men.  The first consists of those for whom the chief thing is the qualities of feelings.  
These men create art.  The second consists of the practical men, who carry on the 
business of the world.  They respect nothing but power and respect power only insofar as 
it is exercised.  The third class consists of men to whom nothing seems great but reason.  
If force interests them, it is not in its exertion, but in that it has a reason and a law.  For 
men of the first class, nature is a picture; for men of the second class, it is an opportunity; 
for men of the third class, it is a cosmos, so admirable, that to penetrate to its ways seems 
to them to be the only thing that makes life worth living.
33
 
 
This classification, according to John Fitzgerald, manifests the fundamental characteristic of the 
scientific man who desires to learn merely for the sake of learning itself. He does not pursue 
truth for the sake of power or pleasure.
34
 The Peircean scientists share common features with the 
Confucian sage.  There is a sense of learning for the self in both models.  The self is not, first and 
foremost, viewed as the being-in-self which precludes almost all accessibility.  It is this ossified 
concept of being-in-itself that started the whole process of shutting down the symbolic meaning 
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of nature, imprisoning humanity in the iron cage, depleting from it all possible meaning and 
value. There are probably not too many philosophical terms that have done and been doing such 
great harm to the inquiry of sincere humanity. Phenomenologists like Husserl and Heidegger 
attempted to circumvent that impasse. Yet what they did was no better than planting the flower 
of meaning on an impoverished dry land. 
The remedy for the Kantian model of petrified being-in-self is the developmental open 
model of learning-for-self.  The being of being-in-self indicates a preexisting ossified entity 
which is by and large aloof from the flux of the real world. In contrast, the leaning-for-self stands 
for a developmental model of self which constantly and dynamically engages the flux of the real 
world. The result of learning-for-self is the ever growing equilibrium and harmony, along with 
an ever-changing world that’s been participated in and transformed by humanity.   
There has been a common misconception that the ancient Chinese scholars lacked the 
spirit of scientific inquiry.  If we adopt the Peircean model of scientists, we cannot but come to 
the conclusion that the authentic person in Confucianism is a person permeated with the 
scientific spirit. A scientific person goes beyond a unilateral investigation of the seemingly 
infinite things in the world.  He/she is also ready to adjust his/her lifestyle on the basis of this 
inquiry.  Scientific spirit flows from cognitive curiosity, penetrates into the behavior pattern, and 
consolidates itself in the character of a particular person. It also becomes codified as ritual and 
custom in a given community.     
Peirce sets out to change the usual emphasis in the definition of science from “a body of 
organized knowledge” to “a mode of life”.   For him the propositions and their organization are 
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the mere “exudation of science”35 The Peircean notion of scientist corresponds strikingly well 
with the Confucian scholars who regard learning as the goal of Zhi Zhi (致知, the acquiring of 
knowledge), which occupies a vital position in the process of self-cultivation.  
Self-cultivation is simultaneously a cultivation of the equilibrium as the tranquil state of 
mind, and harmony as its dynamic state. The creative moment lies subtly on the borderline of the 
equilibrium and harmony. It is the value judging action that, on the one hand, rectifies the 
equilibrium, and on the other hand, responds with appropriate emotions to the stimulus of 
external harmony. Each value judging action reveals and challenges the structure of the existent 
equilibrium. The equilibrium engages the external world by attempts to impose value patterns 
onto the engaged harmony. It produces real consequences to the engaged harmony, either 
promoting it to a more perfected pattern or distorting it in the direction of chaos. The mind (心, 
Xin) in Confucianism is nowhere close to the Lockean tabula rasa. Preexisting tendencies, 
tastes, desires, emotions, appetites, are always present in the mind. Mind as a product of nature 
has its intrinsic value. Or, more directly speaking, mind has its own harmony. There is not a 
moment when the mind is void of any value judgment. From the very beginning to the end of its 
existence, the human mind is always value-laden. Harmony of mind in a new-born baby tends to 
be structured more in the biological sense. As the mind grows, more and more external patterns 
of harmony will be incorporated, and thus the mind improves with higher levels of harmony. The 
mind increases its value as the harmony extends its scope and increases its density. Through the 
aesthetic and semiotic broad way, external value and harmony are apprehended and assimilated 
into the mind. This process results in real progress on the mind’s harmonious pattern. This 
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project of self-cultivation finds its best expression in the opening line of The Great Learning, 
“The Way of learning to be great consists in manifesting the clear character, loving the people, 
and abiding in the highest good.”36
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE CHANNELS OF VALUE TRANSACTION 
 
An Introductory Note on the Concept of De (德) 
 
The previous chapters elaborated on the axiological nature of the universe and its myriad 
existences. The human essence that corresponds to the value-laden universe is the model that 
views human beings as the equilibrium of feeling, which is constantly and dynamically 
connected both with the external world and the transcendent Ultimate. What bridges the external 
value and the inner value processing center is the concept of De (德), which is the essential 
category of this project. De (德) as defined by traditional Chinese spirituality is to be respected 
as one of the core concepts that stand on par with other essential concepts such as Heaven, Earth 
and Dao, from which the entire culture can be re-capitulated from an axiological perspective. 
Corresponding to the major channels of value internalization proposed in this project, the 
significance of De (德), can be analyzed in four ways.  Aesthetically, De (德) as intrinsic values 
embodied in a myriad of natural entities is in communication with and comprehensible by the 
human equilibrium as a value processing center. In other words, external value as aesthetic 
stimuli may arouse various feelings as fibers within the human equilibrium, and be captured in 
ways that are either effable or ineffable. Semiotically, when De (德) is captured and expressed in 
the form of signs, symbols and rituals, it enters into a semiotic market that dramatically enhances 
its efficacy. The semiotic processing of De (德) constitutes one aspect of the ethical stage. The 
other aspect of the ethical stage finds concrete embodiment in actions that are under the 
influence of De (德), whether in the form of individual behavior patterns that usually result in 
character, or in the collective form of rituals that makes crucial components of ethos and 
cultures. The communal aspect of De (德) cannot be over-exaggerated, because De (德) needs to 
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be practiced and attained within a communal context. De (德) also functions as a transcendent 
category that bears supernatural significance. According to ancient Chinese tradition, De (德) is 
shared by the Royal Supreme Lord of Heaven (皇天上帝) and the sages as representatives of 
enlightened humanity. Chinese tradition cherishes an axiological version of the Ultimate as the 
perfect embodiment of De (德) in its infinite form. The virtuous connotation of the Ultimate 
undergirds the universe and its myriad existences as the source of all natural values. In short, De 
(德) in Chinese spirituality paves the way that enables humanity access to the Ultimate.  
Aesthetic Appreciation and Semiotic Prehension 
 
As Angle rightly pointed out, the original etymological meaning of De (德) is closely 
related to the cognate term De (得), which means to receive or attain (Angle 2009, 53). Similar 
ideas can also be found in the works of Zhu Xi and Wang Yang-ming. At certain places in the 
Classified Conversations of Master Zhu, Zhu Xi uttered explicitly that De (德) is “attaining it for 
oneself”1. Similar statements can be found in Wang Yang-ming’s work, only that Wang 
appeared to be more introspective. Wang States, “One calls the Heavenly mandate within my 
nature, when I attain De (得) this nature, one calls it De (德)”2. Beyond this traditional 
interpretation, I propose the following hypothesis: What De (德) attains are values that are 
scattered in nature and its myriad entities, the aesthetic appreciation of which is the first and 
fundamental step of the human equilibrium embarking on the journey of spirituality. To be more 
specific, aesthetic appreciation finds expressions in the Daoist ineffable non-differential ecstatic 
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union with nature, the Confucian effable expression that consists of name-rectifying and the 
whole enterprise of semiotic construction. The theoretical model that will be extremely useful in 
this section will be Peirce’s semiosis.  
Peirce defined his semiotic theory as “the cenoscopic science of signs” (Collected 
Papers, 8.343).
3
 “Cenoscopic” was a term coined by Jeremy Bentham “… from two Greek 
words, one of which signifies common—things being to others in common, and the other looking 
to.”4 According to Peirce, commonalities tend to “… escape the untrained eye precisely because 
they permeate our whole lives, just as a man who never takes off his blue spectacles soon ceases 
to see the blue tinge” (Collected Papers, 1.241). Semiosis is thus the method of cenoscopic 
observation that “comes within the range of every man’s normal experience.”5 This is exactly the 
reason some scholars, for instance Tu Wei-ming, translated the title of Chong Yong (中庸) as 
Centrality and Commonalities. The concept of Centrality refers to an unbiased appreciation of 
the universe and its myriad entities, whereas Commonalities connotes the perception Peirce 
expressed in the above passages, as well as the convictions of the Scottish Philosophy of 
Common Sense, that truth exists not in obscured esoteric knowledge, but comes from proper 
observations of common existences in mundane life. This does not imply that truth is plainly 
accessible to everyone. As Peirce pointed out, what is most common may well go unnoticed until 
there is reason to notice it (Collected Papers 1.242). In other words, the very reason the great 
Dao tends to be concealed and slip away unnoticed is because of its pervasive existence in our 
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mundane life. For the most common existences, our minds tend to shut down, and their meaning 
becomes too slippery for the commoners. Yet, if the Ultimate is benevolent and shows no 
favoritism, as portrayed by most of the Confucianists, the great Dao ought to surround us and be 
accessible by all. Any philosophy that discovers the key of identifying the meaning and 
significance of mundane existences discovers the entrance to the great Dao. This is exactly what 
Peirce intended to do with his semiotic theories. According to Peirce, what he means by sign is 
anything that can be said to have meaning. Peirce’s theory of sign is a theory of discovering 
meanings and significances by engaging every mundane existence as meaning-bearing vehicle. 
To facilitate a better understanding of this important point, some brief explanations of the 
Peircean theory on sign and interpretant will be helpful.   
Investigation of Things 
 
The Confucian doctrine on Investigation of Things can be understood as an axiological 
application of the Peircean semiotic theory. As I have pointed out in the previous chapter, 
traditional Chinese philosophy projected a value-laden universe, affirming the ubiquitous 
existence of value in the universe and its myriad existences. Practically, the objectively existent 
external values have been incessantly apprehended and integrated into the Chinese culture. 
Throughout the history of China, there has been no technical theory that provides anatomic 
analysis of this value transactional procedure with sufficient perspicuity. The absence of this 
kind of analysis accounts for the failure of Wang Yang-ming who in this youth launched an 
abortive endeavor of putting this Da Xue (大学) doctrine into practice with a three-day intensive 
investigation of the cluster of bamboos in his court yard. Peircean semiotic theory, for the first 
time, provides a systematic explanation with practical tools for value apprehension. The vastness 
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and pervasiveness of the theory matches the Confucian belief that values exist ubiquitously in 
mundane commonalities. Peirce defines the concept of sign with enormous generality and 
breadth. According to Peirce, anything may function as a sign as long as it represents another 
object or determines an interpretants. Moreover, the same object may function as different signs 
which give rise to an infinite number of interpretant. For instance, Han Ying (韩婴), a Confucian 
scholar in West Han (西汉), exercised a keen investigation on chicken, and summarized its 
character as having five virtues (De 德): “[the] cockscomb on the head symbolizes cultivated 
nobility; being armed with a sharp claw stands for power; fearlessness before enemies embodies 
bravery; cooing to inform others when seeing food is a manifestation of benevolence; devotion to 
the duty of night watchman, it illustrates the virtue of faithfulness.
6
  
The above axiological investigation of the virtues (De 德) of chicken illustrates some of 
the distinguishable characteristics of Peircean semiosis. First, values are so scattered as to be 
found in places as common as ordinary chickens. Lying behind this conviction is the belief that 
we live in a value-laden universe, along with faith in a version of the Ultimate that is benevolent 
enough to render the truth to commoners. Second, all virtues have their seminal root in the 
objective characters of natural existence. In other words, contrary to the modern bias that values 
are mere mental properties concocted by the hyperactive human psyche, values have concrete 
foundations that are verifiable by objective criteria. Third, any single natural entity may serve as 
an axiological diamond which, with its multi-facets, gives rise to an infinite variety of 
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interpretant which, in turn, yield infinite possibilities of moral fruit. Fourth, the Confucian 
axiological interpretation characterizes itself with certain trends, which themselves are signs of 
ingrained habits. That is to say, no interpretation happens in a vacuum. The equilibrium of the 
interpreting agent is loaded with previously acquired values, and thus displays certain habits and 
tastes as factors that determine the general orientations of ensuing interpretive activities. These 
inclinations are true both for the individual equilibrium and for cultural traditions with collective 
dispositions.  
The most relevant methodological tool provided by Peirce is his discussion of the notion 
of interpretant. According to Peirce, the interpretant is that determination of which the immediate 
cause, or determinant, is the Sign, of which the mediate cause is the Object may be termed the 
interpretant (CP 6.347). At other places, Peirce calls the interpretant the “proper significant 
effect” (5.475). The interpretant can thus be construed as an encounter between the subject and 
the object. A genuine encounter creates something new that arises between the subject and the 
object. A certain aspect of the object registers and is recognized by the subject as bearing 
something significant. That determinant of the object stirs up something within the realm of the 
subject. The attraction between certain aspect(s) of the subject and the object leads to a 
meaningful engagement between the two, which in turn results in the re-interpretation of the 
object, as well as the re-configuration of the subject.  
It is true that the locating of the interpretant differs from culture to culture. A culture 
tends to progress along the path of tradition, and then push it further, extending it in depth and 
breadth. Any natural entity has the potential of serving as infinite source of interpretant. The 
reason why some interpretants stick out as noticeable and appealing to the interpreter is due to a 
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habit that the interpreter already acquired in previous interpreting activities. Hence, the formation 
of the interpretant itself is a product of the interpreter under the stimulation of external values, 
and at the same time the novelties that are about to be incorporated into the equilibrium for its 
ongoing concrescence.   
Peirce’s classification of interpretants sketched out the process through which external 
values are appreciated and prehended. He distinguished three major types of interpretant, 
namely, the immediate, the dynamical and the final.
7
 According to Peirce, the immediate 
interpretant is “the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the sign itself” (CP 
4.536). The emphasis here, as Fitzgerald pointed out, is on the interpretability of the sign, on its 
fitness to be interpreted in a certain way. In the context of this project, we may define the 
interpretant as the initial contact between the agent equilibrium and the natural entity as sign. At 
this stage, the primordial bundle of feelings, although it already has its idiosyncratic 
characteristics, remains in an unthematic, disorganized, primordial condition, waiting to be 
differentiated, articulated and expressed. Due to the semiotic nature of our existence, the 
equilibrium approaches the natural entity with inborn urges of hunting for significant aspects of 
the entity, with a priori appetite for rendering them as sign-vehicles to be employed in the service 
of value transaction between the agent equilibrium and its surrounding environment. This is to 
say, humans as semiotic beings do not merely depend upon the environment for their physical 
energy, their survival and ability to thrive depend also on the semiotic potentials of natural 
entities. The Peircean notion of immediate interpretant stands at the initial stage of the sign-
making process, when the feelings of equilibrium detect in the engaged entity potential values 
                                                 
7
 Charles S. Peirce’s Letters to Lady Welby, ed. I. C. Lieb (New Haven, Whitlock’s, 1953), 36. 
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that can be appreciated or prehended, in the same way a predator detects the smell or a clue of 
prey in the field. No real value transaction happens at this stage.   
In Peirce’s scheme, what comes after the immediate interpretant is the dynamical type, 
which in turn consists of three sub-types-- the emotional, the energetic and the logical.
8
 These 
are a set of categories which dovetail perfectly with the Confucian notions of investigation of 
things and rectifying names as sign-making processes. According to Peirce, the dynamic 
interpretant comes into being when a sign starts to bear “actual effect” upon an interpreter (CP 
4.536). The first layer of actual effect lies at the feeling and emotional level:  
The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it. There is almost 
always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the proper 
effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight. This 
“emotional interpretant”, as I call it, may amount to much more than that feeling of 
recognition; and in some cases, is the only proper significate effect that a sign produces. 
(CP 5.475) 
 
Obviously, as a sub-category of dynamic interpretant, the emotional interpretant signifies 
a formal engagement of the sign with the interpreting equilibrium with efficacious impact. 
Through the sensory organs of the interpreting agent, bundles of information are prehended by 
the interpreter’s synergies of feelings. According to Peirce’s definition, the emotional 
interpretant ranges from the first feeling of comprehension to the preparatory stage of the 
emergence of linguistic signs. It is a feeling of recognition without which no further effects of 
the sign can be operated upon the equilibrium. For many signs, emotional interpretants are the 
only effect upon the interpreter. The Daoist ineffable non-differentiated type of aesthetic 
appreciation extends from immediate interpretant to that of the emotional stage of the dynamic 
interpretant. As we have pointed out, physical and energy transactions do happen at this stage, 
                                                 
8
 John J. Fitzgerald, Peirce’s Theory of Signs as Foundation for Pragmatism (Humanities Press, New York, 
1966), 76.  
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though usually with low intensity. If feelings and emotions, as the project claims, are essential 
faculties of the equilibrium, then the emotional interpretant plays a much more important role 
that it is assigned by Peirce. Not only do the emotional interpretants work on a peripheral level 
before their conscious purposeful participation, they also function at a stage beyond the reach of 
logical signs, in the sense that at the core of the human equilibrium, there is a need for the logical 
signs to be converted back to feelings and emotions if we take the feeling model of anthropology 
seriously. Values that are semiotically encapsulated are to be restored and released to feelings 
and emotions if they want to be fully apprehended, absorbed and integrated into the equilibrium. 
This value integrating process reverses the sign-making process. Values which have been 
encapsulated in the sign-making process, are reversed and restored back to feelings and emotions 
to be fully prehended. 
For now, we are still discussing the sign-making process, for which Peirce’s theory 
applies as an effective guideline. According to Peirce, energetic and logical interpretants are the 
ones which come after the emotional interpretant. An energetic interpretant requires the active 
participation of the interpreting agent. “The effort may be a muscular one, as in the case of the 
command to ground arms; but it is much more usually an exertion upon the Inner World, a 
mental effort” (CP 5.475). Here, Peirce combines the mental participation of the imagination 
with the physical participation of actions. The mental participation will be included in next 
section’s discussion on rectifying the name, while the behavior participation will be explained 
further in the sections on actions and rituals. The validity of the emerging sign is enhanced 
significantly at the stages beyond the energetic level. According to Peirce, when a sign reaches 
the mature stage of logical interpretant, it fulfills the conditions for an interpretant in the strict 
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sense, and allows for future translations and development. In other words, the sign-making 
process completes itself within the instantiational cosmos of the interpreting agent.  The final 
interpretant, as Peirce defines, is that “which would finally be decided to be the true 
interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were 
reached” (CP 8.184). When a sign reaches the stage of final interpretant, its universal validity is 
accepted and respected by the interpreting community as a whole. At the final stage, the sign 
accomplishes its status as widely circulated common property, and becomes part of the collective 
cultural identity of the interpreting community.   
The current project relies heavily on Peircean semiotic theory as an essential 
methodological tool. Yet it goes beyond the Peircean semiosis by probing furthering into the role 
that semiosis plays in the value transaction process. Peircean semiotic theory brings forth a good 
anatomical analysis of the formation of sign. From an axiological perspective, signs are vehicles 
that can be employed in the value transaction process. Moreover, signs can also serve as building 
blocks with which the human semiotic essence is constructed. In fact, Peirce did envision a 
semiotic version of the individual self in his later years. In one of his unpublished manuscripts, 
Peirce wrote, “a mind may, with advantage, be roughly defined as a sign-creator in connection 
with a reaction-machine.”9 At another place, Peirce identifies the reaction-machine as the body 
and the symbol-creator as the mind (CP 6.61). Even though various details about the Peircean 
version of self are still open to debate, rudimentary consensus is that Peirce affirmed a 
developing model of a semiotic self, with special emphasis on the gradual acquisition of habits in 
the context of that person’s circle of society (CP 5.421).  
                                                 
9
 Vincent M. Colapietro, Peirce’s Approach to the Self (SUNY Press: New York, 1989), 89. 
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As a result, the Peircean semiosis constructs a common ground that serves as a 
foundation to both the value-laden universe and the human heart/mind as a value processing 
equilibrium. There is a homogenous continuum between the external and internal values from the 
standpoint of axiological semiosis. Starting from the Confucian practice of the investigation of 
things, external values are recognized first in the form of immediate interpretants; and then 
further engaged as emotional interpretants with thematic expressions in the practice of name-
rectifying. Then the semiotically encapsulated values achieve general validity within the sphere 
of the interpreting agent when it reaches the stage of logical interpretants. The logical 
interpretants evolve into final interpretants when recognized and accepted by the wider 
interpreting community. After a sign comes to fruition as a final interpretant, it starts a new life 
cycle among the interpreting community with much greater efficacy and popularity. Technically 
speaking, signs at immediate and dynamic stages remain in the realm of aesthetics, since, at these 
stages, value transactions happen mainly between nature and the individual human equilibrium. 
When a sign matures as a final interpretant, it enters the realm of ethics, because, after that, value 
transactions happen mainly between interpreting agents.  
The Peircean concept of interpretant occupies an important position in this axiological 
continuum. From a physiological perspective, the human mind is a dynamic web of neuron 
connections with capabilities of information transference, as well as the malleability of 
reconfiguring the structure of itself as the result of value transactions and integration. If the 
equilibrium, as I proposed, is to be understood as bundles of fibers of feelings, every bit of 
spontaneous subject form is to be converted into stimuli which travel on the neuron web. 
Similarly, external values, in the form of interpretants, can also be converted to stimuli which 
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enter the neuron web through portals of sensory organs. A dynamic convergence between the 
internal and external stimuli constitutes a continuum that places the human equilibrium and the 
universe in the same axiological matrix. On the basis of this continuum, spirituality as purposeful 
value transactions in the form of repetitive stimuli patterns results in the transformation of the 
structure of the neuron web, and thus transforms the human subject in a tangible physiological 
sense. This summarizes the core of spirituality of any kind. Under the aid of various types of 
interpretants, the neuron web of the interpreting equilibrium manages to extend its connections 
into nature and its myriad entities with the interpretants serving as footings to the significant 
value aspects of natural entities. Thus, rendering the instantiatized interpreting equilibrium as the 
center, the whole universe is to be perceived in the form of a gigantic web with an infinite 
number of connections. On this web, various types of interpretants serve as extensions of neuron 
fibers, extending beyond physical limitations, deep into the universe, with all registered entities 
enclosed in this axiological web.  
To apply the above continuum in the context of Neo-Confucianism, we might come to 
some new insight on the debate between Zhu Xi and Wang Yang-ming. Zhu Xi and his followers 
argued that the Principle (Li 理) is to be found externally in the myriad existence. He claimed 
further that the Principle is the same, yet its manifestations diversify in natural entities, a doctrine 
with a technical term called Li Yi Fen Shu (理一分殊). The normative path that leads to the 
Principle is the investigation of things. Wang, in contrast, believed that the highest good is in 
people’s minds. The right path that leads to truth is, then, no other than rectifying the mind with 
the purpose of restoring its innate goodness which is endowed by heaven, a doctrine in Wang’s 
technical term as Zhi Liang Zhi (致良知). In light of the above discussion, Wang’s approach is, 
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obviously, reductionist. Wang’s path is characterized as a sudden awakening, while espouses 
more of the type of gradual learning. Wang inherited from Mencius an optimistic view of human 
nature which claims direct revelation as not merely possible, but as a necessary condition for 
every human existence. Between Zhu and Wang, anyone with a genuine appreciation of Peircean 
semiotic epistemology will, more likely, side with Zhu. It seems to me that Wang developed his 
shortcut doctrine only after his frustration of practicing the investigation of things, and also 
under the influence of the Buddhist doctrine of sudden awakening which was then popular 
among the southern branch of Zen Buddhism. This is not to say that Wang is useless or irrelevant 
in spiritual practice. Instead, Wang’s breakthrough is in his doctrine of the unity of knowledge 
and action, as an effective means of establishing genuine connections with the surrounding 
environment, even though it may appear to be just a side-effect to the original intention of his 
doctrine. Wang’s contribution in this area will be picked up when we come to the discussion on 
action as the third channel of the value transaction. Furthermore, Wang’s notion of Liang Zhi (良
知) will later be engaged in the discussion about the function of the Ultimate.  
Rectifying the Name as the Initial Ethical Phase of Value Transaction 
 
The Confucian aesthetic appreciation in the form of investigation of things characterizes 
itself with connections between the interpreter and nature. Rectifying the name as another 
Confucian practice, however, enters the realm of ethics because its general orientation shifts 
towards the social communal realm. Even though investigation of things as an aesthetic approach 
and rectifying name as an ethical endeavor both employ signs as meditative vehicle, they are 
different in several aspects. The main difference between them is the direction of this mediating 
process. Investigation of things signifies a construction of value pathways from nature to the 
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interpreter, whereas rectifying the name reverses the direction. Investigation of things is an 
aesthetic process with the emphasis placed on nature and the values it carries. Rectifying the 
name is more of an ethical effort because it is the interpreter’s attempt to make sense of the 
world by means of semiosis. Investigation of things is centered on nature, natural entities and the 
values they carry; while rectifying the name revolves around the equilibrium in the process of 
establishing an ordered world from the focal point of subjective instantiation.  
We might come to a better understanding of these value-transaction paths by displaying 
them along the spectrum of Peircean phenomenology, in which the main categories are firstness, 
secondness and thirdness:  
[t]he first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while 
in respect to one another they are [factorially] first, second, and third. The first is thought 
in its capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague 
idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event. That is, it is of the 
general nature of experience or information. The third is thought in its role as governing 
secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it 
body. It is informing thought, or cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental 
human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign (Collected 
Papers 1.537).  
 
Peirce never defined his categories of phenomenology with due precision. There is 
always room for different interpretations of these categories. When applied to the current project, 
the efficacy of Peirce’s categories becomes obvious. What Peirce defined as “firstness” seems to 
be equivalent to the Daoist ineffable, non-differentiated, intuitive appreciation of nature and its 
myriad entities in the form of naturalistic unity. The human heart/mind as an equilibrium of 
feelings engages a certain objective natural entity prior to the rise of word, concept or theory. 
Value transactions at this stage are immediate and unmediated. Floods of aesthetic stimuli act 
directly upon the human equilibrium. Meanwhile, the equilibrium is more than a passive 
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recipient of these external stimuli. Instead, the equilibrium is involved in a dynamic process of 
mobilizing its fibers of feelings, distributing subjective forms onto the flood of stimulation, and 
coming to an unexpressed idiosyncratic impression of the targeted natural entity. This 
transactional process happens on both logical and causal levels. It is causal in the sense that the 
aesthetic stimuli do, more or less, alter the structure of the equilibrium by re-configuring the 
connections and combinations between its ions, neurons, molecules and cells, even though some 
of the alterations are minor and temporal. Impacts and changes will be much more significant at 
the stages of actions, habits, rituals and characters, where purposeful cultivation of repetitive 
practices usually result in profound, lasting or even permanent alterations.  
If the Confucian practice of investigation of things falls into the category of firstness, 
then rectifying name as another Confucian spiritual practice more towards the category of 
secondness. Secondness is an elusive category, to the point that even Peirce himself was 
sometimes not sure about its definition (CP 8.330). All that is sure about this category is that it 
stands in-between the firstness and the thirdness. When applied to this project, the Peircean 
secondness bears a lot of similarities with the Confucian notion of rectifying the names. In 
contrast to the Daoist ineffable appreciation, the Confucian practice of rectifying the name 
follows right after the Daoist non-verbal approach with the agent’s effort of articulating the 
experience which once was ineffable. As Peirce pointed out, our only direct knowledge of it is in 
the willing and the experiencing of a perception. It is in willing that the secondness comes out 
most strongly (CP 1.532). In the same passage, Peirce went further to admit that the boundary 
between secondness and thirdness is rather blurry. The current project faces a similar challenge 
in how to differentiate the realm of aesthetics and that of ethics. I assign the Confucian practice 
104 
 
 
 
of investigation of things to the realm of aesthetics and rectifying name to the realm of ethics, 
simply because there is a sense of directness in the former without necessarily referring to any 
system or intention, whereas the latter entails taxonomy, linguistic system and social 
communities. There is a built-in thirdness underlying Peircean phenomenological categories, due 
to the fact that the triadic system is itself a theory, which, by definition, is a kind of thirdness. 
Only when the interpreting agent reaches the stage of thirdness, can the firstness and secondness 
be recognized and defined. The obscurity of the first two categories comes partially from the 
existence of thirdness as the precondition of their definition. From this standpoint, we may make 
an assertion that there is no pure firstness or secondness. These two categories are contingent 
upon the existence of the thirdness, and they are categories established retrospectively after the 
theory of thirdness is achieved.   
On the grand scheme of Confucian social engineering, rectifying names comes after 
investigation of things. Zheng (正), the Chinese character of rectifying, connotes the bringing of 
order out of a chaotic situation by applying normative standards. The very definition of the term 
implies its major location in the thirdness of the Peircean category. Rectifying the name is a 
systematic project, because the clear definition of any specific term requires distinction from 
other neighboring terms with definitive boundaries. Rectifying one name, hence, necessarily 
involves a web of terms, of which specific names are just dots of connections on the web. 
Rectifying names is also a normative effort conducted in light of the norms of a greater scheme. 
In the case of the Confucian naming project, the underlying norms are moral constants such as 
benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and faithfulness.  
105 
 
 
 
The doctrine of rectifying names was first proposed by Confucius, and was carried on by 
Confucianists such as Xun Zi and Meng Zi. The first explicit reference to the doctrine appeared 
in the Analects:  
Zi Lu said, "The ruler of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you to administer 
the government. What will you consider the first thing to be done?" The Master replied, 
"What is necessary is to rectify names." "So! indeed!" said Zi Lu. "You are wide of the 
mark! Why must there be such rectification?" The Master said, "How uncultivated you 
are, You! A superior man, in regard to what he does not know, shows a cautious reserve. 
If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language 
be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. 
When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music will not flourish. 
When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. 
When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand 
or foot. Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be 
spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. 
What the superior man requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect."
10
 
 
From the above passage it is clear that the first and foremost task for proper governing it 
to rectify names, a surprising answer to Zi Lu, the inquirer. Rectifying names is of rudimentary 
importance in bringing order and harmony out of social and political chaos. What Confucius 
meant here by the term “rectifying names” was the proper definition of the ideal norms 
embodied in the roles, positions and rituals, a task he had been pursuing throughout his life, and 
which was epitomized in the Spring and Autumn Annals. According to Confucius, only after 
names are properly rectified can society be expected to be governed harmoniously. In the 
foreword of Zuo Zhuan, one of the exegetical interpretations on the Spring and Autumn Annaul, 
it was stated that Confucius complied the narrative history as a way of envisioning his ideal 
society. What lies beneath this seemingly simple historical documentation is a set of normative 
standards with which Confucius measured kings, social institutions and other historical figures. 
                                                 
10四书五经之《论语 子路》，宋元人注 （上），中国书店出版，1989。 
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In the midst of existential social upheavals, Confucius created categories that placed complicated 
historical variations into proper orders. In the midst of narratives, Confucius praised and blamed 
with keen and subtle application of well-defined categories. It was believed that traitors and 
usurpers were intimidated by historians like Confucius because they were scared at the 
possibility of being nailed on the pole of shame. For instance, Confucius used six characters to 
record a political struggle between the ruler Duke Zheng (郑) and his younger brother Duan (段) 
in the year of 722 B.C.. The original entry in the chronicles was just six words: “Duke Zheng 
defeated Duan at Yan” (郑伯克段于鄢)11. Such a short phrase was loaded with richly nuanced 
subtleties by the various shading of terminologies. First, Duan (段), the defeated rebeller, was 
the younger brother of Duke Zheng. Confucius omitted the title of “Brothers” as Xiong (兄 elder 
brother) or Di (弟 younger brother) with the direct use of names. It is a satirical expression that 
mocks the elder brother for lacking the virtue of friendliness (友), the kind of brotherly 
benevolence that an elder sibling is supposed to hold for the younger ones. Neither had the 
younger brother demonstrated any virtue of Ti (悌), the kind of brotherly deference that a 
younger sibling should hold for the elder ones. In a word, Confucius upbraided both brothers 
with well-defined, value-loaded categories, in this case, the absence of proper titles that would 
not be omitted in normal situations. Second, Confucius used the term “defeat” (ke 克), which 
implies a battle between equal forces, rather than “a punitive expedition” (fa 伐), which is more 
suitable for a king overpowering one of his vassals. Third, the entry starts with Duke Zheng, with 
the implication that the Duke, as elder brother, failed to discipline the younger. Instead, he 
                                                 
11四书五经之《春秋三传》，宋元人注 （下），中国书店出版，1989, 37. 
107 
 
 
 
accommodated and indulged his young brother’s malevolence so that he could find an excuse to 
dislodge the young brother from his fief. The order of the syntax suggests that Duke Zheng 
merited at least some of the reproach.  
At another place, Confucius suggested that good government is possible only if a king 
behaves like a king, a minister behaves like a minister, a father behaves like a father, and a son 
behaves like a son.
12
 For social roles like king, minister, father and son, it is not enough to 
occupy the positions nominally. Rather, it is necessary for those who hold the positions to 
embody the specific virtues that are correspondent to those positions. A king should engage the 
minister according to ritual propriety, and the minister serves the king with sincerity and 
faithfulness; a father ought to be benevolent, and the son should practice filial piety; an elder 
brother ought to be friendly, and the young brother should be deferential; a husband ought to 
treat the wife with righteousness, and the wife should be obedient.
13
 As Cheng Chungying points 
out, “… rectifying names has practical significance for human conduct and is not merely a matter 
of the correct use of language.” It is to “… establish standards of the true, the good, and the 
right.”14 Confucius’ contribution to Chinese culture, thus, can hardly be over-exaggerated. He 
was among the few who laid the normative foundation for this culture. Despite the transience of 
worldly affairs, as long as the Chinese people preserve their language, there is no way to escape 
the normative influence of this value system. In times of upheaval and chaos, these normative 
categories both judge and condemn the culprits and lawbreakers. In times of peace and 
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 《礼记·礼运》: “何谓人义？父慈，子孝，兄良，弟悌，夫义，妇听，长惠，幼顺，君仁，臣忠” 
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 Cheng Chung-ying, New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosophy (SUNY Press: New 
York, 1991), 224. 
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prosperity, these categories help to deepen the density of individual existence and enhance the 
social harmony.  
What Confucius achieved with these normative categories is a version of ethical realism. 
By “ethical realism”, I mean that all Confucian ethical categories, such as king and kingly 
benevolence, minister and ministerial sincerity and faithfulness, father and the fatherly kindness, 
son and filial piety, all have a practical power that creates and sustains orderly communities. The 
current project, however, goes one step further by proposing a version of naturalistic realism, 
which, along with ethical realism, composes what I called axiological realism. Unlike ethical 
realism which regulates social relations with normative ethical categories, naturalistic realism 
illustrates a direct relatedness between values scattered in nature and the foundational categories 
of a cultural system. Naturalistic realism as one of the major constituent parts of axiological 
realism serves as a bridge that connects the aesthetic and the ethical realms. This picks up where 
we left off in the previous section, pushing forward in constructing a smooth cannel that allows 
values to travel between nature and human equilibrium. Or, to put it more accurately, what I am 
doing is no more than dredging a preexisting channel that has been desolated, obstructed and 
destroyed. The channel “preexists”, because it had been constructed by Confucian sages from 
generation to generation, but was derailed and desolated in the colonial and post-colonial era. 
This value channel includes the following major components: a cosmology that recognizes 
nature as value-laden field, aesthetic appreciation in the form of Daoist ecstatic naturalism and 
the Confucian investigation of things, the Confucian practice of rectifying names as a way of 
encapsulating natural values with semiosis, application of the semiotically encapsulated natural 
values in the realm of ethics, internalization of natural values with repetitive practice that usually 
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results in individual habits/characters and social rituals. These channels can also be extended into 
the supernatural realm through a discussion of Christian soteriology and pneumatology. This 
project is anchored by the Chinese Protestant church communities in North America with its 
ultimate goal being to initiate an axiological renaissance through rediscovering of Confucian 
spiritual tradition and infusing it with Christian supernaturalism.   
In the spectrum delineated in the above passage, we have already discussed how 
Confucius defined the general characters of the Chinese culture by applying some major ethical 
categories as guiding norms. To understand how these categories were developed, we need to do 
a retrospective investigation of how natural values are encapsulated with semiosis as a basis for 
their application in social and ethical realms. The following discussion takes up the naturalistic 
part of the axiological realism.  
The Chinese language is the only living language that is based on an ideographical 
system. What distinguishes it from phonographic languages is that the ideographical system 
maintains direct etymological affinities with nature and its myriad entities. The Peircean semiotic 
theory on interpretants finds concrete embodiment in the radicals, morphemes and icons of the 
Chinese ideography. For many of the semantic components such as radicals and etymons, they 
started as pictographic representations of real natural entities. For instance, the five proceeding 
elements as gold, wood, water, fire and earth (金、木、水、火、土) were all construed as five 
basic radicals under each one of them series of characters were developed. In keeping with the 
Peircean theory, any object could serve as a source of infinite number of interpretants as long as 
some element of that object appeals to the interpreting agent as signifying potential meanings or 
values. At the initial stage, graphics served merely as representations of the natural object. For 
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example, the Chinese character for Sun,日 (ri), was a transfiguration from a circle with a dot in 
the middle for the convenience of writing. Similarly, the Chinese character for moon, 月, too, 
was a transfiguration from a vivid graphic symbol of moon. Gradually, it evolved to express 
dynamic existential occasions such as “difficult”. The ancient Chinese character for difficult 
situation is “屯”(tun), which, according to a lexicon in Eastern Han (25-220 A.D.), signifies the 
growth of a seedling in a painstaking manner gradually breaking through the ground. The 
pictograph “艹” indicates the grass seedling, while the “一” signifies the ground. The compound 
word “屯” thus describes the burdensome process for a gentle seedling to break the hard 
ground.
15
 Here, the interpretants extend to a process, or an occasion. I will return to the process 
nature of the interpretants in a moment. 
At a later stage, the Chinese language evolved from ideographic language to that more of 
a logographic type, because many of the radicals gradually drifted from their root meaning, and 
increasingly developed into independent morphemes that were suitable for expressing 
complicated and abstract meanings. For example, the word “菜” (vegetable) is a Pictographic-
phonetic compound ideograph that consists of two parts: the upper part “艹” is the determinative 
meaning-- grass/herb, and the lower phonetic part “采”. The phonetic part “采” is itself an 
inferential ideograph made up of two elements, a hand 爫 (zhua) plucking items from a tree 木 
(mu). In summary, the compound word “菜” means the kind of grass/herb that can be plucked 
and prepared (for food)
16
, which amounts to an etymological definition of vegetable. In various 
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other cases, the combination of morphemes can also express abstract or even transcendent 
concepts including the Ultimate. “神” (Shen, God) as the Chinese concept that designates the 
meaning of the Ultimate has undergone gradual evolutions, picking up ever increasing 
naturalistic and humanistic connotations. An etymological study on the original definition of the 
concept, nevertheless, reveals the profound meanings assigned to this concept. The original form 
of the character was put in a piece of calligraphy art work by an artist named Wu ChangShuo (吴
昌硕) (1844-1927) in the following manner:  
 
It is a compound character with two constituent morphemes, the Shi (示), and the Shen 
(申), both are determinatives. The component on the left, Shi (示), is a dictionary section header 
that governs most of the Chinese characters with transcendent connotations. The original 
pictogram of Shi (示) indicates the concept of epiphany or divine revelation.17 The upper stroke 
“一” stands for the supreme realm of Heaven, and all that exists under the second stroke as the 
mundane, natural realm. What lies under the second horizontal stroke are three vertical strokes 
proceeding into various directions, which signify the general revelation that permeates the 
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mundane realm. However, there is a gap between the first and the second horizontal strokes, 
which conveys a sense of separation, abruptness and mystery. The component on the right, Shen 
(申), makes up a specific determinative, standing alongside the generic one on the left. Shen (申) 
stands as a mimic pictogram of a pair of hands extending from above in a gesture of making 
something. The original meaning is, thus, the Ultimate God who brings things into existence 
with the act of creation. Combining both components, the Chinese character of Shen (神 
Ultimate, God), is the God of revelation and creation, a concept shares plenty of similarities with 
the Scriptural definition in Christian tradition.  
As we have seen, values scattered in nature and its myriad entities are recognized by 
interpreting agents, and encapsulated first as interpretants of various kinds, and then find 
embodiments in pictograms and morphemes, and the combination of morphemes can express 
concepts that are complicated and abstract. These are concrete steps that connect natural 
aesthetic values and social ethical values in a continuum. This value capture and transaction 
process is also the process that gives birth to signs, characters and language. Once values and 
interpretants take the independent form of semiosis, they assume dramatic power and freedom as 
they circulate in the ethical realm. Semiosis is so powerful, free and independent that it evolves 
into a separate realm, within which humans as semiotic beings have their existence. Signs, 
characters, languages as semiotic currency exhibit much similarity to monetary currency, at least 
in the following respects. First, as currencies, they both carry a certain value, either monetary or 
semiotic. Second, both can be subjected to severe abuse and cause harm. Just as monetary 
currencies may give rise to frauds or various kinds of derivatives that violate distributive justice, 
semiotic currencies, too, may produce lies, perjuries, or even massive propaganda that 
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manipulates the public. Third, even though both are vulnerable to misuse or abuse, they stand for 
powers that can be freely employed and exercised by human equilibrium as effective media of 
interactions. In fact, both currencies have irreversibly altered human history by empowering the 
social nature of human being. Fourth, ideally, both currencies are supposed to be able to be 
restored back to their material or nature basis, even though they may display a tendency to break 
away from their original roots. Moreover, semiotic currency appears to be even more powerful 
than the monetary currency due to the fact that semiosis echoes with the semiotic nature of 
human essence. Semiotic currency reaches the deepest core of human nature. It nourishes, 
develops, or even in some sense, creates the human essence. In addition, with semiosis the 
interpreting agents project and create a cosmos which they inhabit and flourish. Under the aid of 
a commonly shared semiotic system, interpreting agents within the same semiotic community are 
able to connect and prehend each other with much greater intensity. Natural values prehended by 
individual agents become common intellectual properties after entering the common semiotic 
market. As a result, semiotic building blocks increase dramatically. The interpreting agents 
within the community are thus able to build up concepts, theories or even cosmologies when the 
signs and symbols as building blocks are sufficiently defined and refined. Values can thus be 
carried far and beyond, and also accumulate from generation to generation.   
Wide circulation of large numbers of signs distinguishes human society from animals. It 
is on this semiotic basis that the social and ethical nature of human beings unfolds fully. Value 
transaction in the ethical stage is characterized further by systems of signs shared by interpreting 
agents who belong to the same community, as well as by the sign’s applicability in the dynamic 
process in instantiated occasions. In regard to the standardization of the signs, the emergence and 
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maturation of the dictionary is an indication of its popularity among the interpreting community. 
Er Ya (尔雅), the first dictionary in China, attempted to standardize the various dialects at that 
time, so as to come up with unified expression and pronunciation. According to some scholars, 
the book came into existence no later than the mid year of Warring State era (476-221 B.C.)
18
. 
China was then in a period of chaos and division. Er Ya can be interpreted as an intellectual 
effort to unite the disintegrated states into a nation by means of creating a system of common 
semiosis. In the long run, creating a unified interpreting community can be as effective as, if not 
more effective than, uniting the nation with political coercion. One of the most profoundly 
significant tasks of ethical stage is to create a common value market shared by every interpreting 
agent of the community.  
The most influential dictionary that played an essential role in creating a unified 
interpreting community in ancient China was Shuo Wen Jie Zi, a dictionary complied by Xu Shen 
(许慎 58-147 A.D.) in the East Han Dynasty. In its foreword, the dictionary’s author spoke 
directly and beautifully about its naturalistic origin:  
Anciently, when Bao-xi had come to the rule of all under heaven, looking up, he 
contemplated the brilliant forms exhibited in the sky, and looking down he surveyed the 
patterns shown on the earth. He contemplated the ornamental appearances of birds and 
beasts and the (different) suitabilities of the soil. Near at hand, in his own person, he 
found things for consideration, and the same at a distance, in things in general. On this he 
devised the eight trigrams, to show fully the attributes of the spirit-like and intelligent 
(operations working secretly), and to classify the qualities of the myriads of things.
19
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The above text clearly connects the ideographic system to the de facto system of natural 
entities. Later in the foreword, a methodological scheme that consists of six major categories 
with which most Chinese characters were created and explained. These six major categories 
include pictographic imitation (象形), pictographic-phonetic compound (形声), inferential 
ideogram (会意), referential ideogram (指事), associative-transformative ideogram (转注) and 
phonetic loan ideogram (假借). Theorizing attempts of this kind pushed the language beyond its 
pictographic/ideographic stage, and evolved into a logographic type. The theorizing effort 
displayed in the foreword also provided guiding principles for future sign-making processes, and 
thus transformed the dictionary into an open system that beckons further developments.  
Ancient dictionaries that arrange the logographic characters in systematic order 
encapsulate natural values in a static fashion. The real natural values, however, are scattered in 
the ever changing processes of dynamic occasions. For values to be applicable in real life 
situations, it is necessary to revitalize them in the context of changing processes. The Book of 
Change (I-Ching) accounts for the dynamic features of natural values by positing the instantiated 
sign in the context of a process. For example, the above mentioned pictograph 屯 (tun) also 
stands for one of the sixty-four hexagrams of I-Ching. The hexagram of Tun stands for a 
combination of two natural elements—water  (on the top) and thunder  (at the bottom). 
The dynamic process contained in this hexagram is equivalent to the creation story of the biblical 
narrative, “In the beginning … the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface 
of the deep” (NIV Genesis 1:1-2). The expository notes of Tun interpret the characteristic 
conditions of the dynamic process in the following words: 
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The name of the hexagram, Tun, really connotes a blade of grass pushing against an 
obstacle as it sprouts out of the earth—hence the meaning, “difficulty at the beginning.” 
The hexagram indicates the way in which heaven and earth bring forth individual 
beings. … the situation points to the teeming, chaotic profusion; thunder and rain fill the 
air. But the chaos clears up. While the Abysmal sinks, the upward movement eventually 
passes beyond the danger….20 
The linear judgment then gives discriminative analysis for each of the six lines, from the 
bottom all the way to the top. I-Ching was believed to be a book of divination. If, in a random 
fashion, the hexagram Tun was picked by the diviner, the structure and image of the hexagram 
illustrated the general condition of the process. The individual lines, then, give further 
explanation of the various stages of the process, with pertinent instructions on how to behave and 
what to expect. Each line, thus, becomes an instantiated point of view from which the whole 
hexagram is to be interpreted; and that hexagram is situated in the context of the entire cosmic 
system, from which the whole universal process is to be idiosyncratically prehended and 
interpreted. I-Ching, of course, is much more than a book of divination. Most of the intellectuals 
in ancient China believed that anyone who truly understands I-Ching has no need to engage in 
divination activities, because the wise man understands his own situation and follows the 
constant principle of the cosmos. The spirit of Dao no longer had loose rein. Rather, it had been 
captured by the dynamic system of semiosis.  
It is worth noting that there is a universal dimension in naturalistic realism. Christian 
Scripture, both the Old and New Testaments, designate sheep as a symbol of divine goodness. In 
Isaiah 53:4-7, along with various passages in New Testament, the suffering Messiah was 
described as a lamb. The harmlessness and sacrificial nature of sheep, especially the lamb, were 
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employed as symbols for the goodness of the divine nature. It is more than a mere coincidence 
that the sign for sheep was given similar connotations. Shuo Wen Jie Zi, the above mentioned 
dictionary, defines 羊 (sheep) as 祥 (auspicious), a rendition that connects sheep directly to 
divinity (示).21 A further exegetical note made by a scholar in Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.) 
elucidates the point more directly, “according to Kao Gong Ji (考工记), sheep means 
goodness.”22 Many commendatory terms have their root in sheep, such as beauty (美), 
righteousness (義), goodness (善), and gregariousness (群) to name a few. Why were there 
etymological affinities between two semiotic systems that emerged independently? Why can 
most terms in various linguistic systems be translated with considerable equivalence? What are 
the bases of communicability between different types of civilizations? The answer to these 
questions is what I call “naturalistic realism”. Despite the flux nature of world processes, most of 
the natural entities, such as animals and vegetables, maintain characters that are comparatively 
stable. When these stable characters are semiotically signified, they assure a certain degree of 
correspondence between various semiotic systems. This is what I call the universal dimension of 
naturalistic realism.   
Ethical Phase II, Action, Habit and Disposition 
 
Until the last section, natural values had been transported into human equilibrium as a 
value-processing center by means of various kinds of semiosis. For natural values to be fully 
digested and assimilated into the equilibrium, they must go through the process of action. Only 
when values are repetitively practiced can they be integrated into the equilibrium. Repetitive 
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practice gives rise to habit, and the combination of habits evolves into disposition. The role of 
action in value prehension is comparable to what the digestive system does in nutrition 
absorption. In a broader sense, the stage of action includes the portion of unconscious 
appropriation of values in the form of ritual practice, which will be the major focus of next 
section. Yet at this stage, I would like to speak of action as a necessary step of the value 
transaction that is under the guidance of the individual agent’s conscious participation. The goal 
of this process, however, has as its target the decrease of conscious involvement, to the extent 
that habits evolve into disposition. Disposition is a name for spontaneous response patterns that 
bypass direct conscious involvement. Informational paths were reconfigured in nerve or 
muscular systems. When the wiring system of a human subject is changed, the essence of that 
human subject was changed too, because the essence of a human being consists not in 
unchangeable static substance, but in the dynamic structure and patterns that are constantly being 
formed. Action is a pivotal concept that defines the essence of human existence.  To understand 
the role of action, we have to first go through some preliminary remarks on the nature of value, 
the nature of human equilibrium, and the relationship between the two.  
Value as a Harmony of Vibratory Patterns 
 
We must now give a clear definition of the concept of value. According to Neville, truth 
is to be understood as the carryover of value, and the theory of interpretation is to be measured 
by the achieved values of things.
23
 He perceives value particularly in terms of harmony. As a 
professed Confucian living in the Boston area, Neville deliberately tailored his definition of 
harmony to be equivalent to Ho (和), a concept in the Chung Yung. Following Whitehead’s 
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Process Philosophy, Neville views reality as layers upon layers of societies that are dynamically 
interacting with each other. Harmonies as patterns concrescing the components of societies are 
essential forms of values with objective existence. As the harmony of essential and conditional 
features of an occasion, value is pervasive in the cosmos. The world is loaded with values, and 
experience can be perceived as valuing or carrying over of the values.   As Neville puts it, “every 
thing, event, situation, or actuality of any sort is a mixture of harmony.” Things are made up of 
components. “[E]ach component is itself a harmony with its own components, and so on all the 
way down.” Harmony as value is such an intrinsic element to every existence that, “To be is to 
be a harmony.”24 Neville’s thought has its root in American Pragmatists, mostly Peirce and 
Dewey, as well as Eastern thoughts, especially Confucianism.  
In non-dualistic theoretical models such as Process Philosophy, Pragmatism and 
Confucianism, action is taken to be a metaphysical principle underlying every existence. 
Confucian/Neo-Confucian theory, for example, perceives a myriad of existences as a variety of 
vibration patterns between yin and yang. According to Zhou Tun-yi (1017-1073), the Great 
Ultimate samples all things as a pattern of movements from tranquility (yin) to movement 
(yang): 
The Ultimate of Non-being and also the Great Ultimate! The Great Ultimate through 
movement generates yang. When its activity reaches its limit, it becomes tranquil. 
Through tranquility the Great Ultimate generates yin. When tranquility reaches its limit, 
activity begins again.
25
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The vibratory pattern of the Great Ultimate epitomizes the metaphysical principle 
operating within every occasion or society of occasions. Each entity, or cluster of entities, is 
harmonized with unique patterns that account for their individual identity. In the context of this 
dynamic cosmology, values are defined as patterns that harmonize the reality. Values as 
harmonizing patterns are thus far been perceived by the feeling equilibrium in the form of 
aesthetic appreciation, investigation of things, name rectifying efforts, all of which have been 
encapsulated with semiosis, and transferred to the equilibrium, ready to be assimilated and 
integrated.   
In order for values to be smoothly transferred and absorbed, we need to investigate the 
nature of the equilibrium, as to its feasibility for value transaction. Human equilibrium as one 
type of existing entity is no exception to the metaphysical principle of yin/yang vibration. Chung 
Yung (中庸) describes the heart-mind as equilibrium in terms of contraction and extension: 
“While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the 
state of Equilibrium. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, 
there ensues what may be called the state of Harmony.”26 On the basis of yin/yang vibration, a 
continuum is established between external natural values and the equilibrium as a value-
processing center. Both being harmonizing patterns of vibration, the equilibrium can reconfigure 
itself into new patterns under the influence of external values; and the external harmonizing 
patterns, too, can be altered due to the equilibrium’s interpreting or physical interference. Hence, 
action is the universal principle for all existences as harmonized vibratory patterns. Action is the 
way through which value exchange occurs between the equilibrium and its environment.  
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The above discussion attempts to establish semiotic and actional avenues for values to 
travel freely between human equilibrium as internal value processing center and values scattered 
ubiquitously in surrounding environment. There is an unanswered question, though —what is the 
motivation behind the strenuous series of value transference? John Dewey offered a naturalistic 
answer with insightful discussion in Experience and Nature. Dewey asserts that all natural 
entities have an equilibrium. Maintaining, or restoring, equilibrium is what motivates the value 
transactional process. Dewey adopted a broader definition of equilibrium which includes both 
organic and inorganic entities. According to Dewey, the difference between inorganic situations 
and organic situations is that the former lacks the capacity to restore or recover itself when its 
equilibrium is disturbed; whereas the latter has the capability of adapting to the changing 
environment so as to maintain the equilibrium.
27
 The activities of living things are characterized 
by needs, efforts and satisfactions: 
By need is meant a condition of tensional distribution of energies such that the body is in 
a condition of uneasy or unstable equilibrium. By demand or effort is meant the fact that 
this state is manifested in movements which modify environing bodies in ways which 
react upon the body, so that its characteristic pattern of active equilibrium is restored. By 
satisfaction is meant this recovery of equilibrium pattern, consequent upon the changes of 
environment due to interactions with the active demands of the organism.
28
  
 
To apply Dewey’s insight to human equilibrium, the impact of external value as vibratory 
patterns disturbs the balance of the existing equilibrium, pushing it towards a new pattern that 
harmonizes the internal existing structure and the new external stimuli. Dewey’s differentiation 
between animate and inanimate items does not account sufficiently for humans as conscious 
beings. Human equilibrium goes beyond the passive reactive effort of maintaining or restoring 
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the existing equilibrium. We, as conscious beings, are urged by a subjective, innate desire of 
value prehension. This innate urge links directly to our nature as axiological beings. Just as all 
animated existences are equipped with urges of survival and procreation, and our aesthetic nature 
appeals naturally to beauty, our axiological nature equips us with a natural appetite for value. 
Even though there is no external disturbance that creates a need for maintaining or restoring the 
equilibrium, there is still an innate desire that urges us to active value apprehension. Human 
beings are by nature value hunters. Our desire for axiological evolution is as strong as any of 
biological evolution. Or, to be more concise, at the conscious level, the urge for biological 
evolution is expressed mainly in the form of axiological evolution. Human equilibrium as a value 
processing center aspires to evolve with higher quality and more refined taste by means of 
prehending external values. This explains human beings’ universal tendency of spiritual pursuit, 
to be like sages or saints, or more directly, to be like the divine.  
In neurophysiological terms, vibrations of various patterns are to be converted as 
stimulus or bioelectric currents. Delicate energy ex-changes are made possible due to the special 
design of our physiological structure: 
… for nature has carefully shut up our brain and spinal cord in bony boxes where no 
influences of this sort can get at them. She has floated them in fluid so that only the 
severest shocks can give them a concussion, and blanketed and wrapped them about in an 
altogether exceptional way. The only impressions that can be made upon them are 
through the blood, on the one hand, and through the sensory nerve-roots, on the other; 
and it is to the infinitely attenuated currents that pour in through these latter channels that 
the hemispherical cortex shows itself to be so peculiarly susceptible.
29
 
 
James furthered his discussion with an anatomic explanation on the formation of habit. 
From this perspective, the entire nervous system is nothing but a system of paths between a 
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sensory terminus a quo and a muscular, glandular, or other terminus ad quem.
30
 In the context of 
the current project, what James meant by terminus ad quem is defined as the equilibrium of the 
human heart-mind. Physiologically, the equilibrium is equipped with a net of neuron connections 
which allows vibratory stimuli to travel freely. Axiologically, the net of neuron connections is 
extended with interpretants that connect the equilibrium with the external world. Values as 
vibratory patterns travel on the net of interpretants and neurons in the form of stimulating 
currents. According to James, external currents get synchronized into the nerve system either by 
traveling on the old paths, or by opening up new paths. When a certain neuron path is traveled 
repetitively, it consolidates itself on a physiological basis, the manifestation of which is called 
habits. 
A path once traversed by a nerve-current might be expected to follow the law of most of 
the paths we know, and to be scooped out and made more permeable than before; and this 
ought to be repeated with each new passage of the current. Whatever obstructions may 
have kept it at first from being a path should then, little by little, and more and more, be 
swept out of the way, until at last it might become a natural drainage-channel.
31
 
 
This above adaptation is possible due to the fact that the human nervous system, as living 
organism, is made up of some unique material, which James called the material of plasticity. 
Malleability constitutes a distinguished feature of the material of living organism. All spiritual 
endeavors are meaningful only under the premise that human beings are malleable mentally, 
culturally and physiologically. Malleability is indeed presupposed by the notion of “self-
creation”. Three sources of creativity are identified in traditional Chinese philosophy, namely, 
the Heaven, the Earth and the Human. The human creation, however, differs from the ontological 
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creation that brings existences “ex nihilo”. The human creation is “ex materia”, a cosmological 
type, yet also with genuine novelty. The malleable nature of human physiological material makes 
it possible for repetitive actions to consolidate themselves in the process of concrescence. As 
James pointed out, “when a current once has traversed a path, it should traverse it more readily 
still a second time.”32 When such organic modification has been fixed in the growing brain, “… 
it becomes a part of the normal fabric, [which]… may endure to the end of life, like the scar of a 
wound."
33
 
 During the above process of cultivation of habits, the role of consciousness deserves 
some specific explanation. Does value integration require the active or cooperative participation 
of the agent’s consciousness as an indispensable element? The answer is negative. Most of the 
powerful and effective value integrations are carried out without or beyond the conscious 
participation of the human subject as a free and autonomous agent. In some sense, human 
consciousness can be regarded as a product of natural process. Even before the emergence of our 
individual consciousness, the basic biological structures of our nervous system had already been 
determined. It is also beyond our personal choice that we were born into cultures with specific 
axiological dispositions. We were brought up in real and concrete existential environments that 
impressed and configured our nervous system before active participation of our individual 
consciousness. However, active participation of human consciousness is an essential element of 
spiritual cultivation for two reasons. First, conscious participation does play a pivotal role in the 
cultivation of desirable habitual dispositions. Volitional persistence fueled by consciously held 
goals brings spiritual cultivation to a stage that is beyond the reach of free natural evolution. The 
                                                 
32
 Ibid., 110. 
 
33
 Ibid., 112. 
125 
 
 
 
landscape of human spirituality can be dramatically altered in the same way the landscape of the 
earth has been altered and manipulated by deliberate human projects. Second, for some cultural 
conventions that now exist as given conditions in individual consciousness, there was a time in 
preceding generations when these values were starting to be apprehended and integrated by 
conscientious efforts. The essential concept of De (德), as discussed above, may serve as a good 
illustration. At the time of Duke Zhou, this concept was deliberately singled out as the 
ideological foundation for the new regime. It once was a concept of consciously devised before 
being accepted as the social norm. For the ensuing generations, however, the general milieu that 
developed under the influence of De had been evolved as a given condition. Recognizing and 
understanding its initial entry at the portal of consciousness enables us to catch the spirit of this 
concept of De. It facilitates the interpreting agent in applying, adapting and modifying the 
concept in concrete existential conditions. Of course, there are plenty of natural influences that 
shaped our physical and semiotic existence without direct involvement of the human 
consciousness. We may still retrospectively apply conscious attention to these natural 
mechanisms, either for better understanding or for possible amendment.  
Action plays an essential role in the formation of habits. Repetitive actions distill 
themselves as habitual patterns that reconfigure the mind, the nervous system, the muscular 
system, and also leave their discernible marks in communal and social realms. This project 
explores paths of external values being transferred into and prehended by human beings, both 
individually and collectively. When values are activated in the human sphere, they establish 
active paths that transform the physiological and social structure.  The concept of habit as paths 
that are forged by repetitive actions resonates very well with the notion of Dao (道). The concept 
126 
 
 
 
of Dao as the universal principle has its very origin in the formation of paths. There was no path 
on the ground in the beginning. It was the active and repetitive trading along the same route that 
gave rise to it. As Chen Chun (陈淳, 1159-1223), a Neo-Confucianist, pointed out in Souther 
Song, “the general principle of Dao is the principle people should follow in daily affairs and 
human relations. Only what is followed by all people can be called Dao.”34 Traditional 
interpretation of the concept of Dao emphasizes its abstract, transcendent aspect. Dao is believed 
to be the unified spirit that runs through every variety of existence. This project defines an 
imminent and concrete notion of Dao which makes paths that are inscribed on the physiological 
elements of human body by means of repetitive behaviors. The human Dao as De (德) requires 
painstaking discipline that forges the paths in our nervous and muscular systems. Our own 
identities are created through action. It is by repetitive actions that shape the behavior patterns in 
the form of physiological paths that our characters and dispositions are nurtured. Praxis, hence, is 
the way through which our individual identities come into being. Here again comes the subtle 
difference between the Si-Meng School (思孟学派) and Xun Zian School (荀学派). The Si-
Meng School presupposes some heavenly endowed tendencies that beckon the practicing subject 
to travel on paths of benevolence, righteousness, courtesy, and wisdom, to name a few 
possibilities. Whereas the Xun Zian School emphasizes the human obligation to chart out paths 
contrary to human nature that is prone to selfish desires. From a pragmatic standpoint, the Xun 
Zian approach appears to be preferable because it puts more stress on the human effort of self 
cultivation and social engineering. 
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Analysis of the Three Types of Habits:  
Interpreting Habits, Linguistic Habits, Physical Habits 
 
If living creatures, as claimed by William James, are to be viewed as “bundles of 
habits”,35 then we can examine the value transactional process in terms of various types of 
habits. The following discussion is an analysis of three types of habits: the interpreting habits, 
the linguistic habits and the physical habits.  
Interpreting habits are subtle and powerful. Whenever an interpreting subject approaches 
a natural scene, an existential occasion, or an existing text, he/she brings into the interpreting 
process a mixed bundle of interpreting habits. Some of the habits are hard wired by nature, for 
instance, the physiological difference between male and female cerebrums. Some of the 
interpreting habits are indoctrinated culturally, such as national or patriotic sentimentality. The 
majority of the interpreting habits come in company with the acquisition of the semiotic system 
itself. Before any interpretant is chosen, the interpreting agents, either individually or 
communally, remains in the condition of a primordial mass of non-differentiation. This is an 
ideal situation that enjoys complete freedom and full potentiality. I doubt this situation has ever 
existed. Even the Daoist ineffable ecstatic union with nature contains implicit aesthetic 
preferences. When it comes to the Confucian practice of investigation of things or rectifying the 
names, interpreting habits start to manifest themselves in explicit semiotic preferences. As we 
have pointed out in the previous text, every natural entity, along with the universe itself, is to be 
viewed as axiological diamonds that exhibit infinite aspects that can be engaged as interpretants. 
The fact that some aspects were chosen as interpretants and the numerous others were dropped 
might be understood just as certain parts of the ground were trodden on making paths and the 
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rest were left as un-trodden field. There might be practical considerations mixed with haphazard 
contingencies at the initial stage. Yet when the path takes its form, the ensuing travelers may 
conveniently step into it without further consideration. What drives these later travelers is the 
power called convention. For most people, convention is the power that dominates most of the 
unconscious activities. Interpreting habit makes an essential constituent element of convention.  
Interpreting habits are the conventional paths that exercise a powerful influence in all of 
our mental activities. According to Pierce:  
A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. If this triple relation 
is not of a degenerate species, the sign is related to its object only in consequence of a 
mental association, and depend upon a habit. Such signs are always abstract and general, 
because habits are general rules to which the organism has become subjected. They are, 
for the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general words, the main 
body of speech, and any mode of conveying a judgment. For the sake of brevity I will 
call them tokens. (CP 3.360) 
 
At another place, Pierce identifies representamen as mental habits (MS 675). Sign, or 
representamen, according to Pierce, has a special mental effect upon a mind in producing certain 
associations that adumbrate something that would come to be (MS 675-676). In other words, we 
as interpreting agents never come up with interpretants with a mind of tabula rasa. Both the 
collective and individual history equips us with plenty of mental habits. These interpreting habits 
determine the engagement of interpretants with conventionally registered stimuli. The general 
direction of interpretation at its initial stage may be oriented by unique geographical locations, 
climate types, incidental historical events with profound ripple effects, or efforts of some sages 
who happen to live in the formative period of that culture. Once an interpretation is set on its 
own course, it inclines to aggregate and develop with continuing featured tendencies. 
Interpreting habits, on the one hand, facilitate the interpreting agent in the interpreting process. 
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On the other hand, they also impose limitations on the interpreting agent. Interpreting agents tend 
to mobilize existent semiotic tools and slip into familiar interpreting patterns. In the context of 
advanced civilizations, allusions and literature quotations are common mechanisms of elegant 
expressions. These common interpreting patterns eclipse genuine novelty to the point that many 
members of the interpreting community live as mere semiotic surrogates with no real 
authenticity. Interpreting habits also cause the interpreting subject to overlook the rich, dynamic 
and multi-layered flood of feelings, and caricature them with hackneyed phrases.  
Linguistic habit comes after the interpreting habit, and is distinguished with noticeable 
physiological traits. It stands in the middle of interpreting habits as mental activities and physical 
habits of bodily activities. Most of us who have the experience of learning a foreign language go 
through struggles and frustrations on how to express an idea through channels other than our 
native tongue. Learning a second language tends to be more difficult than the mastering of the 
mother language, because, in the case of mother language, linguistic trainings are like traveling 
on a ground upon which no one has tread. Struggles of learning the first language come mainly 
from the inertia of our physiological elements. Once the channels are established by drill and 
practice, the foundational structure is laid for that particular practitioner. The learning of a 
second language, however, is a different story. Inertia no longer makes up the major source of 
the difficulties. What constantly distracts the learner is the temptation to slip back into the tracks 
left by the first language. For those who speak English as their second language, it is not difficult 
to discern another layer of linguistic habits beneath their English. Usually, we can even 
distinguish the speaker s’ cultural background as Russian, French, Indian, Japanese, or Chinese, 
simply by judging from their habits of pronunciation. My personal observation is that you can 
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even tell the subtle difference between those who have English as their first language for 
generations, and those who are as yet only second generation immigrants from other linguistic 
systems. Those second generation immigrants either have inherited some of the physiological 
features that are related to pronunciation habits from their parents, or were taught with non-
English languages at a very young age and their oral muscular systems still carry some of the 
traits.  
Scripture records a good example about the subtle physiological traits shaped by various 
pronunciation systems. When the Israelites were without kings, and were in chaotic anarchism, 
tensions between tribes led to civil struggles and wars. On one occasion recorded in Judges 12, 
when the Ephraimites were captured by Gileadites at the fords of the Jordan. The Gileadites 
managed to identify Ephraimites by forcing them to pronounce Shibboleth. The Ephraimites 
were accustomed to a dialect without the phonic sound of “shi”. Their ears were not trained to 
distinguish “shi” from “si”, neither were their tongues able to pronounce “shi”. The closest thing 
they could pronounce was Sibboleth. The Gileadites were thus able to single out the Ephraimites 
and kill them. For those Ephraimites at the ford, it was an issue of life and death whether they 
could pronounce that phonic sound correctly, and most of them betrayed themselves by that 
sound and were killed. This story is a concrete illustration that language as repetitive actions 
creates physiological and anatomical traits through daily practice. It is true that the Ephraimites 
were born free to pronounce the sound “shi”. Yet when they were cultivated gradually and 
unconsciously on the way to adulthood, the muscular tissues of their tongues were shaped in a 
way that ruled out the proper pronunciation of the “shi” sound. This is an obvious phenomenon 
among sub-cultural groups of particular geographic locations. As immigrants, many of us may 
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discern the different pronunciation habits known as the Indian, Japanese, Korean or Chinese 
accent.    
As to the cultivation of physical habits, we may find a good example in music education. 
Drills as repetitive practices are essential in the acquisition of skills and dexterity for playing any 
instrument. When practices accumulate to a certain level, the voluntary action of initial stage 
evolves into habitual action. In a habitual action, “… the only impulse which the centers of idea 
or perception need send down is the initial impulse, the command to start,” and “… the upper 
regions of brain and mind are set comparatively free.”36 This is to say, habitual behaviors can be 
accomplished with very little or no direct involvement of human consciousness. Equilibrium as 
the central processing center can be bypassed in habitual actions. Memories are pushed down 
into nerve and muscle systems that are subordinate to human consciousness. The mind is thus 
freed up in habitual behaviors, which enables it to embark on acquiring new skills that demand 
more conscious attention. This point is verifiable even for those who never played a music 
instrument. While performing habitual actions such as swimming, riding a bicycle, or driving a 
car, we usually operate with conditional responses that require little conscious involvement. Our 
mind might be engaged in intense thinking or reasoning while our subsystems are performing a 
series of habitual actions with sufficient accuracy.  
Transforming values into physical embodiment through repetitive practice has been a 
popular concept both in classic and Neo Confucianism. The opening line of Analects states: “The 
Master said, ‘Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance and application?’”37 The 
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original character for “practical application” (習) invokes the image of a small bird learning how 
to fly by means of daily practice. Learning with repetitive practice that comes to fruition has 
been a deep rooted concept in Confucianism. The opening chapter of Xun Zi also emphasizes 
practical learning:  
The learning of the gentleman enters his ear, clings to his mind, spreads through his four 
limbs, and manifests itself in his actions. His smallest word, his slightest movement can 
serve as a model. The learning of the petty man enters his ear and comes out his mouth. 
With only four inches between ear and mouth, how can he have possession of it long 
enough to ennoble a seven-foot body?
38
 
 
Physical embodiments of deferential habits make up significant portions in the Analects. 
Confucius was depicted as an ardent practitioner who disciplined himself with persistent 
cultivation of deferential habits. Confucius knows how to behave appropriately according the 
variation of the situations.  In his home village, “… he was most deferential, as though at a loss 
for words.”  And yet in the ancestral temple and at court, “he spoke articulately, though with 
deliberation” (Analects 10.1).  At court, when speaking with lower officials, he was congenial, 
and when speaking with higher officials, straightforward yet respectful.  In the presence of his 
lord, he was reverent though composed (Analects 10.2).  When summoned by his lord to receive 
a guest to the court, his countenance would change visibly and his legs would bend.  He would 
salute the others standing in attendance, gesturing his clasped hands to the right and to the left, 
and with his flowing robes swaying front and back with his movements, he would glide forward 
briskly.  When the guest retired, he would be certain to report to his lord, “Our guest no longer 
looks back” (Analects 10.3).  There are a lot of similar recordings. A lot of training is needed to 
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be able to consciously and unconsciously conform the whole body to the deferential pattern, to 
the level of switching back and forth smoothly, swiftly and elegantly. Confucius once lamented 
those who disengage word from action: “I am not sure that anyone who does not make good on 
their word is viable as a person.  If a large carriage does not have the pin for its yoke, or a small 
carriage does not have the pin for its crossbar, how can you drive them anywhere?” (Analects 
2.22)    Action is the organic part of knowledge.  Only when the knowledge is put to action, and 
consolidates itself as habit and character, can the knower claims that he/she knows.    
 
 
Wang Yang-ming’s “Chih Hsing Ho-I  
 
In the camp of Neo-Confucianism, there was basically one major thrust that successfully 
overcame the chasm between the mental/subjective realm and the physical/objective realm. That 
was Wang Yang-ming’s philosophy of action. Wang weaved knowledge and action into a unity. 
Action itself is a unity of body and mind. Action interacts dynamically with its surrounding 
nature. Action also implies immediate value appropriation. This notion of action rescued Wang’s 
theory from a mere representation of nature. Self-cultivation too, in Wang’s theory, was rescued 
from a mere enclosed psychological tautology when Warren Frisina analyzed Wang’s phrase 
“Chih Hsing Ho-I (the unity of knowledge and action) in light of Dewey’s metaphysics and 
epistemology.
39
 According to Frisina, Wang invented the doctrine in order to correct a 
misleading interpretation made by Zhu Xi (朱熹). Zhu Xi appeared to posit a split between 
knowing and acting with an unbalanced emphasis on knowing. The problem Wang strove to 
resolve is phrased by his own words, “This doctrine of knowledge first and action later is not a 
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minor disease and it did not come about only yesterday. My present advocacy of the unity of 
knowledge and action is precisely the medicine for that disease. The doctrine is not my baseless 
imagination, for it is the original substance of knowledge and action that they are one.”40 Frisina 
rightly pointed out that, under the Confucian mentality, Wang’s concept of action should not be 
considered as equivalent to the Western understanding of practical knowledge. For Confucian 
scholars, the central motif had always been self-cultivation in the direction of sagehood. There 
was a built-in axiological concern which is uncommon in the western notion of practical 
knowledge.  
Wang developed his Chih Hsing Ho-I as a doctrine alternative to the Investigation of 
Things (Ge Wu) in the Great Learning. At the age of sixteen, Wang embarked on serious 
practices of the doctrine of Ge Wu. He sat in front of a bunch of bamboo for a couple of days, 
contemplating its principles, until he became fatigued.
41
 This harsh, yet futile, practice left Wang 
with a deep suspicion of the doctrine of Ge Wu. Wang later sided with a subjective interpretation 
of the doctrine. In his Inquiry on the Great Learning, Wang claimed that Ge Wu was actually “a 
renovation of oneself in an effort to attain the sincerity of will that enables us to deal with the 
world truly.”42 Neo-Confucianism thus blocked one of the major pathways that allows values to 
be carried over from nature into the interpreting conscious. That which drove Wang Yang-ming 
to the breakthrough of Chih Hsing Ho-I was a defect he found in Zhu Xi’s theory. After 
following Zhu’s method of self cultivation for quite a few years, Wang found himself not making 
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any real progress. Zhu’s theory was like a person walking in a dream. No matter how hard he/she 
tries, the body is not going anywhere. This affliction triggered another breakthrough at the age of 
36 (1508). The sudden enlightenment happened when Wang was demoted to a position in the 
barbarian area of Gui Zhou. As if there were somebody instructing him in the dream, Wang came 
to a sudden understanding about the notion of Ge Wu. He was so excited that he jumped up from 
bed, screaming aloud. According to the record, the content of this enlightenment is about Xin and 
Xing (心、性). Wang started to realize that all the teachings of the sages and the worthies are 
about the endowed nature of human being. There is no need to quest for the principles externally. 
The nature of human being is sufficient in itself. Every bit of real knowledge comes only from 
within.
43
 This might have been a breakthrough for Wang himself. Yet it definitely was not a 
decisive progress for Neo-Confucian epistemology. It was not a turn from the already subjective 
misunderstanding of Zhu Xi. Wang twisted the doctrine of Ge Wu to a degree that is actually 
worse than Zhu Xi. It is this radical version of subjectivism that implicated Wang’s theory with a 
threat of heterodoxy. The danger of this radically subjective version of mind was offset by 
Wang’s doctrine of Chih Hsing Ho-I. Without Chih Hsing Ho-I, Wang’s theory of mind would 
inevitably lead to a closed psychological roundabout. Overall, Wang’s work is a breakthrough in 
the history of Chinese philosophy. The gist of Wang’s philosophical contrubution, however, lies 
not in his theory of the mind, but rather in the doctrine of Chih Hsing Ho-I. It is this Chih Hsing 
Ho-I that served as the corrective to Neo-Confucianism, placing it squarely back on the road to 
reality. As to Wang’s theory of the mind, most naturalists, I believe, will regard it as a setback 
from Zhu Xi’s theory of Ge Wu.  
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When we position Wang in his historical context, the path he delineated appears to be 
influenced heavily by Buddhism and Daoism, because, in his youth years, Wang was a secret 
admirer of these theories. It was only due to some practical concerns that he did not devote 
himself completely to the teachings of Buddhism and Daoism. Nevertheless, the influence of 
these theories found their way into his version of Confucianism. Such a hybrid mixture fueled a 
controversy about whether Wang’s teachings inclined more to Chan/Dao (禅/道) or remained 
faithful to the Confucian motif. I believe Wang was still a Confucian both because that is what 
he called himself, and because of his passion for social involvement. Yet, some of Wang’s 
doctrine was indeed saturated with the flavor of Chan and Dao. For instance, Wang’s view on 
human reality as the perfect Xing (性) without blemish does not appear to be Confucian, or at 
least to have gone awry from that of the vague definition of Confucius himself. It was Mencius 
who first made an outspoken claim that the nature of human essence is good as endowed by the 
Heaven with nascent sprouts of goodness. Wang definitely picked up the Mencius theme, and 
pushed it forward dramatically along the line of Buddhist teaching which ascribes a Buddha 
nature to everyone. This is why Tu Wei-ming, along with his teacher Mou Zongsan, asserted that 
Wang was the real heir to the Mencius line of Confucianism. In fact, Wang not only inherited 
Mencius’ optimistic view of human nature, he inflated the Mencius doctrine by stretching it 
towards a syncretistic form of Buddhism. This is why many Confucian scholars in late Ming 
China, along with the Korean scholars at that time, denounced Wang as heterodox. It also 
accounts for the popular acceptance of Wang’s theory in Japan, a place where Chan Buddhism 
flourishes.  
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Generally speaking, the path advocated by Wang was at odds with the path proposed in 
this project. The kind of action as defined by Wang was pure mental action. It is subjectively 
deeper than the three kinds of activities discussed in the preceding text, namely, the interpretive, 
the linguistic and the bodily actions. Wang’s action is the action within the heart/mind, within 
the individual human consciousness, with no necessary external manifestations. The current 
project takes the commonsense understanding of the notion of action. The unity of knowledge 
and action is, thus, to be understood as a dialectical process in moral practice. Mental knowledge 
needs to be embodied in action before its validity can be attested. Through action, mental 
knowledge is refined and reshaped, and new knowledge arises in praxis. Furthermore, 
knowledge needs to be practiced repetitively before it can be distilled and infused into the human 
equilibrium, which results in the reconfiguration of the structure and refinement of the taste of 
the human equilibrium. To sum up, Wang’s intuitive, direct, unmediated value awakening innate 
to the good consciousness appears to be both idealistic and reductive. External values need to go 
through various aesthetic and ethical steps before they can be transferred into and prehended by 
the human equilibrium. From an axiological perspective, Zhu Xi’s theory on acquiring 
knowledge through investigation of things (格物致知) makes more sense than Wang’s theory on 
rectifying the good consciousness (致良知).   
 
Ritual as the Matrix of Value Internalization 
 
Some Hypotheses Concerning Rituals and Convention 
 
The previous sections illustrated briefly the paths through which natural values are to be 
prehended and integrated into individual equilibriums. I broke the unified continuous process 
down into the stages of aesthetic appreciation, investigation of things, rectifying of the names, 
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and habits as repetitive behavior patterns. The actual process is, however, much more 
complicated than the theoretical model. Not only do the above steps constantly intervene with 
each other, there is another dimension that plays a vital role in the process of value transaction, 
namely, the communal aspect. Strictly speaking, none of the above steps happen in isolation. 
Even the seemingly individual practice of aesthetic appreciation cannot happen without a taste 
that emerges from and is constantly being refined by the communal matrix. A retrospective 
examination of aesthetic appreciation indicates that the appreciating equilibrium brings with it all 
the aesthetic habits and semiotic systems, even though some of these systems were deliberately 
kept inactive. The steps after aesthetic appreciation are even more intricately intertwined with the 
community to which the interpreting and acting agents belong. For instance, at the stage of 
investigation of things, the interpreting activity presupposes an interpreting community from 
which the semiotic tools come, and among which the newly invented semiotic currencies will 
circulate. As to the stage of the rectifying of the name, there is an explicit intention to render the 
names in a way that their intended meanings are accurately understood, and lead itself to clear 
and effective communication. The whole project of name rectifying was driven by an earnest 
communal urge. Further, community is the field where values were practiced in the form of 
action, habit and convention. The previous section on action still stresses the consciously active 
involvement of the individual in the cultivation of habits. This actually accounts for the 
formation of only a small number of habits. The majority of basic habitual patterns were formed 
unconsciously before the individual reaches maturity, thus without the active participation of 
individual’s consciousness.  
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The hypothesis that ritual is a channel of value transaction states that rituals are to be 
considered as axiological banks in which semiotic currencies deposit their value. This 
axiological bank is accessible to all members of the interpreting community as long as they have 
their beings and existences within the semiotic environment. Rituals are like ether from which no 
one can escape. For those who understand the nature and operational principles of ritual, they 
hold the key to miraculous powers of self-cultivation and communal engagement. The content 
and structure of rituals make up the essence of any given culture. Such an essence came into 
existence as the result of accumulative efforts of all previous generations, and is dynamically 
interacting with and being transformed by the current generation. From the essence of existent 
ritual content and structure, the community as a whole and all the individual members of that 
community assume their being. Meanwhile, the current generation is capable of amending or 
transforming the existent rituals, sometimes even in dramatic and revolutionary fashions. I adopt 
the broad definition of ritual advocated by Neville: “… penumbral convention such as eye 
contact, posture and movement, semiotically coded signs such as language and gesture, sign-
shaped behavior the very exercise of which constitutes social institutions, manners regarding the 
playing of socially defined roles, the cultivations of personal relationship, and the practices of 
etiquette, and then explicit ceremonies themselves.”44  
The metaphysical hypothesis that grounds the pivotal role of convention is to keep distant 
from the traditional substantial, or ousia, understandings of the essence of human and society. 
Contrary to the view that human individual and community were endowed with definite 
ontological substance, the hypothesis is that both human as an individual and as a communal are 
void of determined essence. Nature only sets up the stage and delineates the perimeters which 
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create a free stage for human beings to act as the main characters. In other words, I hereby adopt 
a radical view that claims humans participate in their own creation, both individually and 
communally. The value transaction and integration process discussed in the current project is 
nothing less than the unfolding of human creativity in which individual and communal humanity 
assumes its essence. A stance like this resonates well with the anthropological assumption of 
Xun Zi. Among all Confucian sages, Xun Zi was the one who professed a version of 
anthropology in which man is radically underdetermined. Espousing with his anthropological 
premise, Xun Zi took human creativity seriously. Among the triadic sources of creativity in 
classical Chinese philosophy, Xun Zi regarded the unfolding of human creativity in building up 
ritual and convention as an indispensable component, complementary to that of Heaven and 
Earth as sources of creativity.  
Under the premises that human natures is radically underdetermined, and the unfolding of 
human creativity plays an essential role in the process of self-creation, we may then come to a 
sensible evaluation of the role of rituals and convention in the axiological process. If we continue 
to use the metaphor of market and currency, rituals and convention are like mature products, just 
as signs and symbols are comparable to currencies in circulation. Each individual ritual is made 
up of a semiotic that is arranged with certain structure. In the public realm, rituals are social 
grammars that make public life/communication possible. Only when the values of currencies are 
to be embodied concretely in commodities, can their values be fulfilled and consumed. Similarly, 
semiotic commodities are too abstract to be prehended before they are concretely embodied by 
rituals and convention. I set rituals and convention abreast as a pair of concepts with internal 
logical affinities. Ritual, as a concept, is designated with individual or clustered behavior patterns 
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that can be identified with specific features; whereas the concept of convention is to be defined 
as a generic concept that amounts to the whole of rituals. Rituals and convention are like 
valuable properties we inherited from the forefathers. A healthy market needs mature products so 
that the circulation of currency will be meaningful. Rituals and convention are the social clothes 
that prevent us from being naked, shelters that rescue our souls from being homeless, and 
building blocks to be used in the task of self-construction, both individually and collectively. In 
the private realm for any particular equilibrium, rituals exist as part of the given order within 
which the individual equilibrium dwells. Moreover, rituals as building blocks construct and 
shape the essence of our existence, a crucial process in which values are internalized. Rituals 
function both as media and essential elements of this value-internalization process. Rituals 
accomplish the value transactional mission in a way that is both subtly penetrating and 
enormously effective. Rituals exist as the given condition such that the emerging equilibriums 
take them for granted. On occasion, rituals are internalized by individual equilibriums without 
the conscious discretion of a mature person, because the growth and maturity of consciousness 
itself depends on rituals as its building blocks. Furthermore, rituals exist usually in the form of 
behavior codes which are repetitively practiced and thus will eventually become physiologically 
embodied. Peter Berger, from a sociological perspective, delineated the mutually creative 
process between the communal and individual nature of convention: 
The fundamental dialectic process of society consists of three moments, or steps. There 
are externalization, objectivation, and internalization. Only if these three moments are 
understood together can an empirically adequate view of society be maintained. 
Externalization is the ongoing outpouring of human being into the world, both in the 
physical and the mental activity of men. Objectivation is the attainment by the products 
of this activity (again both physical and mental) of a reality that confronts its original 
producers as a facticity external to and other than themselves. Internalization is the 
reappropriation by men of this same reality, transforming it once again from structure of 
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the objective world into structures of the subjective consciousness. It is through 
externalization that society is a human product. It is through objectivation that society 
becomes a reality sui generis. It is through internalization that man is a product of 
society.
45
  
 
The dynamic process delineated by Berger applies aptly to the axiological process of 
value transaction. Rituals can be interpreted as products of the externalization, embodiments of 
the objectification and means/building blocks of the internalization.    
 
 
Rituals are What Differentiate Humans from Animals 
 
Human beings are biological animals motivated by a variety of desires. The difference 
between a human community and that pack of animals is that the later functions according to the 
sheer power of jungle principle, while the former is organized by the principles of 
rituals.  Rituals help our desires to be expressed and fulfilled in a civilized manner. Because 
human beings are semiotic beings, we are endowed with much more flexibility and malleability, 
both individually and collectively. The inception of semiosis endowed the individual human 
heart/ mind with a degree of value apprehension that's dramatically increased compared to the 
non-semiotic species that rely predominately on natural instincts. Our ability to use signs such as 
language creates infinite possible patterns of connections in our equilibriums. As we engage 
ourselves in semiotic activities, such as reading, thinking, articulating ideas, or even 
dreaming, we are creating and reconfiguring the connection patterns in our mind and body. 
When our essential harmony patterns are revised, our essence is changed. Similar principles 
apply to the collective realms too. The human community characterizes itself with a degree of 
indefiniteness that allows the community to organize social lives according to infinitely possible 
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patterns. The barbarian way of chaotic anarchism lies very likely at the bottom of the possible 
choices, with other more valuable organizing patterns scaling up from dictatorship, oligarchy, 
democracy and other better possibilities. The ideal pattern has been under heated debate 
throughout human history, an indication of the existence of real possibilities with significant 
consequences.   
The process of ritualization goes hand in hand with the process of humanization and 
civilization. When two siblings want the same toy, they might fight for it viciously without 
consideration of the other. Both of them just want instant gratification of their desires. The result 
of which is that whoever is stronger possesses the toy with the weaker being deprived of his/her 
rights. From the perspective of Confucian ethics, a situation like this violates the brotherly love 
which includes the friendliness of the elder siblings and deference of the younger siblings. Both 
siblings are not acting according to the rituals that regulate appropriate behavior patterns 
between the siblings. Even though the siblings are connected biologically, they need rituals to 
cultivate brotherly benevolence in the older one, and deferential obedience in the younger. the 
older one with brotherly benevolence, and younger one with deferential obedience. Only after 
the appropriations of rituals, can they become brothers in real sense. Without ritual proprieties, 
they might become strangers that are irrelevant to each other, or foes fighting for their own 
rights. It is ritual that differentiates human siblings from a pair of wolves in the jungle. 
Cultivation of ritual proprieties begins with detailed existential specifics. For instance, the sibling 
who wants to play with the toy might ask politely with ritualized language such as "Would you 
please let me play with the toy for a while?" Or "May I have that toy?" These are civilized 
options carried out with proper framings required by ritual proprieties. They are much better than 
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the jungle principle of sheer power, in which desires are expressed with power and violence. 
Actually, there are other better options such as the elder sibling voluntarily sharing with the 
younger sibling out of internalized virtue of friendliness, or the younger one sharing voluntarily 
out of brotherly deference. Another possible embodiment of higher values might be that both 
siblings, with ritual proprieties permeating deep down into their hearts, habitually respond by 
putting first the need of the sibling. In fact, the process of ritualization is none other than the 
process of humanizing or civilizing. This concept goes directly back to the etymological core of 
the root concept of being ru (Confucianist, 儒), which originally designated the tanning of raw 
hides into supple and durable leather. It is by means of rituals that the raw un-carved human 
material is cultivated into humaneness.  
There is an illustrative story about Kong Rong (孔融 153-208), the 20th generation of 
direct descendent of Confucius. According to the anecdotal story, Kong Rong was sufficiently 
ritualized that, at the age of four, he was able to pick a smaller pear, leaving the bigger ones for 
his elder brother out of deferential benevolence.
46
 The story has been in the basic reading 
materials for elementary students since the Southern Song Dynasty (1127-1279 A.D.). This story 
exemplifies the power of ritual indoctrination. For a child as young as the age of four, the role 
that his individual consciousness played in the indoctrinating process should be very limited. The 
reason Kong Rong was so saturated with rituals is because rituals were the semiotic womb in 
which he assumed his being. With twenty generations accumulated ritual cultivation, the kin 
group of Confucius’ descendents by then had already formed a communal matrix which was 
loaded with ritual proprieties as the existential environment for its members. Ritual 
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indoctrination for those emerging equilibriums could be interpreted as the semiotic stage in the 
communal womb, which comes right after their biological stage in the biological womb of their 
mother. The unconscious appropriation of ritual proprieties in the form of behavior patterns 
works extremely well at a young age when the physiological elements are supple and flexible. 
Moreover, for young children, their physiological formation can be identical with the semiotic 
formation, because the initial paths are engrained at the same moment their physiological 
systems take their shape. Value cultivation at this stage is void of distracting interferences by 
previously acquired habits with less value. Neither will they encounter inertias as strong as that 
of the adults. It is quite obvious that childhood is the best stage for value cultivations in the form 
of ritual, the younger the better. It is also of vital importance to choose wisely a good 
community, which functions as the semiotic womb in which individual equilibriums are formed. 
Confucian scholars with deep appreciation of rituals were well aware of these basic principles. 
After Song Dynasty, Confucian sages, such as Zhu Xi, invested a lot of energy in compiling 
basic materials for elementary education. In light of these insights, we may come to a better 
understanding of some of the anecdotal stories such as that the mother of Mencius moved many 
times before settling down in a good community. Education in a Confucian cultural context was 
tremendously valued, sometimes even with redemptive functions.   
Ritual and Coercive Social Mechanisms 
 
In the short run, other coercive social mechanisms such as political orders, legislation or 
military forces, might appear to be more powerful and effective than rituals. That is why some of 
Xun Zi's students, for instances Han Fei (韩非 280-233 B.C.) and Li Si (李斯 284-208 B.C.), 
resorted to legislation as a more directly effective method in restoring social order from chaos. 
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The coercive mechanisms were actually very powerful as regards to short-term effects. Both Li 
Si and Han Fei made significant contributions to the rise of Qin, which eventually united the 
whole China in the year of 221 B.C. The negative effects concurrent to these coercive 
mechanisms were obvious, too, however. Not only was the unification achieved at a high price, 
the loss of life and the devastation of many cities, it also accumulated and intensified tremendous 
social tension to a point that the newly established regime lasted only fourteen years. The short-
lived Qin Dynasty, along with other similar regimes, such as Yuan (1271-1368 A.D.), reinforced 
the hypothesis that sheer power without proper institutionalized ritual can hardly sustain an 
orderly society with long-term stability. In addition, the lamentable story of Li Si and Han Fei 
also testifies to the necessity of ritual propriety, without which genuine friendship gives way to 
envy and naked competition. According to the biographies on Lao Zi and Han Fei in The 
Records of the Grand Historian (史记 老子韩非列传), Qin Shi Huang (259-210 B.C.) was very 
excited after reading some works by Han Fei, and started to entertain with the idea of hiring Han 
Fei for an important position. Li Si, who was trained along with Han Fei under the instruction of 
Xun Zi, was then the prime minister of Qin. He made a scandalous remark about Han Fei, which 
caused Han Fei to be executed by Qin Shi Huang.
47
 Years later, Li Si himself offended the 
emperor, and was executed along with all of his kinsmen. Both Li Si and Han Fei started as 
apprentices of Xun Zi. Yet they considered Xun Zi’s prescription of ritual as the solution for 
social problems to be pedantically ineffective, especially in a turbulent time like theirs. Both of 
them deviated from ritual, and opted for legal and military powers as the more effective solutions 
because they seem to more directly address their contemporary social problems. In a sense, they 
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partially accomplished their goal as they made great contributions to the transformation of the 
society. Yet, without ritual propriety, their accomplishments vanished quickly. Not only did the 
regime they helped to establish vanished as a fleeting shadow, their lives were also void of 
valuable pleasures such as friendship, peace, prosperity, and longevity.    
The indispensable necessity of ritual as social mechanism finds another proof in the life 
of Shang Yang (385-338 B. C.). He was another leading representative of the Legal School 
before Li Si and Han Fei. Shang Yang, and he, too, believed in the sheer power of politics, 
military strength and severe punishment. His reformation set Qin on a trajectory of rising quickly 
as a super power, and laid the foundation to Qin's conquering of the other states. Shang Yang 
believed human nature to be evil, and advocated the rule of terror against the eruption of 
individual selfishness on the one hand, and attempted to stimulate the selfish impulse to 
empower the nation on the other hand. Ritual, along with other Confucian values such as music, 
poetry, humaneness, sibling deference/friendliness, sincerity, were all denounced as "lice" that 
impeded social progress.
48
 Shang Yang's reformation accomplished tremendous success in the 
short run. Qin rose quickly as the most powerful state and eventually conquered all other states. 
The unrestrained violence of such a militant spirit, however, inflicted a lot of suffering on the 
residents in Qin, and on people of other states as well. Even though almost all of the territories 
were conquered by Qin, the naturalization process was a total failure. Sheer power is never an 
effective mechanism for perpetual peace and prosperity. Shang Yang, the representative of Legal 
School of his time, suffered a fate similar to that of Li Si, the representative of Legal School 
about a hundred years later. Shang Yang and his kinsmen were all killed violently out of 
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revenge. Sheer power may be strong enough to build strong states, or to conquer vast territories, 
yet it is unable to establish perpetually stable, prosperous communities. The members of a 
society established on the basis of sheer power are highly unlikely to enjoy a life of peaceful 
contentment.  
The above discussion does not mean coercive mechanisms such as legal regulations are 
not important. Coercive powers sometimes regulate the society in ways that are powerful enough 
to redirect the society, or to perpetually impact the society. Political and legal coercions are like 
canals that direct the follow of water with definite directions, whereas rituals and convention are 
comparable to water courses formed naturally and gradually. After being enacted and practiced 
long enough, coercive regulations can be assimilated into and absorbed by the public behavioral 
code, and become part of the convention of a soceity. Their coercive nature diminishes along the 
way as they mingle with the realm of conventional rituals. Given enough time, many of the rules 
that used to rely on coercion might evolve into convention with such deep entrenchment that the 
very revocation of these conventions would require coercion. One illustrative example was the 
decree promulgated by the Qing emperor in the year of 1646, commanding all men under the 
Manchurian reign to shave their heads but keep a queue. The compulsory enforcement of this 
decree encountered violent resistance. In some areas such as the Yangtze River Delta, the decree 
provoked riots one after another, which led to vast scale massacres by the Manchurian army.
49
 
Such abrupt alterations suffered strong resilient power of convention at its fullest extent. 
Manchurian conquerors at that time were obsessed with blatant force, and underestimated the 
power of convention. The decree was considered as one of the six detrimental promulgations 
issued by the early Qing rulers. Negative ripple effects of these detrimental decrees incurred high 
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social costs both for the rulers and for the subjects. The Manchurian rulers were sensible enough 
to realize their mistake, and they swiftly shifted their position from iron fisted violence to the 
endorsement of Confucian rituals. Deference for convention helped the Qing Dynasty (1636-
1912 A. D.) escape the fate of short-lived dynasties such as Qin and Yuan, and sustained the 
regime for about three hundred years.  
Some behavior patterns that were initially imposed by coercion can eventually evolve 
into convention. Once a practice reaches the status of convention, the coercive element 
diminishes gradually as the power of habit takes over. As discussed in the above section on habit, 
the power of convention comes from the inertia of previously entrenched paths, which exist in 
the physiological system of the individual person, as well as in the ethos of a given society. In 
many occasions, the power of convention exists without too much rational explanation. The 
above mentioned detrimental decree of compulsory hair-shaving was in the beginning resisted at 
all cost. Yet, after couple hundred years of enforcement, it assumed the status of convention. For 
those diaspora Chinese who lived beyond the Manchurian regime in the late 19th century and 
early 20th century, they voluntarily shaved their foreheads and kept the queue out of a sincere 
belief that the practice was just a part of their national identity. In March 1912, the newly 
founded Republic issued an order, commanding all male citizens to cut off their queues. Many 
conservative people refused to comply, because, after so many generations, the Manchurian style 
had already evolved into convention. As convention, it was buttressed with the tremendous 
power of inertia.
50
 All above observations endorse the hypothesis that convention and coercive 
social mechanisms are in dynamic interplay with each other. Rituals as convention are to be 
viewed as a constantly living organism.  
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The Magic Power of Ritual 
 
To what shall I compare the power of convention? It is like ether, the hypothetical 
element that pervades the whole universe. Just as ether is believed to be the sustaining power of 
the physical universe, rituals are fundamental fabrics that sustain the individual and communal 
cosmos of the human being. Just as ether is believed to be hidden from sensible prehension, the 
pervasive power of rituals deeply permeates the essence of our existence as an intricately woven 
fabric that sustains our being. Rituals function at a level similar to our subconscious or our basic 
instincts. They play a tremendous role in our life, yet are usually invisible on the radar of our 
consciousness. As the constituting elements of human essence, social convention and personal 
habits lie at the very center of our existence. Together they establish individual and collective 
dispositions. The reason their powerful existence usually escapes our attention is because they 
have been internalized as constitutive elements of our subjectivity. They exercise their power 
behind our own mask. Convention and habits are thus powerful, though as elusive as ether. The 
project of spiritual cultivation is in some sense equivalent to the establishment and 
transformation of these ethereal subconscious elements. Thus, this is the sense in which most 
insightful Confucian scholars classified social engineering and self cultivation in the same 
category, only that the former is more subtle and profound than the later. The power of 
convention is always there. For any political system to be applied effectively, the proper 
engagement with the power of convention by means of various rituals is prerequisite. A sage 
who achieves a penetrating understanding of the convention of the time, and engages it with 
effective rituals, will be endowed with the power of harmony, much like the orchestra conductor 
who knows the score and his musicians well. Compared with the power of rituals and 
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convention, political institutions are only of minor importance, because, despite the form of 
government, social harmony can be accomplished only as long as convention is understood and 
rituals are properly exercised. Herbert Fingarette understands the “magic” power of ritual:  
Yet, in spite of this dedicated and apparently secular prosaic moralism, we also find 
occasional comments in the Analects which seem to reveal a belief in magical powers of 
profound importance. By “magic” I mean the power of a specific person to accomplish 
his will directly and effortlessly through ritual, gesture and incantation. The user of magic 
does not work by strategies and devices as a means toward an end; he does not use 
coercion or physical forces. There are no pragmatically developed and tested strategies or 
tactics. He simply wills the end in the proper ritual setting and with the proper ritual 
gesture and word; without further effort on his part, the deed is accomplished.
51
 
 
Rituals are different from laws and regulations in that the latter has not assimilated into 
the convention deeply enough. In other words, laws and regulations still set themselves 
antithetically against the general milieu of that group of people, for if some behavior code has 
been accepted as convention, there is no need to promulgate it in the form of a law. The very 
definition of law as a coercive mechanism implies the existence of tension. Yet rituals, as non-
coercive mechanisms, restrain and constrain by the power of habit. When a behavior pattern 
becomes habit, it assumes power as the informational paths being engrained on the individual 
and collective equilibriums. Here I use the term "equilibrium" in a collective sense, by which I 
mean those vibratory patterns that have been shared commonly among the members of the 
community. It is the power of Dao (道), or the power of De (德), or the power of public opinion. 
This is what Confucius meant by the following expression: “If the people be led by laws, and 
uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but 
have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the 
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rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good.”52 His 
statement implies that rituals are more powerful than politics and legislation. The constraining 
power of ritual comes from the commonly accepted behavior patterns. From a physical and 
physiological point of view, it is just the alluring power of existing paths that direct the wheel to 
repeat them, or the inertia that assesses the opening of a new path to be more expensive in terms 
of spent energy. The power of convention is actually very subtle and overwhelming, even the 
strongest political power sometimes cannot override it. That doesn't mean the convention always 
stands on the right side. There are occasions when reformations and changes are necessary, yet 
convention blocks the way of progress.  
Rituals of a given society weave its members into a continuous whole. The rulers and the 
subjects engage each other in a social dance in accord with ritualistic rhythms. Everyone 
occupies a part, irreplaceable by others, and engages others according to the proprieties that are 
suitable for his/her existential location. When rituals are properly understood and utilized, 
powerful results ensue: administrating a big country can be as easy as frying a small fish.
53
 
When, however, the rulers are ignorant about, or neglect the convention, they will surely meet 
with great resistance. Many times, capricious rulers, as powerful they may have been, were 
denounced as mere jokes, because they failed to engage rituals and convention with a deferential 
attitude. Those who understand the power of convention and engage them properly, even though 
they are not in a ruling position, are called "the commoner king" (素王). Confucius was 
respected as one of the “commoner kings” by scholars who commented in the Spring and 
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Autumn Annals. With keen apprehensions on the real values behind the rituals, the sage assumes 
a pivotal position that harmonizes the whole society with proper engagement of the magic power 
of rituals. Confucius expressed the point succinctly: "He who exercises government by means of 
his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn 
towards it."
54
 
In a Confucian ideal, ritual and music always come as a pair essential element of a good 
society. The correspondence between the two can be understood in the following way. First, both 
ritual and music have harmony as their goal. Harmony from a metaphysical perspective is to be 
understood as that kind of coherent vibratory pattern that orchestrates all participating patterns. 
Or, to use Whitehead’s terms, it prehends the participating patterns by concrescencing them into 
a unified one. It is the spirit that consists and transcends all that is in harmony. If we go beyond 
the substance language, harmony is the essence of all existences. Any change to the harmonic 
pattern is a real change to the essence of that existence. Harmony is thus essential both for social 
engineering and individual spiritual cultivation. Modification of the harmonic pattern is both the 
means and end of spirituality. Ritual as a collective harmonic pattern makes its way to the core of 
all equilibriums that take shape in its matrix. Furthermore, both rituals and music are to be 
evaluated by taste. Even though taste might vary substantially from person to person, the concept 
can be adapted to the ranking of different types of rituals. Both rituals and music are normative 
practices that can be appraised with certain standards. It is interesting that Confucius attributed 
an intricate and intimate relationship between the two. The quality of rituals of a certain place is 
manifested by the quality of its music. For instance, “the Master said of the Shao that it was 
perfectly beautiful and also perfectly good. He said of the Wu that it was perfectly beautiful but 
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not perfectly good.”55 Here, Confucius obviously employed an ethical standard in the evaluation 
of aesthetic appreciation. The relation of music and rituals also characterizes the comments of 
Confucius made at Wu Cheng, “The Master, having come to Wu Cheng, heard there the sound of 
stringed instruments and singing. Well pleased and smiling, he said, "Why use an ox knife to kill 
a fowl?"
56
 Music and rituals were considered by Confucius as tools of social engineering that are 
too grand to be applied on a small city like Wu Cheng. The commensurability between the 
aesthetic taste for music and the ethical taste for rituals and convention is actually intelligible, 
because both ritual and music are vibratory patterns apprehended by the equilibrium, with 
harmony as the category common to both realms. The quality of ritual harmony exhibits clues in 
the musical harmony of that society. There were occasions when Confucius made negative 
comments on local music, accompanied with suggestions to change the music as an art of 
governing.
57
 
In addition to Confucius, the most insightful resources on rituals are to be found in works 
by Xun Zi. Li Si and Han Fei, Xun Zi’s two most famous apprentices, failed to catch the gist of 
the Xun Zian theory with their reductive treatment on the Xun Zian notion of rituals. Ritual was 
the solution Xun Zi prescribed for his own time. The validity of this prescription persists even in 
the contemporary social settings of the 21
st
 Century. For any social mechanism to work properly, 
it must understand the convention of that society, and to engage that convention with proper 
ritual properties. In the past two hundred years, China has been learning from the West, first in 
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the realm of mechanics and technology, and then on the level of institutions. The wide spread of 
Christianity stands for another wave of efforts, targeting deeper, more essential elements. 
Whether Christianity is able to take root in Chinese society depends on how well it is adapted to 
the rich and deep convention in China. It took Buddhists the continuous effort of several 
generations before the inception of indigenous denominations such as Chan, Huayan and Tiantai. 
Many Buddhist terms then became part of the daily lives of average Chinese people. Only when 
Christianity reaches a similar level, can it be said to be successfully integrated into the 
conventional cultural in China. The success of this process depends on how well we mobilize 
convention, and integrate it into creative ritual.  
At this point, we have to pause for a moment for a more detailed discussion on the Xun 
Zian view of human nature. Xun Zi was well known for his view of human nature as evil. He 
even entitled one of his essays directly, "Man's Nature Is Evil".
58
 Yet a further study indicates 
that Xun Zi held a view quite beyond a mere assertion of the vicious nature of human being. As a 
matter of fact, Xun Zi's view on human nature was a deductive conclusion on the basis of two 
premises, namely, the natural preference of self interest and the deficiency of material resources. 
Ritual principles arose as a means to harmonize this pair of conflicting conditions:  
That is the origin of ritual? I reply: man is born with desires. If his desires are not 
satisfied for him, he cannot but seek some means to satisfy them himself. If there are no 
limits and degrees to his seeking, then he will inevitably fall to wrangling with other men. 
From wrangling comes disorder and from disorder comes exhaustion. The ancient kings 
hated such disorder, and therefore they established ritual principles in order to curb it, to 
train men’s desires and to provide for their satisfaction. They saw to it that desires did not 
overextend the means for their satisfaction, and material goods did not fall short of what 
was desired. Thus both desires and goods were looked after and satisfied. This is the 
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origin of rites.
59
 
 
From a biological point of view, desires are not all together evil. Beneath the outspoken 
assertion on the selfish nature of human being, there is another layer in Xun Zian anthropology, 
namely, its radical malleability. It is with confidence in human malleability that the sages 
cherished the hope of molding mankind with rituals. The validity of all axiological efforts 
depends on the malleability of our nature. Xun Zi took a stance similar to that of Shang Yang, 
only that he placed great emphasis on the almost infinite capacity of being molded into a wide 
variety of possibilities. The above example of hair-shaving and queue-growing may serve as an 
apt illustration for this point. The radical malleability of human nature displays a neutral 
character, with no preference either towards the good or the bad. In other words, human nature is 
susceptible to rituals and convention, good and bad alike. As we have seen in the illustration, the 
same practice of hair-shaving and queue-growing that was resisted at the cost of many lives was 
regarded as part of the Chinese identity for about three hundred years by the same ethnic group. 
It is clear that human nature is capable of being cultivated with all kinds of habits, virtuous, 
vicious or neutral. That is why Xun Zi began his work with a discussion on “encouraging 
learning”: 
A piece of wood as straight as a plumb line may be bent into a circle as true as any drawn 
with a compass and, even after the wood has dried, it will not straighten out again. The 
bending process has made it that way. Thus, if wood is pressed against a straightening 
board, it can be made straight; if metal is put to the grindstone, it can be sharpened; and if 
the gentleman studies widely and each day examines himself, his wisdom will become 
clear and his conduct be without fault…. Children born among the Han or Yueh people of 
the south and among the Mo barbarians of the north cry with the same voice at birth, but 
as they grow older they follow different customs.
60
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Xun Zi surely advocated a much more profound and comprehensive solution than that of 
his students Li Si and Han Fei. Ritual is the way that is smooth and broad, leading to the essence 
of human equilibrium. Ritual fabricates the essential structure of our being, individual and 
communal. The selfish inclination of our nature makes ritual an indispensable mechanism 
without which no harmony can be accomplished.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
QUESTING FOR NORMS IN THE VALUE CARRYOVER PROCESS 
 
As we have seen in the above chapters, Confucianists of various generations developed a 
sophisticated theory and method of prehending and carrying over values into the subjective 
equilibrium. In order to acquire a better understanding of this value transactional process, we 
have to pay special attention to its dynamic and dialectical nature. It is dynamic because it 
involves the historical status of the equilibrium, the possible resulting consequences for the 
future, and the forms and norms that are involved in the present harmonization. It is dialectical in 
the sense that the subjective equilibrium issues subjective forms that organize the value datum, 
and at the same time, the equilibrium is constantly modified by the values that are being 
prehended. In fact, the equilibrium itself can somehow be perceived as the product of former 
value transactions and integration. The malleability of the equilibrium indicates that it is 
constantly modifying itself. The nobility of human equilibrium in a sense lies in its wide range of 
malleability, which opens up infinite possibilities of value integration. The whole meaning of 
Confucian spirituality depends on the evolution of the human equilibrium in certain directions.  
Now, we come across another essential issue in the value transactional process, namely, 
the norms. Given the ubiquitous existence of values in the universe, what are the ones that are 
desirable? By what kind of criteria do we deem some as desirable and others as dispensable? Are 
there transcendental norms innate to the human equilibrium?  What are the essential features a 
value exemplary equilibrium should consist of and demonstrate? Is there any principle in the 
structure of normative equilibrium? Is there just one normative equilibrium, or are there multiple 
types of ideal equilibrium? These are all inescapable questions the answers to which define the 
general character of any given culture.  
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The collective wisdom of Confucianists of many generations managed to provide 
answers to the above questions that can be interpreted in different directions. There are roughly 
two camps of Confucian scholars, the transcendental camp and the pragmatist camp, represented 
by Meng Zi and Xun Zi respectively. If we consider Confucius as the one that maintained a 
primordial balance about human nature, then bifurcation soon started in the second or third 
generation. Zi Si (子思), who is believed to be the grandson of Confucius, along with his disciple 
Meng Zi, claimed that human nature comes with transcendental moral sprouts that are common 
and universal to all human beings. If not blocked or ruined by external forces, these sprouts are 
bound to grow and thrive. The essential model of spiritual cultivation, then, lies in the returning 
to and cultivating of these transcendental moral sprouts. Meng Zi proposed four basic types of 
transcendental sprouts, namely, the feeling of commiseration (humanity), the feeling of shame 
and dislike (righteousness), the feeling of respect and reverence (propriety) and the feeling of 
right and wrong (wisdom).  
Ever since Zi Si and Meng Zi, the transcendental school has been dominant in the 
historical development of Confucianism. Zhu Xi, the great mediaeval synthesist, selected Zhong 
Yong (中庸), which was believed to be authored by Zi Si, as one of the basic documents for 
Neo-Confucianism. The opening phrase of Zhong Yong acknowledges the affinity of Tien and 
human nature: “What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow human nature is 
called the Way. Cultivating the Way is called teaching.”1 These statements clearly point to 
Heaven (天) as the source and origin of these transcendental sprouts. Zhu Xi expanded the 
transcendental categories from four sprouts to the concept of Li (理), which pervades every 
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individual existence including human beings. Li as the innate principle resides in the human 
mind (心), yet it needs to go through strenuous efforts of self-cultivation before it can be fully 
actualized. The method of actualizing the innate principle, according to Zhu Xi, is no other than 
extending knowledge through the investigation of things (格物致知). The principle of the mind 
penetrates all as blood circulates and reaches the entire body.”2 Humanity as the innate principle 
can thus be fully realized and manifested only when the mind has embraced and penetrated all 
things. Unlike Wang Yang Ming, Zhu Xi managed to maintain a balance between the innate 
principle of human equilibrium and the external principles that exist in the myriad things. Wang 
Yang Ming took a subjective turn in his understanding of human equilibrium. Wang identified 
the human mind as the substance of principle. According to Wang, there is no principle other 
than those embodied in the human mind. The human mind itself embodies all possible principles. 
The central task of self-cultivation is no other than rectifying the mind itself, for all principles are 
innate in the mind. This subjective turn negated the necessity of the investigation of things, and 
hence cut off the channel that transfers the external natural value into internal equilibrium. Wang 
clearly made a fatal epistemological mistake with this subjective turn. It is through his doctrine 
of unity of knowledge and action that Wang Yang Ming managed to bridge the gap between the 
human mind and the external world. Wang’s School of Mind, however, represents an extreme 
case of transcendental Confucianism.  
In the modern area, transcendental Confucianism was represented by prominent figures 
such as Fung Yu-Lan and Tu Wei-Ming. On the basis of Zhu Xi’s school of principle, Fung Yu-
Lan advocated a theory of Neo-School of Principle (新理学). Fung, with the aid of Western 
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philosophical concept, pushed the Song Ming principle of Li (理) towards the Platonic notion of 
form. Fung worked out his new thrust by reactivating the argument of Kung-Sun Lung (b. 380 
B.C.), the major exponent of the School of Names. Principle, according to Fung, is self-existent, 
absolute, eternal, and belongs to the realm of reality. There are more principles than are 
actualized in the world. The sum total of principles amounts to the Great Ultimate.
3
 The principle 
of human being is, thus, the sum of logical concepts that define the class of human being. To be 
accurate, the principles that are innate to the human equilibrium are to be better described as 
transcendent, rather than transcendental.   
Tu Wei-ming as the leading contemporary Confucian scholar also adopts the Si Meng (思
孟) transcendental position on human nature. Tu constructed his scholar work on the foundation 
of Chung Yung (中庸). He sketched an ideal figure of a profound person with ever-deepening 
personality, who lived in a fiduciary community. The profound person, as Tu suggests, is able to 
penetrate into and be one with the principle of Heaven by means of being sincere. Sincerity, 
which Tu considers as ontological, lays out a path that leads to the original human nature 
imparted by heaven. Human beings are, as Tu says in accord with Chung Yung, endowed with 
innate morality. The primary concern of education “… is to make manifest the moral qualities 
inherent in our nature.” “… [T]he reason human beings can learn to be sincere is not because of 
Heaven’s ‘grace’ but because their nature is originally so endowed.”4  
What’s common to the above transcendental Confucianists is that they all believe in some 
sort of “norms” that are innate to the human equilibrium. The most common version is the five 
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“universal ways”, or “five constancies”, of humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and 
fidelity. Others believed in norms that exist in comparatively more diffused modes such as 
principle and good consciousness. Are these constancies truly constant in a universal sense? Are 
they normative to other cultures? Comparative studies in a pluralistic age indicate that those 
“constancies” are not universally constant. Those patterns turn out to be culturally determined, or 
parochially limited, in light of comparative studies of world cultures. Instead of being 
transcendental categories that are universally valid, they are just behavior patterns, or character 
modes, that are no more than social inventions. They make up unique features of a given culture. 
These patterns can be understood as moral hypotheses that were formulated in the process of 
historical development. They are not to be confused with innate faculties of human equilibrium 
such as pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy. Emotional faculties are innate, universal and common to 
all human equilibrium, and thus constitute a common ground for axiological discussions, 
whether east or west, past or present.  
If we follow Neville’s definition of norm as “… whatever makes the difference between 
better and worse in possibilities relevant to human behavior”5, then what the transcendental 
Confucianists considered as “constancies” are norms that signify possible patterns of organizing 
human behavior. Defining norms as hypothetical patterns helps to dislodge them from their 
absolute status that usually inhibits fruitful discussion and comparison. It also avoids cultural 
bigotry and prejudices that are hostile to innovative patterns that are better than those that are 
popularly accepted. In other words, denying absolute, or transcendental, status to any normative 
pattern opens channels for friendly communication between cultures, as well as allowing room 
for improvement of the culture involved.  
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The pragmatic Confucianists, in contrast, understand human nature as void of innate 
goodness and capable of all kinds of depraved conduct. In other words, they regard human nature 
as free and chaotic if unleashed from socially invented mechanisms such as ritual and legal 
regulations. Xun Zi, the prototype of the pragmatic Confucianist, for example, depicted human 
nature as the Hobbes’s “war of all against all.”  The uncivilized primitive natural situation of 
human society, according to Xun Zi, is no different from that of a herd of animals. Human beings 
might have ethically positive impulses such as loving and caring for our children, which Mencius 
codified as innate universal sprouts. Yet, for Xun Zi, these rudimental good beginnings are not 
strong enough to girdle and tame our innate chaotic impulses.  Xun Zi, hence, regarded our 
primordial chaotic nature as evil. 
Human nature is evil, according to Xun Zi: goodness comes only as the result of 
conscientious effort.    
The nature of man is such that he is born with a fondness of profit.  If he indulges this 
fondness, it will lead him into wrangling and strife…  Hence, any man who follows his 
nature and indulges his emotions will inevitably become involved in wrangling and strife, 
will violate the forms and rules of society, and will end as a criminal…  It is obvious 
from this, then, that man’s nature is evil, and that his goodness is the result of conscious 
activity.
6
 
 
Goodness and principles, according to Xun Zi, come from outside. They were purposefully 
designed by the sages so as to domesticate the evil nature of the human being. 
In ancient times the sage kings realized that man’s nature is evil, and that therefore he 
inclines towards evil and violence and is not upright or orderly.  Accordingly, they 
created ritual principles and laid down certain regulations…. In this way they caused all 
men to become orderly and to conform to the way.
7
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Xun Zi was challenged by the followers of Mencius and realized that he was obligated to account 
for the origin of ritual principles and humanness. After all, there is a logical inconsistency that 
demands explanation. If human nature is evil, from where, then, do the ritual principles come 
from? Xun Zi understood the validity of such a challenge, and offered his rebuttal.   
Some one may ask, if man’s nature is evil, then where do ritual principles come from?  I 
would reply: all ritual principles are produced by the conscious activity of the sages; 
essentially they are not products of man’s nature.8   
 
He made his point even more explicitly in the following segment:  
 
Therefore, the sage transforms his nature and initiates conscious activity; from this 
conscious activity he produces ritual principles, and when they have been produced he 
sets up rules and regulations.  Hence, ritual principles and rules are produced by the 
sage.
9
   
 
Thus, sages, according to Xun Zi, were not innately good.  With respect to human nature, the 
sage is just the same as others.  It is only in his conscious activity that the sage differs from and 
surpasses the commoners.
10
  What, then, is this so-called conscious activity of the sage?  It is a 
pivotal point from which to grapple with Xun Zi’s theory.   
The sage’s conscious activity revolves around the pragmatic concern of social 
consequence.  It is a massive project of social engineering.  Ethical norms and principles do 
matter in this process.  The sages, who transcended their natural selfishness, serve as guardians 
of the public good.  While the presupposed evil nature of human beings inevitably leads to social 
chaos, the sage’s mission is to bring harmony to the primitive chaos. His basic strategy is the 
invention and application of ritual propriety.  In his Treaty on Heaven, Xun Zi outspokenly 
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denied any transcendental root of social engineering.  For him, ritual propriety is a social project 
out of pragmatic concern.  Its sole purpose is to establish and enhance social harmony.  
According to Xun Zi,  
… in ancient times the sages, realizing that man’s nature is evil, that it is prejudiced and 
not upright, irresponsible and lacking in order, for this reason established the authority of 
the ruler to control it, elucidated virtual principles to transform it, set up laws and 
standards to correct it, and meted out strict punishments to restrain it.  As a result, all the 
world achieved order and conformed goodness.  Such is the orderly government of the 
sage kings and the transforming power of ritual principles.
11
 
 
As we have discussed earlier, the essential task of human cultivation in Mencius’ scheme 
is to remove the obstacles and masquerades that eclipse the innate goodness of humanity.  
Sincerity is upheld as the path leading to this innate truth within humanity, which in turn leads to 
a unity between Heaven and humanity.  For Mencius, the ontological continuum between 
Heaven and humanity has never been broken.  The innate goodness of humanity is the outflow of 
the transcendent goodness of Heaven.  Heaven is depicted by Mencius as benign and virtuous.  
Affirming the moral nature of heaven becomes a theme that characterizes contemporary 
Confucian scholarship.  This probably is the reason Confucian moral ethics of today oftentimes 
assumes the nickname “virtue ethics”.  The reality of Heaven, according to this version, is 
predominantly ethical.  The call is for humanity to rise and shine, to implement its innate 
goodness into daily practice, and to cooperate with heaven by exemplifying its virtuous reality.   
Xun Zi, in various important aspects, was diametrically opposed to Mencius.  He did not 
believe in the moral nature of Tien.  For him, Heaven is nothing more than the blue sky along 
with all the natural laws that are permanent and unchanging.   
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Heaven’s ways are constant.  It does not prevail because of a sage like Yao; it does not 
cease to prevail because of a tyrant like Chieh.  Respond to it with good government, and 
good fortune will result; respond to it with disorder, and misfortune will result.
12
    
 
In other words, Heaven is beyond human manipulation.  The umbilical cord that connects 
humanity to Heaven is, in the Xun Zian scheme, cut off with the scissors of rationality.  No 
matter how virtuous or how perverse a person is, Heaven is not going to change its course to 
reward or punish this person  Heaven is active, yet all the actions follow a particular pattern, and 
thus are common to all beings.  There is no moral echo between Heaven and humanity, neither is 
there any immediate bond that connects the two.  The ethical correspondence between Heaven 
and humanity (天人感应) is decisively cordoned of by Xun Zi as superstitious psychological 
manipulation.  Heaven serves, in the Xun Zian model, only as a common backdrop for all human 
beings.  What really makes the difference is human effort.   
The Xun Zian cosmological layout postulates the essential importance of ritual and 
morality as human invention.  For Mencius, the absence of ritual leads to naive ignorance, while 
for Xun Zi, a society without ritual principle is bound to ruin in chaos and disaster.  Ritual 
occupies a more fundamental position in Xun Zian model than in that of Mencius.  
Just as Professor Tu Wei-ming is regarded as a contemporary representative of 
transcendental Confucianism, Robert C. Neville stands as the major advocate of pragmatic 
Confucianism. As a Peircean pragmatist, Professor Neville adopted the Xun Zian theme, and 
developed it into an elaborate theory with his method of symbolic engagement. Professor Neville 
is one of the few philosophers in the West who envisions profound application of ritual in 
contemporary society.  As Neville notices,  
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Mencius emphasizes the fact that the heart would automatically perceive and respond 
well if society had not taught selfishness.  Xun Zians counter that the connection between 
the ten thousand things and the heart itself needs to be created by appropriate rituals or 
habitual meaning structures.  If the learned rituals are bad, selfishness is reinforced.  But, 
if the person is relatively unritualized, the heart will be like the baby’s infantile 
selfishness.  The way to create a path between the world and the heart necessarily 
includes teaching civilizing rituals.”13 
 
Thus far, I have been trying to demonstrate the relative and fallible nature of norms that 
pervaded various denominations of historical Confucianism. As an effort to clear the ground for 
further discussion, norms can be compared and ranked along a certain spectrum. The so-called 
“constancies” of transcendental Confucianists are not ontologically absolute rules imparted 
directly from heaven as they claim to be. They are actually social inventions, though good as 
they possibly are, among numerous other possible alternatives. In fact, if examined carefully, we 
may discern reasons for these “constancies” to stand out as prominent, or even idolized, 
principles that surpass others. Yet they are not without problems once they become petrified. 
Before embarking on a systematic discussion and the construction of several pairs of norms that 
may help to bring the traditional Confucian norms under new light, I would first like to offer 
some further critique on transcendental Confucianists. The purpose of these critiques is to place 
these so-called “constancies” in their relatively proper position in a broader axiological 
framework, and to deliberately create some distance by singling them out from general 
Confucian culture, making possible the creative transformation of traditional Confucianism.  
First, these norms of transcendental Confucianists confused potentiality with reality. 
Human equilibrium as a dynamic matrix comes with infinite numbers of possible patterns, of 
which the “constancies” are merely a few among the infinite. The equilibrium’s potential to be 
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organized according to the patterns of “constancies” does not guarantee that those patterns are 
existing realities innate to the equilibrium. The whole world of effort is involved in bringing 
potentialities into realities. This confusion is a subtle, yet fatal, misunderstanding that entranced 
moral, social, political and philosophical realms of Chinese culture. One of the resulting 
consequences was an excessively optimistic assessment of human nature. The theme of human 
depravity was never seriously engaged within major denominations of traditional Confucianism. 
Such a misguided anthropological hypothesis entrapped the Chinese culture with tenacious 
beliefs in saint figures with heroic attempts to bring order and justice to the society. What 
Chinese history attests to, however, is the pervasive existence of corrupted officials and the 
abuse of public power. Never has human nature as perceived by the Confucianists depraved and 
in need of salvation. Instead, the common perception has always been that the cultivation of 
innate good was possible through education.  
I have to admit, however, there is a profound reason behind this anthropological 
misconception that has been so persistently embraced by transcendental Confucianists. This 
leads to the second critiques on transcendental Confucianists. Not only have they confused 
potentiality with reality, but they also confused ideal norms with practical norms. My definition 
of an ideal norm is slightly different from that of Neville’s. Professor Neville defines an ideal 
norm as “… whatever it is that makes alternative possibilities better and worse”.14 His definition 
anchors upon human responsibility, because ideal norms obligate the chooser to opt for the best 
possible option. What I mean by the ideal norm is the exemplary, or best possible, norms that a 
given society can think of. In the case of transcendental Confucianists, ideal norms are embodied 
by a series of virtues of which the five constancies are its summary. Concrete ideal norms are 
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still social inventions favored by the existent structures of that society. For instance, the 
Confucian five constancies are closely knitted with three cardinal guides, namely, father guides 
son, emperor guides subject, husband guides wife. These three cardinal guides laid the 
foundation for the hierarchical society in ancient China, out of which grew the five constancies. 
We are now distant enough to draw an easy conclusion that these seemingly “immutable 
relationships” and “constancies” were no more than artifacts that reflect and reinforce the 
existent social structure. Ideal norms of a given society are usually distilled into and absorbed by 
the minds of its members, which gives rise to certain moral and aesthetic tastes that define the 
general milieu of that society. Oftentimes, these ideal norms are set up at a level so high that it is 
sometimes even beyond the reach of saints and sages. Ideal norms serve as targets that define the 
general orientation of behavior patterns of the members of a given society. It is not surprising 
that, most of the time, the actual behavior of the average member falls short of the ideal norms. 
This amounts to the original definition of the Hebrew concept of sin as missing the target. Sin is 
usually considered an overstatement in the context of Confucianism. Eastern society prefers the 
notion of shame. Sin and shame are behavior failures for which the involved person is held 
responsible for. Nevertheless, there is an even more profound kind of sin, of which I define as 
the original sin of a given society. “Original sin” can be understood as inherent defects that 
corrupt the ideal norms. For example, the Nazi virtue of courageous kempt embodied by Hitler 
served as official ideal norms during the Third Reich. Yet, guided by such perverted ideal norms, 
the more fervent the people become, the more crimes they commit against their Jewish 
neighbors. Hence, if ideal norms are comparable to targets, sins are unavoidable in societies with 
misplaced targets.  
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Before returning to the critique of transcendental Confucianists, I would like to elaborate 
more on the concept of sin in light of the current discussion on norms. Human beings are unique 
creatures that are endowed with the capacity of ideal envisioning, which, expresses itself as 
super-ego, to use Freudian language. The structure of the super-ego is usually both religiously 
and culturally determined. It consists of a web of ideal norms that the given society or culture 
values the most. Even though the members of the society can rarely achieve these ideal norms, 
they, nevertheless, were built in the structure of their personality as the criteria by which the 
members of the society measure the behavior of themselves and others. The existence of these 
ideal norms is so real that it constitutes an essential component of their being. Had these ideal 
norms be removed or altered, the very structure of their being might collapse. For every “bit” of 
feeling that’s been issued from the equilibrium, these ideal norms come instantly as constituent 
ingredients of that bit of feeling. Even though there might be a temporal sequence in every 
feeling, or to put it more specifically, evaluative judgment as constituent part of that feeling may 
come at a later time, it is nevertheless unnecessary or redundant to always dissect the feeling 
unless for the purpose of inquisitive analysis. The structure of every bit of feeling, then, comes 
with an innate tension between the ideal and the existential. When applied to moral reflections by 
the self, the sense of guilt or shame comes as an indispensable component of that feeling, 
because, in light of the ideal norms, almost every single human behavior falls short somehow. 
Sin, shame, or guilt, thus, comes universally as a component of our feeling. It is determined by 
the very structure of our nature as axiological entities.  
I would like to expand the notion of ideal norms a little more. Even though ideal norms, 
whether individually or socially, can be interpreted as social inventions, their very existence of 
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ideal norms as logical forms still awaits further explanation. Cultures are defined by the 
existential milieu, as much as by their implicit ideal norms. Human existence, whether individual 
or communal, is implanted with an ideal dimension. The absoluteness of a particular set of ideal 
norms, such as the five constancies of the transcendental Confucianists, has been undermined or 
broken, yet the validity of the concept of ideal norm remains unharmed, though, the concept now 
recedes further towards the horizon. In the contemporary pluralistic age, many sets of ideal 
norms are proven to be culturally, historically, or geographically bound, and hence not eternal or 
absolute. The absolute stands as a void concept that begs for more plausible hypotheses. The 
very existence of the concept of ideal norm may, again, prove the axiological nature of human 
existence.  
Now, let’s return to the critique of transcendental Confucianism. The first two points 
concern its confusion between potentiality and reality, and between ideal and practical norms. 
The third criticism is about the one-sided nature of these normative values. Norms as constancies 
embody the existent social orders. By emphasizing the existing orders, they fail to pay deference 
to values that are opposite to these constancies, such as creativity, spontaneity, and unique 
authentic identity. The list of norms as constancies indicates a preference for stability above 
creativity, superiority above minority, and order above dynamics. If we follow the scheme of 
norms elaborated by Neville, sufficient deference should be paid to these opposite polarities, no 
matter how threatening to the existent order they may appear to be.
15
 In its thousands of years of 
history, China has suffered chronically from social and political upheavals and chaos. A 
pathological study of its social theories may find the root of chaos lies in an unbalanced design 
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of its norms. With a set of norms that value order and stability to an incommensurate and 
excessive degree, non-conformist and dissident values are usually deprived of normal channels 
to express themselves. When creative values, which are usually initiated as a kind of heterodoxy 
in a dogmatic society, accumulate to a threshold, they erupt with volcanically destructive power. 
They devastate the society by annihilating the existent structural order. A dialectical tension 
between order and chaos, probably, characterizes almost all societies, with China exemplifing as 
an extreme case. We may do Chinese society a great service by providing it with new sets of 
norms to help remedy its extremist tendencies, as I will do in the following section.  
The fourth critique applicable to transcendental Confucian norms is their implicit 
susceptibility to dogmatism. With its embedded one-sidedness, the norms gradually deplete their 
vitality, and become petrified dogma. A society full of petrified dogma allows its members to 
avoid moral responsibility. Fresh moral choices denigrate into mere acceptance of moral codes 
inherited from past generations. Dynamic moral decisions that involve the entire human 
equilibrium are thus aborted in favor of compliance to existing rules. For this reason, Confucius 
condemned philistine morality more than once in his Analects: "Your good, careful people of the 
villages are the thieves of virtue."
16
 What James Legge translated as “the good, careful people of 
the villages” was, in original text, a technical term called Xiang Yuan (鄉愿), which finds its 
interpretation in another passage in Analects:  
Zi Gong asked, saying, "What do you say of a man who is loved by all the people of his 
neighborhood?" The Master replied, "We may not for that accord our approval of him." 
"And what do you say of him who is hated by all the people of his neighborhood?" The 
                                                 
16 《論語 陽貨》: 子曰：「鄉原，德之賊也。」 
 
173 
 
 
 
Master said, "We may not for that conclude that he is bad. It is better than either of these 
cases that the good in the neighborhood love him, and the bad hate him."
17
 
What Confucius meant by moral choice is thus not a simple people-pleasing business with 
philistine taste. It involves the responsibility of discretion, and courageous decision, and, if 
necessary, standing up against the evil in the community. Meng Zi once offered a similar critique 
about a smiliar figure:  
Their words have not respect to their actions and their actions have not respect to their 
words, but they say, "The ancients! The ancients! Why do they act so peculiarly, and are 
so cold and distant? Born in this age, we should be of this age, to be good is all that is 
needed."Eunuch-like, flattering their generation - such are your good careful men of the 
villages.
18
 
In the same spirit, Jesus confronted the Pharisees who regarded themselves as embodiments of 
the social norms of the first century Jewish community. It bears much symbolic significance that 
Jesus as the incarnated divine norm was condemned and crucified by allied forces of which the 
Pharisees were a major partner. Fossilized norms can be fatal obstacles that block authentic 
moral decision. They blight individual moral subjects to become mere surrogates, and thwart the 
society, preventing creative regeneration.  
We will do Chinese culture a great service if we may revise the one-sided, petrified, 
legalistic norms of the transcendental Confucianists with a set of balanced, dynamic, authentic 
pairs of norms that allow both the individuals and society to maintain their stable identity and, at 
the same time, unfold their creativity. This constitutes the goal of next section.  
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Proposing Four Sets of Norms for Value Carryover 
 
As we have seen, the working norms of the traditional Confucianists, especially those of 
the transcendental camp, appeared to be one-sided and unbalanced. They confused potentiality 
with reality, giving human nature an overly optimistic interpretation. They prefer order over 
novelty and attempt to maintain stability at the expenses of creativity. As a result, the overall 
course of Chinese history, guided by this ideology, suffered along a rocky course. Recurring 
social upheavals ruined the order and the wealth that was accumulated during peaceful periods. 
Construction and destruction occur alternatively as a pattern characterizing the many years of 
Chinese history. The root cause of such a pattern lies not in the axiological nature of Chinese 
culture, but in the unbalanced norms that tend to suppress novelty during the peaceful times, only 
to cause its volcanic eruption after its energy destructively accumulates beneath the surface. How 
can we interpret human nature in a more balanced fashion? What are the norms that may serve as 
a remedy to alleviate this destructive force? Are there norms that are more balanced, and thus 
may maintain the social stability while, at the same time, allowing for novelty to unfold freely so 
as opening up the doors that lead to the future?  
I would like to propose four sets of norms that may help Confucianism to creatively 
transform itself in order to become more contemporarily relevant. The four sets of norms are 1) 
earth and heaven, as norms that define its objective relation to nature; 2) stability and creativity, 
as norms that define the internal structure of equilibrium; 3) self and others, as norms that define 
its empathetic relation in community; 4) commonality and transmundane, as norms that define its 
infinite possibility in light of the ultimate.  
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From the very beginning of this construction, I have to admit that these proposed norms 
are by no means “constancies” as the transcendental Confucianists may suggest. Instead, they are 
fallible hypotheses that function as an effort to infuse the normative scheme with a relevance 
with which traditional Confucianism may find its rejuvenation. These norms are by no means 
exhaustive. Neither are they in any sense unchangeable.   
1. The objective Norms of Earth and Heaven 
Traditional Chinese philosophy recognizes three main sources of creativity, namely, the 
heaven, the earth and the human being. If we regard heaven as the source of ontological 
creativity, and earth as that of the cosmological, then human being as creative agent is derivative. 
Nature provides a definitive framework for human creativity. The freedom that the human 
equilibrium enjoys is not that of ex nihlio, but ex materia. As we discussed above, value as De    
(德) that’s been apprehended by the equilibrium is not the mere product of mental activities of 
the human mind (xin 心). It has an objective root as a property of a natural entity. No matter how 
freely the equilibrium interprets the feeling, it has a root in a natural entity as the seed of its 
objectivity. Therefore, the truthfulness of any given value does have its objective verification in a 
natural entity. It is publicly verifiable whether a value is sound or problematic by examining the 
process of how it comes into existence. Therefore, nature serves as an objective norm for any 
value making process. One assumption of modern philosophy is that values are just chimeras 
made up by human emotions, interests, tastes or imagination. To root value firmly on properties 
of a natural entity amounts to a forceful refutation of this modern assumption. Values do have 
objective foundations, and can be verified by objective criteria.  
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Nature as the objective norm of human valuative process can be perceived from the original 
unity between nature and human equilibrium. From a naturalistic point of view, human 
equilibrium has nature as its origin. There are at least three layers that can be dissected in each 
human equilibrium, namely, the nurture, the culture and the nature.  The conscience itself 
participates in the formation of the nurture layer. This layer develops from the moment of 
conception in mother’s womb.  From the very beginning, the conscience develops through the 
nurturing of the social and natural environment.  No matter how determined it appears to be, 
either biologically, psychologically, or socio-economically, there is always a thread of free 
spontaneity lying at the center of each equilibrium, from which proceeds the subject forms.   
Under the layer of the conscience as a nurtured biographical entity lies the deeper level of the 
conscience as a culturally determined entity.  At this level, people assume the identity of being 
Chinese, Indian, Tibetan, or American, within which includes our religious identity. Rendering 
myself as an example, being Chinese means, from the very beginning of the Chinese culture, my 
remote ancestors were limited and conditioned by certain geographical locations, which in turn 
determined their diet, and then the Chinese physiology.  All these elements have been weaved 
into the idiosyncratic features of “Chineseness”, whether physical or cultural.  These physical 
features have been transmitted down to me as a contemporary Chinese.  It gives me the 
inclination of being carnivore or herbivore, along with tastes that are generically Chinese.  The 
physical part of being a Chinese also implies inheritance of the genetic features, some of which 
may make me immune to certain viruses, while embodying some other genetic defects.  All these 
elements are physically here in my body.  Being Chinese means a physical inheritance of these 
compositions, for good or for ill.  However, the physical part is not the focus of this article.  The 
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major theme of this layer is those cultural elements that were pulled down in the semiotic 
systems such as language, custom and ritual.  The so-called “Chineseness” lies mainly in this 
realm.  From the very moment when the first pictogram was invented to this Internet age when 
numerous new vocabularies are being coined every day, there is a sea of signs that are available 
for each one within the community.  If we view human conscience as a semiotic center that is 
constantly shaping and reshaping itself, this layer of existence usually stands out as the most 
significant part.  The more civilized a nation, a community or a person is, the more important this 
layer becomes.  For the sake of expressive convenience, we’ll just term this layer, “culture”.   
The most hidden, yet also the most fundamental part of human existence is this part of 
nature.  Every human equilibrium can be viewed hitherto as the most developed product of 
nature, which entails a history from the very beginning of the universe.  A naturalistic 
perspective affirms that human conscience is a product of Mother Nature.  Our mind, our 
nervous system, along with all other human organs, are deeply connected with and rooted in the 
environment.  Every human conscience is, in some sense, a living fossil.  Deep down in each 
conscience, a tremendous amount of information is hidden, and most of which we are not aware 
of or we simply neglect.  To sum up, every human equilibrium can be dissected into three layers, 
namely nurture, culture and nature.  The conscience with a biographical history centers on 
freedom, choice and responsibility.  The cultural level exemplifies the idiosyncratic feature of 
each tribe or nationality.  The most significant aspect of this level is the semiotic system that is 
accumulating complexity, and being transmitted from generation to generation.  The third level 
is the layer of nature. The responsibilities correspondent with each layer are those of my parents, 
of my nation and of the Creator (or Tien), which goes from imminent to infinite.  The moral 
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identities in my case, correspondingly, are self as a nurtured conscience, Chinese as cultural 
inheritance, and human being as part of the Mother Nature. Nature as norm exists not merely 
externally, as the verification criteria of human valuative process; rather, nature penetrates 
deeper into the inner core of human existence by laying itself down as the normative foundation 
for human equilibrium.  
As the valuative subject, human equilibrium requires sincerity as the norm of valuative 
process. The very basic meaning of sincerity requires the valuing subject to respect the 
objectivity of the natural property upon which the whole valuative process depends. Sincerity 
precludes hyper-active fanaticizing attempts from the valuing subject. It prevents sudden 
disruption between the subject and the object. In other words, sincerity as a norm guarantees the 
continuity between the De and the pertinent natural property from which De is derived.   
With sincerity, the human equilibrium is able to perceive and apprehend the rich endowment 
of De in the myriad entities in nature. Each natural entity is as rich a source as the multi-facetted 
diamond that provides almost infinite sides from which to engage semiotically. The common 
character of every natural entity, along with its almost infinite possibilities of semiotic 
engagement, is its concreteness. Rich as these entities, they provide finite pathways to the 
ultimate. In other words, they ought to be perceived as icons that lead to partial understandings 
of the ultimate. They are not to be understood as idols that block the way to the ultimate. 
Sincerity of the subjective equilibrium, on one hand, directs us to recognize the haecceity of the 
myriad entities without artificially twisting them. On the other hand, it directs us to the horizon 
where earth meets with heaven. It is obvious that by the very term “horizon”, I intend to follow 
Karl Rahner’s definition. Horizon is the place where the immanent meets the transcendent. It 
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always accompanies us, yet we can never touch it or exhaust it. It always recedes further into the 
remote, and opens up new fields in front of us. Rahner’s subtle dialectic tension between 
immanence and transcendence echoes quite well with the notion of Tien Ming (天命) in Chung 
Yung.  
Tien Ming as heavenly mandate, or heavenly endowment, is just like the horizon that lies in a 
far, remote area. It somehow defines the human equilibrium with normative characters by 
providing it with directions and guidance. Yet it also creates open spaces for and leaves the 
equilibrium the freedom to grow into authentic existence. Religiously, this might be the further 
front that Confucianists reached. Professor Tu Wei Ming gave the notion of Cheng (Sincerity 誠) 
an ontological spin by establishing it as a common ground of Heaven and human equilibrium.
19
 
Cheng (诚) stands for genuine true aspiration from humanity, and also for the faithfulness and 
unfailing benevolence of Tien.  When the halves encounter each other, ecstatic union, bliss and 
novel creativity happen.  What this meeting produces is exactly the blissful unity between 
Heaven and humanity (天人合一).  This ecstatic unity is semi-religious and semi-naturalistic.  
The best term to express the characteristics is “aesthetic union”.  When the personhood of Tien   
(天) gradually faded away through cultural evolution, the personal dimension of the ultimate was 
gradually shifted onto humanity.  Within the framework of Chinese philosophy, it is fallacious to 
talk about any rigid dichotomy between Tien and humanity.  Humanity as the product of Tien 
also shoulders the unfolding mandate of Tien.  In other words, humanity is one organic part, if 
not the pinnacle point, of Tien.  Tien fulfills itself through the unfolding creativity of humanity.  
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Humanity also needs Tien as its inspirational moral resource and ultimate horizon through which 
to realize itself.  Cheng catches the gist of Tien Ming in a nutshell.   
Cheng from the very beginning can be pictured as the encounter between the half that is 
innate and the half that is external.  The two-way traffic is succinctly delineated by the quite 
obscure lines on Cheng: 
When we have intelligence resulting from sincerity, this condition is to be ascribed to 
nature; when we have sincerity resulting from intelligence, this condition is to be ascribed 
to instruction.  But given the sincerity, and there shall be the intelligence; given the 
intelligence, and there shall be the sincerity.
20
 
 
The above text echoes the opening thesis of Chung-yung.  A few pivotal concepts re-
appear here, such as Hsing (性) and teaching (教).  We can not help but understand these lines as 
affirmation of the central thesis of Chung-yung, only in a deepened way by adding in authenticity 
as a new component.  The newness is, obviously, the concept of Cheng (诚), which is 
unmistakably the theme of the following twelve chapters.  Cheng is the path through which the 
way of Heaven and the way of humanity encounter each other.   
Cheng is the way of Heaven.  To think how to be Cheng is the way of man.  He who is 
Cheng is one who hits upon what is right without effort and apprehends without thinking.  
He is naturally and easily in harmony with the way.  Such a man is a sage.  He who tries 
to be Cheng is one who chooses the good and holds fast to it.
21
  
 
The inward path of pursuing Cheng is to be espoused by a vigilant external quest of truth.  
The mirroring image that explores the innate and external cosmos leads us again back to the root 
concept of Tien Ming.  The authenticity of one’s humanity can only be verified or illuminated by 
the light (intelligence) that comes from unremitting moral study and practice.   
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To attain this illumination, requires the extensive study of what is good, accurate inquiry 
about it, careful reflection on it, the clear discrimination of it, and the earnest practice of 
it.  The superior man, while there is anything he has not studied, or while in what he has 
studied there is anything he cannot understand, will not intermit his labor.  While there is 
anything he has not inquired about, or anything in what he has inquired about which he 
does not know, he will not intermit his labor…. Let a man proceed in this way, and 
though dull, he will surely become intelligent; though weak, he will surely become 
strong.
22
   
 
The mutual verification of the internal and external half of Tien Ming may lead us to 
picture the relationship in a dichotomized model.  Actually, it is quite far from it.  The best way 
to see them, is to understand them as antithetical halves that collaborate with each other towards 
harmony and integrity.  Tien Ming as both the way of heaven and the way of humanity will 
collapse if either one of the halves is missing.  Tien needs humanity as much as humanity needs 
Tien.  Wing-Tsit Chan, with his in depth  knowledge of the Chinese spirit, made the following 
perceptive comments: 
 
The quality that brings man and Nature together is Cheng, sincerity, truth or reality.  The 
extensive discussion of this idea in the Classic makes it at once psychological, 
metaphysical and religious.  Sincerity is not just a state of mind, but an active force that is 
always transforming things and completing things, and drawing man and Heaven (Tien, 
Nature) together in the same current.
23
 
 
Cheng is thus the ontological key that stitches together Heaven and man, the physical and 
the metaphysical, being and becoming.  It is a mystical concept that serves both as the origin and 
the path.  Cheng is the path of humanity that leads to Heaven.  Cheng is also the way of heaven 
that confers and imparts its essential nature to humanity.  Cheng is the gate to Heaven.  Cheng is 
the entry way into the mystery of being.  
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Again, over-confidence in human moral capacity absorbed the external norms of Heaven. 
Heaven with its norms became too tame and docile to be distinguished from human norms. The 
horizon lies no longer in the distance; instead, it has come within the reach of human beings, 
especially those of sages. Heaven as alluring and transcendent norms ceased to exist as ideal 
norms. This provides an overall portrait of Confucian culture which followed a predominantly 
humanistic course. The downside of this tendency is that the culture gradually lost the 
transcendent, and thus was gradually disoriented within the sphere of humanism.  
Nevertheless, we are discussing these issues with reference to a specific group, namely, 
the Chinese Christians in North America. The above mentioned naturalistic norms do apply to 
them, since they are all culturally Chinese, even though many of them consciously or 
unconsciously reject the cultural heritage. Those earthly norms can be restated in terms of “first 
creation”, or common grace, in an effort to connect with those who identify themselves strongly 
as Christians. The heavenly norms reach back and restore themselves as externally objective with 
the help of Christian theology. The general scheme of Christian theology determines that this 
group of people acknowledges the objective existence of God with definite characteristics that 
are beyond human manipulation. Heavenly norms, for Christians, stand qualitatively different 
from those of earthly and human norms. As direct divine revelation, they actually function as the 
norms that judge those of the earthly and human. The epitomized embodiment of the heavenly 
revelation is, of course, to be found in the incarnation of Jesus Christ. It is from this enlightened 
perspective that the earthly and human norms of Chinese culture are to be evaluated and 
rearranged.  
In conclusion, the sincerity of human equilibrium unfolds its valuative activities along a 
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dialectical set of norms—those of earth and those of heaven. The earthly norms are finite, 
concrete, objective. They prevent the human valuation from sliding into mere fantasy. Every 
semiotic implication created by the equilibrium should have a direct, or indirect, concrete root in 
the natural world. With the theme of creation, every natural entity created by the Creator, thus, 
embodies the creating logos, however partial and tiny that entity might be. This echoes 
kataphatic theology which affirms every bit of truth that’s scattered in myriad natural entities. 
Such a positive theology must be balanced by negative theology, which finds its embodiment in 
the norm of heaven. The norm of heaven is to be understood in the line of horizon, constantly 
receding into infinity. The gist of the heavenly norm is caught by the apophatic theology, which 
refutes any attempted idolatry that comes from the kataphatic theology. A dialectic set of norms, 
such as earth and heaven, on the one hand, renders any aspect of a natural entity as a foundation 
for the creative semiotic interpretation of the equilibrium, while at the same time it makes sure 
that all symbols are icons that lead to the ultimate, rather than idols that block the path to the 
ultimate. Before wrapping up the first set of norms, I still want to point out that, the three 
creative sources in traditional Chinese philosophy are -- the heaven, the earth and the human 
being. Only the earth and human beings have been properly and sufficiently elucidated. Heaven, 
as the third and the most important pole of the triad, has been absorbed by the first two. This is 
the portal through which Christian theology may move the Confucian spirituality onto a splendid 
new phase by providing transcendent, yet object, norms that effectively resist the corrosive 
power of the first two poles of the triad.  
2. The Subjective Norms of Self and Others 
The second set of norms attempt to maintain a dialectical balance between self and 
others. Basically, the value system that revolves around and is occupied by a monolithic 
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perspective of self wants to be extended to a higher stage that harmonizes the self with others. 
Human equilibrium comes with a unique function that enables the bridging of the gap-- empathy. 
Feeling is the mechanism through which the human equilibrium prehends and absorbs values in 
the form of aesthetic stimulation. It bridges the values scattered in nature with the value 
processing center of the human equilibrium. Empathy functions on the basis of feeling, and 
extends the horizon of feeling to a scope that is almost infinite. It is the human capacity of 
stepping into another’s shoes, and seeing the world from the standpoints of others. Empathy 
makes it possible to experience indirectly. Without empathy, human equilibrium would be 
simple, monolithic, and not much different from that of other animals. It is the amazing function 
of empathy that transforms the human equilibrium into a multifaceted center endowed with 
almost infinite capacity of value integration. In other words, empathy opens up the whole realm 
of ethics. It serves also as a foundation, upon which the public realm of semiosis is constructed. 
Direct experience captures natural values by codifying them with signs and symbols. Signs and 
symbols then assume “cash values” while entering the public semiotic market. It is with empathy 
that the receiving equilibrium is able to decode the signs and symbols, and integrate the cash 
values into the self. Empathy exercises its function not only on the receiving side; it also 
participates at the initial stage of every semiotic endeavor. The public nature of equilibrium is 
not added on later. It is rather an innate capacity built into all human equilibriums. Empathy 
works implicitly at the aesthetic stage of value transference, and explicitly at the ethical stage.  
Each equilibrium manages to construct a world of its own. There are as many “worlds” as 
the number of equilibriums in the history of the human being. Discrepancies and conflicts arise 
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inevitably between these “worlds”, as it was well illustrated by a farming proverb that’s popular 
in the area where I grew up:  
The Lord of Heaven faces a constant dilemma in determining the weather of April; 
Silkworm prefers mild temperature, while the wheat sprout favors it to be cool; 
The travelers wish for sunny days, yet the farmers need rain; 
The maidens picking mulberry leaves hope for an overcast day.
24
   
 
The subject of this poem is Tian (天), the Lord of Heaven, who is supposed to cherish 
impartial concerns for the well being of all entities under its care. Even today, there are various 
versions of grassroots, folkloric religion in many areas of China which retain vague beliefs in a 
personified heaven that is similar to a benign human equilibrium. The personified heaven is also 
believed to embody divine infinite wisdom. Yet, even with an equilibrium of this quality, it is 
still a seemingly impossible mission to harmonize the conflicting demands that arise from all 
participating entities from each of their perspectives.  
Along a spectrum with self and others as its polarities, values can range from the 
egocentric extreme that refuses empathetic impulses, to the other extreme of forfeiting authentic 
self identity by blending into popular or mediocre surrogates. The harmonizing principle that 
draws both ends together is the producing of an uniquely authentic self with sufficient 
sensibilities to empower its empathetic capacity.  The guiding norm consists of a continuous 
perceiving center with a scope extended broadly enough to enclose others. An I-Thou tension is 
maintained as the perceiving equilibrium encounters others. In a healthy relationship, the 
perceiving equilibrium neither consumes others, nor is consumed by others. Instead, the self and 
others within the dialect balance mutually enrich each other. The whole civilization thus grows 
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and deepens itself with ever increasing complexity and simplicity, which finds its embodiment in 
the kind of human equilibrium which Chung Yung entitled, “authentic person” (君子). 
An authentic person is the one who fully exercises the innate capacity of empathy. With 
sincerity, the authentic person goes retrospectively into the depth of his inner self, so as to 
discover what it really means to be humane. He then applies the principles he discovered to 
social practice. The way of Confucianism, according to Chung Yung, is the way of getting back 
to onself: 
The Master said, ‘In archery we have something like the way of the superior man.  When 
the archer misses the centre of the target, he turns round and seeks for the cause of his 
failure in himself.’25 
 
Where to find the great Tao of humanity?  It is to be found in “turning around and seeking for the 
cause” in himself.  The secret of humanness is to get back to oneself sincerely and to render the 
self as the measure of all relationship. The author of Chung Yung aptly illustrated it with a 
metaphor of hewing an axe handle with an axe in hand:  
  
In the Book of Poetry, it is said, “In hewing an axe-handle, in hewing an axe-handle, the 
pattern is not far off.”  We grasp one axe-handle to hew the other; and yet, if we look 
askance from the one to the other, we may consider them as apart.  Therefore, the 
superior man governs men, according to their nature, with what is proper to them, and as 
soon as they change what is wrong, he stops.
26
 
 
The authentic person thus enriches the equilibrium in both directions. With sincerity, the 
equilibrium is able to go through rigorous self examination. With empathy, the equilibrium is 
able to extend itself by including others into its scope. The equilibrium develops itself from a 
shallow, narrow subject obstructed by selfishness to a rich, deep, empathic subject characterized 
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by mercy, understanding and unselfishness. One of the mechanisms through which the 
equilibrium develops towards maturity is to shift away from self-centeredness. Just as the 
heliocentric theory harmonizes the solar system better than the geocentric theory, equilibrium 
shifts from the center of self to a position with better harmony. Traditional Confucianism 
advocates an empathic move from minor to superior within the hierarchical system, which results 
in some social norms called three cardinal principles (三纲)—ruler guides subjects, father guides 
son, husband guides wife. The implicit logic is that the superior position instantiates a better 
center to harmonize all the components within the scope. By exercising the empathic 
imagination, equilibriums at a minor position hypothetically assume the superior position, so as 
to envisage greater contributions he/she can make in order to enhance the general harmony of the 
whole system. Chung Yung proposed the technique of position-swapping as a way of cultivating 
moral sensitivity:  
There are four things in the way of the authentic person, none of which I have been able 
to do. To serve my father as I would expect my son to serve me: that I have not been able 
to do. To serve my ruler as I would expect my ministers to serve me: that I have not been 
able to do. To serve my elder brothers as I would expect my younger brothers to serve 
me: that I have not been able to do. To be the first to treat friends as I would expect them 
to treat me: that I have not been able to do.
27
 
 
  It is logically favorable that the head of the household occupies a position that is helpful 
to accomplish a better harmony for all family members; so too the rulers for the subjects within 
the scope. For a hierarchical society to function smoothly, everybody occupies a position that is 
inferior to some and superior to some others. Such a position-swapping practice is, thus, 
applicable to all members of the society. Even though the contemporary society is not as 
hierarchical as the one of traditional China, position-swapping still makes an efficient way to 
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cultivate morality for two reasons. First, no society is completely flat, or absolutely equal. For a 
society to operate smoothly, it must have some power structure. Second, the empathic position-
swapping practice works as efficiently for equivalent relationships as for authoritarian. In fact, 
some classical Confucian texts did consider peer relationships, alongside with the hierarchical 
ones: 
Thus the authentic person comes with innate regulating principles. What a man dislikes in 
his superiors, let him not display in the treatment of his inferiors; what he dislikes in 
inferiors, let him not display in the service of his superiors; what he hates in those who 
are before him, let him not therewith precede those who are behind him; what he hates in 
those who are behind him, let him not bestow on the left; what he hates to receive on the 
left, let him not bestow on the right. This is what is called this is what is called “innate 
regulating principles”28 
 
The author of Great Learning employed a technical term, “the way of Jie Ju” (絜矩). 
Etymologically, Jie (絜) means principle, or measurement; Ju (矩) indicates the instrument with 
which squares are made. When combined, Jie Ju (絜矩) means the innate principles that come 
with the authentic person. A syntactical reading of the text made plain that the so-called “innate 
regulating principles” is no other than the rule of “empathic imagination”. It turns out that the 
regulating principles have their origin in the subjective equilibrium’s execution of empathic 
imagination during the position swapping practice.  
As a result of continuous position swapping practices, the subjective equilibrium 
manages to extend it moral imagination by including more participants in the system. The 
subjective equilibrium is thus able to envisage from a center that holds a broader scope. Such an 
ethical evolution starts from equilibrium as the initial center, goes through the stage of family, 
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clan, nation, and eventually extends itself to the utter extremes of the universe. Some lines of text 
in Great Learning illustrate it succinctly, “When the equilibrium being rectified, the whole 
person will be cultivated. With person being cultivated, the family will be regulated. With family 
being regulated, the state will be rightly governed. With the state being rightly governed, the 
whole universe will be made tranquil and happy.”29 When the empathic capacity of moral 
imagination is exercised to its utmost degree, it includes the whole universe in its scope. Ideal 
moral vision with such loftiness is depicted as “the flowing of Great Dao, when a public and 
common spirit rules over the universe” (大道之行，天下为公).30 If we regard classical 
Confucianism as planting the seed of this ultimate moral vision, then it developed to a mature 
stage in the Neo-Confucianism in the Song dynasty. The stereotypical expression of this mature 
version of ultimate moral vision is found in Zhang Zai’s Western Inscription (张载 西铭):  
Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I finds an 
intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body 
and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All people are my brothers 
and sisters, and all things are my companions.
31
 
 
While exercising empathic imagination, another transformation may occur within the 
structure of the equilibrium— the reversion of its direction. Equilibriums can be divided into two 
basic categories: the centrifugal and the centripetal. The essential differences between these two 
directions involve three major areas: the self, the other(s) and that which is between. Centripetal 
tendency is the natural inclination of every equilibrium before exercising the empathic 
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imagination. Every individual equilibrium is born with the jungle ethic that prioritizes the 
survival and thriving of self at the expense of others. It is by deliberate cultivation that the 
equilibrium’s innate empathic capacity is awakened and strengthened. Empathic moral 
imagination bridles the selfish impulses, and redirects them in a centrifugal structure. The 
centrifugal equilibrium is characterized by self-giving and sacrifice. It respects the rights of other 
equilibriums to exist in freedom and allows for their creativity. True in-betweenness, or true 
union, is possible only between equilibriums with centrifugal structure. An ideal ecstatic union 
transforms and enhances the participating equilibrium, not by absorbing the others, as centripetal 
equilibrium attempts to do, but by nourishing and fulfilling each other in the centrifugal model.  
After going through habitual empathic practice, human equilibrium is transformed into 
de-centered centers. Individual equilibrium is still a center in the sense that it occupies a certain 
existential and actual location within a system. Yet it is no longer an absolute center that 
excludes the rights of other participating equilibriums. A de-centered center is equipped with the 
capacity of prehending the whole system from various imaginative perspectives. Several 
subsequent results are induced in the practice. The first, and most obvious, effect is that the 
individual equilibrium ceases to be self obsessive, and starts to relativize some of its primordial 
impulses that may be destructive to the system. Secondly, the individual equilibrium starts an 
empathic journey, migrating imaginatively away from the self-centered location, and fumbling 
for a central, ideal position that brings to light the best possible harmony for the whole system. 
The individual equilibrium is then able to acquire a re-envisioning of its actual and existential 
location from the perspective of the ideal central position. As a result, the individual equilibrium 
may adjust or reconstruct itself in light of the ideal harmony. Thirdly, the individual equilibrium 
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is then able to instantiate a dialectical balance between the center of self and the ideal center. It 
thus creates a middle point that constantly harmonizes the two polarities. These are the basic 
features of the structure of an individual equilibrium as a de-centered center. When all the 
participating equilibriums of a given society function with essential characters of de-centered 
center, the ideal society of great harmony, or Grand Union (大同之世), has been attained.  
In conclusion, the second set of norms that manages the dialectical relation between the 
self and others consists of empathic practices such as position-swapping, scope-extending, and 
direction-reversing.  
 
3. Seeking a Balance between Commonality and the Ultimate 
Until now, we have discussed two sets of norms: the norms that maintain dynamic balances 
between the earth and heaven, and between the self and others. The first set of norms is 
orientated toward truthfulness as the guide to value apprehension and integration. The fact that 
nature provides the objective norms, assures that that aesthetic values have objective roots, rather 
than being mere chimeras that come from hyperactive feelings or imaginations. For the 
community of Chinese Christians, who are the intended audience of this discussion, direct divine 
revelation serves as the immutable set of norms. Divine revelation provides powerful and 
irreducible normative guidance for the development of human civilization. For the community of 
Chinese Christians, this is their unique spiritual asset in addition to their Chinese culture. Our 
study of the axiological tradition in traditional Chinese culture indicates that its aesthetical and 
ethical elements have been strong to the point of depleting their spiritual norms of validity and 
vitality. Scripture, undoubtedly, supplements the traditional Chinese axiology with a mature 
version of divine revelation, even though issues like interpretation and adaptation are still 
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debatable. As it is pointed out, truthfulness is the goal of the first set of norms. The second set of 
norms, that of the self and others, redirects the equilibrium from its egotistical, self-absorbed 
natural tendency, in an attempt to extend the self, including others in its scope. Compassion, as 
the desirable result of this practice, transforms individual equilibrium into a de-centered center. 
This set of norms attests to the equilibrium’s humaneness with reference to other equilibriums, or 
even to the myriad existences of the entire universe. Harmony between the individual 
equilibrium’s existential perspective and that of the cosmic center is exemplified for Chinese 
Christians by the instantiation of the incarnation of the divine logos.  
The third set of norms derives from a dialectical balance between commonality and the 
Ultimate, between the secular and the sacred, between the mundane and the miraculous, between 
profanity and holiness. This set of norms harmonizes the reflections of things at hand and 
ultimate concerns that penetrate eternity. A preoccupation of commonality with no consideration 
of the Ultimate may lead to an un-reflected life which is no different from the lives of other 
animals. Unchecked obsession with ultimate concerns, in contrast, may result in a negation of the 
mundane life. A dialectical balance between the two extremes yields a lifestyle that brings 
together attention to things at hand and awareness of the infinity beyond the horizon. Desirable 
patterns of feelings are with respect to the common entities and due awe is directed toward the 
Ultimate. Moreover, the normative attitude that harmonizes respect and awe is the heart this set 
of norms, namely, deference.  
Deference distinguishes itself from respect in that it applies mainly to human relationships. It 
also differs from the notion of devotion or piety which addresses mostly the human attitude to 
the divine. Deference, however, signifies a certain innate quality of the equilibrium characterized 
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by appropriate appreciation of the value of the involved party, whether for the divine, the human 
or a natural entity. Deference as a disposition often comes as a result of deliberate and repetitive 
disciplinary training, until it consolidates itself as habit and character. There are two 
cosmological convictions which serve as a foundation for deference. The first is the recognition 
of the axiological nature of the cosmos. Each entity has its intrinsic value within the axiological 
framework, and thus deserves appreciation and respect from the evaluating equilibrium. The 
second is the preference for cosmogony over cosmology within the conservative Protestant 
Christian community. All natural entities are believed to have a direct origin from, and are thus 
completely dependent upon, the Creator. Piety toward the Creator evolves itself into a concrete 
expression in the deferential attitude toward all created entities in the cosmos.   
Deference also entails an epistemological model that prefers analogical thinking to that of 
univocal and equivocal. The equivocal model denies direct correspondence between the 
immanent and the transcendent, between the common and the Ultimate. The typical attitude that 
arises from this model of thinking is most likely that of ironic absurdity, since no ultimate 
meaning can be found within the sphere of mundane life. The univocal model, on the other hand, 
asserts too close an affinity between existence and reality, to the point that they are enmeshed 
with each other without differentiation. The resulting attitude is usually characterized with 
pantheism or idol worship, since natural entities are endowed with divinity. Deference as a basic 
attitude towards the world places the awesomeness of the world due to its divine origin, in 
harmony with an awareness of the qualitative difference between the world and its Creator. To 
put it another way, one could use the “analogical model” which would define what lies behind 
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deference as the view that all natural entities are broken symbols that disclose and shroud the 
reality at the same time.     
The equivocal model has never been very popular in Chinese intellectual history. The 
univocal model, however, has found pervasive and penetrating expressions in various traditions, 
including classic and Neo-Confucianism. Many classical Confucian texts display a strong 
tendency to enmesh immanence with transcendence, or, put it more accurately, transcendence is 
absorbed by immanence. Some New Confucianists, such as Chung-ying Cheng, coined the term 
“immanence transcendence” as a unique feature of Confucian religiosity.32 I personally have no 
strong feeling against this approach. Nevertheless, in light of the norms that we are trying to 
establish, such an approach diminishes, or even eliminates, the dialectical tension between 
immanence and transcendence by pulling the polarities together into one nutshell. The 
foreseeable result is that, once again, transcendence is eroded and eclipsed by immanence. 
Dialectical balance is reduced into one-sided, static constancies that eventually will deplete the 
vitality of the system. However, in order to lead the mundane life in a deferential manner, that 
life has to be set in a dialectical structure with the miraculous. Only with the flash of supernatural 
light, can the mundane, immanent life be cut apart, and its structure will thus be revealed.  
As was pointed out in the above discussion, the fundamental structure of deference consists 
of an appreciation of unique values of any given existence, always in light of the eternal horizon 
that is constantly receding into infinity. Mundane life is thus attributed with meanings and serves 
as concrete steps that lead to infinity and ultimacy. Reflection upon things at hand will reap 
wisdom that is transcendent in nature. Correspondingly, the attitude towards life and existence is 
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positive and affirming. It is truly amazing that the leading text of the Great Learning managed to 
construct a continuous platform stretching from the place where the average human being stands, 
into a bright horizon which even the most prominent sages are not capable of accomplishing.  
The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered 
well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. 
Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their 
persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be 
sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the 
utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. Things 
being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their 
thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts 
being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were 
regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being 
rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy. From the Son of Heaven 
down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of 
everything besides.
33
 
The binary repetitive expressions in the above text illustrate an intentional mechanism of 
emphasis. As it was commonly employed in Hebrew narratives, the binary structure appeared 
also in some important classic texts in traditional Chinese literature. The above text clearly 
illustrates a circle of ripple effects with the subjective equilibrium acting at the center. Perfect 
goodness (至善) as the highest moral ideal lies certainly beyond the instant reach of normal 
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people. Yet everyone, whether sage or average, may start to work towards the perfect moral ideal 
from his/her own moral or existential location. This beginning represents a typical Confucian 
moral endeavor, targeting high, yet starting from the next concrete step. Without the guidance of 
a perfect moral ideal, concrete moral endeavors may lose direction. Meanwhile, only by taking 
the next concrete step, can we hope one day to reach the perfect moral ideal. Therefore, 
immanence and transcendence make up a pair, in which neither can stand without the other.   
Commonality and centrality constitute the double themes of the book of Chung Yong. The 
book successfully manages to maintain a balance between the mundane and trans-mundane by 
establishing a continuum between the two. What lies behind the notion of commonality is a kind 
of profound faith in the benign Heaven which has no interest in playing dice with humanity, and 
is ready to reveal the great Dao pervasively in our mundane life. The Great Tao is believed to lie 
behind constant natural phenomenon, rather than behind strange or odd happenings.  Mundane 
life is endowed by Heaven with great principles.  Only a discerning heart can decode them with 
sincerity.  Confucianism as a philosophical system does not value miracles as means of revealing 
truth and eternity.  All that takes is to get into the mundane life, and truth will be found therein.  
There is a deep faith embedded in the text of Chung-yung that Heaven is very much willing to 
reveal the truth to humanity.  That’s what it means to define yung (庸) as commonalities that 
may serve as symbols of reality.  According to The Analects, Confucius himself seldom made 
comments on four subjects—extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual 
beings.”34  The Analects didn’t give any explanation of this phenomenon.  Chung-yung, however, 
gives us a full account through the doctrine of Yung (庸).  Yung in this article adopts Professor 
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Tu’s translation, who in turn follows the interpretation of Chu Xi, who rendered it as 
commonality.  
Both Confucius himself and the Confucianists following him believed that the great Principle 
of Heaven exists not in the extraordinary, but in the ordinary, not in violence, but in gentleness, 
not in chaos but in order, not in the supernatural but in natural happenings.  In other words, truth 
is to be sought in the mundane, in the commonality and in the constancy.  This notion is 
revolutionary powerful to both the supernaturalists and the naturalists.  For the supernaturalists, 
it might serve as a reminder to them that, while seeking for miraculous signs, they should pull 
their attention back to the natural, the common and the constant.  The miraculous signs, if there 
are any, are few, but the constants and the commons are everywhere.  Reflecting on things at 
hand and perceiving the truth behind the commonalities are the way that leads to authentic life. 
For the naturalists sometimes, commonalities are regarded as too familiar to be signs leading to 
the great reality.  Thus, the more they know about the common entities in mundane life, the 
further alienated they become from reality.  That is a common mistake almost all secularists and 
atheists are prone to.  Inspirations of this kind also account for the false dichotomy between 
natural science and spirituality.  The more modern people know about nature and its principles, 
the less are the chances for natural entities to serve as signs giving access to reality. This has 
been an epistemological habit that commonly plagued the modern mind. Once something is 
scientifically studied and considered to be demystified, its symbolic meaning is dispelled. From 
that point on, the modern mind can perceive nothing from that entity but scientific facts. It leads 
to the ironic dilemma that the more ground gained by science, the more desperately we are stuck 
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in the land that is spiritually and semiotically impoverished. We may call this a curse to the 
modern mind.  
The reinterpretation of Chung Yung offers us a powerful antidote to the sickness of the 
modern scientific mind. Chung Yung affirms without reservation the profound spirituality behind 
the common, the constant and the mundane.  If reality is not to be found in the common, the 
ensuing inference is that the reality itself is not benign, because it is not accessible broadly to the 
grass-root commoners. That would make Heaven some esoteric existence playing favorites for 
those elitist few with esoteric knowledge. That kind of doctrine runs contrary to the 
commonsensical notion of a divine nature that is benevolent, just and fair. Instead, there is a 
logical imperative that, if Heaven is benevolent and faithful, it would reveal itself through these 
common, constant and ordinary phenomena.   Chung Yung drives this doctrine home by 
repeating it throughout the whole book. In The Analects, we have seen Confucius restrains 
himself from speaking about the abnormal and the extraordinary.  Chung Yung quoted from 
Confucius, “To live in obscurity, and yet practice wonders, in order to be mentioned with honor 
in future ages: -- this is what I do not do” 35 Instead, Confucius and his followers were deeply 
convinced that the principle of Heaven exists pervasively in commonalities, whether up above 
the sky or down under the sea: 
It is said in the Book of Poetry, ‘The hawk flies up to heaven; the fishes leap in the deep.’  
This expresses how this way is seen above and below.  The way of the superior man may 
be found, in its simple elements, in the intercourse of common men and women; but in its 
utmost reaches, it shines brightly through heaven and earth.
36
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The principle of Heaven meets any human subject at any existential location. A person 
who intends to pursue the Great Path does not necessarily need to change his/her position as a 
precondition of having access to the Heavenly principle. On the contrary, the Confucianists 
believe that when a course deviates too far from the realm of commonalities, the course itself 
might be incorrect:  
The superior man does what is proper to the station in which he is; he does not desire to 
go beyond this.  In a position of wealth and honor, he does what is proper to a position of 
wealth and honor.  In a poor and low position, he does what is proper to a poor and low 
position.  Situated among barbarous tribes, he does what is proper to a situation among 
barbarous tribes.  In a position of sorrow and difficulty, he does what is proper to a 
position of sorrow and difficulty.  The superior man can find himself in no situation in 
which he is not himself.
37
 
  
Where, then, is the great Tao to be found? It is to be found in “turning around and 
seeking for the cause” in himself.  The secret of humanness, for Confucianism, is to get back to 
oneself sincerely and to render the self as the measure of all relationships, which gives rise to the 
notion of sincerity (誠), a notion to which Professor Tu Wei-ming assigned metaphysical 
implications.
38
 Sincerity, according to Professor Tu, constitutes the metaphysical basis shared by 
Heaven and humanity. It ensures the continuity with Heaven both in the consciousness inside 
and in the commonalities outside.  
Even though the theme was already there in classic Confucianism, transcendent 
significance of mundane life was reiterated, rediscovered and reassigned with greater emphasis 
by Neo-Confucianists in the Song and Ming dynasty. Chung Yung as the pre-Han text was listed 
as a constituent section in LiJi (礼记). It was the Cheng Brothers and Chu Xi who selected and 
                                                 
37
 Ibid., Chung-yung XIV:1-2 
 
38
 Ibid., 67-91.  
200 
 
 
 
elevated it as a major text of the Four Classics. Chung Yung since then became a source book of 
the Imperial Examination, and occupied an almost insurmountable position in the developing of 
the traditional Chinese mentality. The reason that the Song Neo-Confucianists promoted the text 
to such a position, I believe, was because of the challenges they faced from Buddhism. 
Buddhism was among one of the major factors which prompted the Confucianists of late Tang 
and early Song to develop the theory, especially with regard to metaphysics. The featuring social 
theory of Buddhism is characterized by remoteness, apathy, and to encourage the practitioners to 
escape from the mundane, so as to seek for transmundane enlightenment. Its general tone stands 
diametrically opposite to Confucianism which believes truth to be found in things at hand.  
When two theories with extreme differences meet with each other, interactions 
sometimes appear to be rough. There were writings from both sides attacking the other as 
heterodoxy or superficial. Yet, in the long run, such encounters led to significant progresses in 
both traditions. From the Confucian side, Neo-Confucianists since Song Dynasty formed an 
alliance with Daoism, and successfully established a version of metaphysical theory based on the 
notion of Wu (无). Zhou Dun-yi also started his Explanations on the Great Diagram (太极图说):  
The Ultimate of Non-being and also the Great Ultimate (T’ai-chi)! The Great Ultimate 
through movement generates yang. When its activity reaches its limit, it becomes 
tranquil.
39
 
 
It was under the pressure of Buddhism that the pendulum swung to the side of the 
Ultimate, the remote, the transmundane, the miraculous and the metaphysical. As it is true of any 
dialectical relations, alteration on one side will inevitably bring changes to the other side. It is 
always through comparing and contrasting that we gain knowledge. This is just the binary nature 
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of human epistemology. The transmundane tendency of Buddhism did agitate the Confucianists 
to rethink their position. After struggling for several generations, the Confucianists were able to 
come to terms again. They deployed their strategies on two fronts. The first thrust from the Song 
Confucianists were to develop their own version of transcendent theory, as exemplified in Zhou 
Dun-yi’s Explanation on the Great Diagram. Another thrust was to saturate the mundane life 
with transmundane meanings. The Song Neo-Confucianists were able to reaffirm infinite 
meanings in life issues that were seemingly trivial or insignificant. The theme, I believe, was 
already hidden in the classic Confucianism. It was only under the challenge of Buddhism that the 
Song Neo-Confucianists cultivated to a full-fledged version. The mundane life, with its meaning 
usually hidden due to its ubiquitous existence, now started to take an affirmative stance against 
Buddhist negation. Confidence in the mundane life found expressions in literature like this: 
“How scenic are the thatched cottage and the bamboo fence, much better they are than the 
Buddhist temple and court”.40 On the other hand, Buddhism was challenged, too, by the Neo-
Confucianists’ forceful affirmation of mundane life. As a result, original Buddhism adapted itself 
in the Chinese cultural context, and came up with a new denomination called Zen Buddhism. A 
unique feature of Zen Buddhism is that it assigns transcendent meanings to events in daily life. 
Transcendent meditation and mundane activities are interwoven in Zen practice. One quote from 
Chuan Deng Lu says, “Carrying water and chopping firewood, these are all wonderful ways.”41 
With Buddhism standing on the side of transcendence, the remote, the transmundane and the 
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metaphysical, and Confucianism on the side of the imminent, the mundane and things at hand, 
there was a dialectical tension between the two. Even though they were at odds in many 
occasions, they managed to maintain their own identity, and at the same time, transform 
themselves. Both Zen Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism represent delightful fruits produced by 
an ongoing encounter between Confucianism and Buddhism. The emergence and thriving of 
Earthly Buddhism, or Humanistic Buddhism, represents another phase of development in 
contemporary society, which deserves more discussion beyond the current project can handle.  
 
The dialectical balance between transcendence and imminence, between the remote and 
the nearby, between the mundane and the transmundane, between commonality and the 
miraculous, finds perfect embodiment in the doctrine of Christology. The Nicea and Chalcedon 
formulas of Christology refuse any compromise either on the divinity or the humanity of Jesus 
Christ. According to orthodox Christology, Jesus Christ is believed to be God of God, light of 
light, true God of true God, begotten not made, consubstantial to the Father. The whole Nicea 
controversy hinges on whether the Son is homoousia or homoiousia with the Father. The 
prevailing formula asserts the full divinity of Christ. If expressed in the terms of this dialectical 
balance, Jesus stands for the ultimate, the transmundane, the remote, the divine, and the 
miraculous. Yet on the other hand, the Nicea and Chalcedon formulas also refuse any 
compromise on the humanity of Jesus. Jesus is believed to appear as a real human being, in a 
concrete historical time with particular geographical locations. Jesus thus also stands for the 
human, the nearby, the mundane and the existential.  
The doctrine of incarnation thus stretches itself to the utmost in both directions. The 
mundane human life is affirmed decisively as God the Creator became flesh and blood, and 
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became one of us. In Jesus Christ, divinity meets humanity, transcendence converges with 
imminence, the Ultimate lights up commonalities, and the supernatural touches nature. This set 
of norms should have played a much more important role in a secular world like ours. Ever since 
the Enlightenment, the pendulum swung from the medieval mentality which represents the 
remote and the divine, to the post-Enlightenment era of secularism and humanism. Our time may 
appear to be free from medieval bondage, yet the world is becoming ever more secular, and our 
life is being depleted of transcendent meaning. We have lost out hold on the Ultimate. Mundane 
life without transmundane significance soon turns out to be absurd, and then unbearable. Now is 
the time for us to find a balance between the dialectic polarities, to re-enchant nature with the 
supernatural, to reinterpret commonalities in light of the miraculous, to affirm the mundane with 
transmundane significance, to take a stand on concrete existential locations yet with infinite 
horizons in vision.   
4. Dialectical Balance between Tranquility and Commensurability 
 
Fourth set of norms: dialectical balance between tranquility and commensurability, 
between being and doing, between closing and opening, between knowledge and action, between 
disengaged observation of existence as unbiased haecceity and engaging occasions with 
appropriateness. In the following section, I will focus the discussion on the dialectical 
relationship between tranquility and commensurability. This dialectic set finds its root in the 
book of Chung Yung:  
While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be 
in the state of Equilibrium. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their 
due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of Harmony. This Equilibrium is 
the great root from which grow all the human actings in the world, and this Harmony is 
the universal path which they all should pursue. Let the states of equilibrium and 
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harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, 
and all things will be nourished and flourish.
42
 
 
The above text gives the original definition of “harmony”, a term of essential importance 
in value discussion. Harmonization is the activity that encompasses multiple realms by 
consolidating them within a unified theme. As we can see from the text, harmony first mobilizes 
the multiple feelings of the individual equilibrium, and then directs the inner equilibrium to 
embrace the external environment, and finally, arouses emotions that are commensurable to the 
situation. The act of harmonizing commands both internal and external realms, each of which 
includes an infinite number of possibilities. The very nature of harmony, then, implies constant 
action. Just as Spinoza distinguished natura naturans (nature naturing) from natura naturata 
(nature natured), we may also describe the equilibrium as harmony harmonized and harmony 
harmonizing. By harmony harmonized, I refer to the equilibrium that has been already 
formulated. As I have pointed out in the previous section, equilibrium consists of various levels 
such as natured, cultured and nurtured. A substantial portion of the equilibrium as natured and 
cultured is a given before the equilibrium is capable of participating as a conscious and behaving 
subject. These portions belong to the realm of harmony harmonized. Harmony harmonizing, 
instead, refers to the front line where equilibrium responds to the environment with senses and 
feelings. Human beings as living creatures can be understood as a dynamic equilibriums 
constantly harmonizing the inner and external world. The essence of the human being can be 
perceived in terms of activities of harmony. As a matter of fact, even the usage of the term 
“equilibrium” defines human essence more as a verb than a noun. Of course, verbs sometimes 
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can be in the form of a past participle (harmony harmonized) or a present participle (harmony 
harmonizing). Human equilibrium, hence, is equivalent to a gerund.   
There is a dialectical balance between being and doing. On the one hand, being is the 
repose of doing, and that state from which doing is initiated. While on the other hand, being is 
exemplified by doing, and is actually created by doing. Human equilibrium should not be viewed 
as a static and unchangeable being. The equilibrium, rather, is in the dynamic process of self-
creation by means of doing. Apart from doing, we have no way to identify being; apart from 
action, knowledge remains merely as possibilities that await actualization. We human beings are 
bodily existence concretely situated in the real world, rather than the docetic phantoms residing 
in Gnostic world. Before being tested and verified in action, values are mere blossoms without 
fruit. For values to be fully grasped and sustainably carried on, they have to be concrescered in 
repetitive actions until they find physical embodiment in the subjective equilibrium. Moreover, 
values do not stop at embodiment within the individual subjective equilibrium; they need to go 
further as codified rituals or as an ethos that serves as given conditions for emerging 
equilibriums.     
Action and practice play an essential role in any kind of spirituality. If spirituality is 
understood in terms of value internalization, then action constitutes an indispensible link in the 
chain. When this link is missing, hypocrites arise as rotten examples that testify against the 
involved traditions. Without the effort of engaging the values into practice, we easily slip into the 
fallacy of Gnosticism, especially in an age like ours which is flooded with discursive 
information. Truth is never really true until is put into practice, repeated as habits, and acquired 
gradually as character traits. There is a delicate balance between doing and being, to the point 
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that it is almost impossible to differentiate which one goes first. All we can say is that in the 
decisive moment of action, human essence is displayed and, at the same time, created.  
To get to a fuller understanding of the value prehending and integrating process, we have 
to go beyond the representational model of knowledge, and build an informational model that 
gives value concrescence a physiological basis. Modern biology interprets human beings, as well 
as other living creatures, as expressions of genetic codes that are encrypted in every cell. This 
model provides a ground for an informational model of human essence. Human equilibrium 
takes in signs, symbols and aesthetic stimuli in the same way the human body takes in food, 
water and air. The human body consumes food, water and air, and turns them into ions, 
electrons, molecules, cells, tissues and organs, all of which are embodiments of genetic 
information, and, at the same time, carriers of information. Human beings as living creatures 
consist of infinite occasions of information transactions, only a small portion of them are carried 
out with conscious active participation. Human beings take in material and semiotic supplies, so 
as to maintain the sustainability of the equilibrium, both physical and mental. Information 
transactions happen not only inside the individual human body between ions, electrons, 
molecules, cells, tissues and organs, but also between human bodies by means of linguistic 
communication, implicit body language, or even as intensively as by sexual intimacy. Aesthetic 
and ethic stimulations in the form of information are thus apprehended and integrated into the 
equilibrium. This internalized information will inevitably alter the body elements of their 
traveling directions, vibrating patterns, or their physiological structures. Information, thus, 
becomes physically embodied. A dichotomy between body and mind, between physical and 
spiritual, between fact and value should not exist. Even the divine incarnation as the Word of 
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God fits well in this informational model. It is thus understandable that the divine logos as 
information can be apprehended and assimilated into our existence, even to the tangible level of 
physiological embodiment. This non-representative model of informational theory harmonizes 
value transactions between four realms, namely, those within individual equilibrium, those 
between human equilibriums, those between human equilibrium and environment, and those 
between the human and the divine.  
The information theory as I proposed above breaks down the wall between natural 
science and social science. Even if natural sciences, such as biology, were to decode every bit of 
the secret of the human gene, it still cannot manipulate the equilibrium of any given human 
subject, because the equilibrium as a living entity carries on constant value transactions with the 
society and the environment. Natural sciences may be good at studying harmony harmonized. 
Yet they are not able to catch the spirit of harmony harmonizing. Arts, literature, ritual and other 
humanities are of not less important than the natural sciences to the ongoing existence and 
structure of the human equilibrium. These cultural, social and environmental elements exercise 
tremendous power on human life. They provide semiotic nutrition that directly nourishes the 
equilibrium, just as the material nutrition nourishes the body. Since, as this information theory 
suggests, mental equilibrium and physical equilibrium are continuous to each other, social 
engineering in the realms of aesthetics, ethics and religion do produce changes in the human 
equilibrium. They refine the equilibrium’s taste, and thus change the way the equilibrium 
responds to external stimuli. They change human behavior patterns. They change habits. They 
change characters in the long run. Habits and characters usually make their way into 
physiological, or even genetic, expression. In conclusion, human equilibriums as dynamic 
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occasions in the axiological cosmos can’t help but participate in value transactions with incessant 
activities.  
Incessant activities have two ideal expressions, which, in terms of Chung Yung, are 
centrality and commensurability. Both are involved in the rectifying of feelings and emotions. 
Feelings and emotions can be perceived as activities of the equilibrium, just as the five senses 
express activities of the body. Centrality, or tranquility, is usually interpreted as cessation, or 
absence, of feelings and emotions. I believe that centrality is better interpreted as a unique and 
extreme way of exercising feeling and emotions. Feeling and emotions can potentially be 
exercised towards occasions, and the ideal exercise is to be deployed according to the norm is 
commensurability. Feelings and emotions can also be exercised retrospectively back toward the 
equilibrium, and the norm of this exercise is centrality. Centrality features a deliberate 
appropriation of feeling and emotions in the reposed position. Centrality involves delicate 
reflective actions of rectifying the mind, so as to produce the mirror image of the world without 
the slightest warping. It is through centrality that the world as haecceity displays itself before 
subjective forms are imposed. Chung Yung recognizes tranquility as a desirable mode of human 
equilibrium, yet realizes that it is hard to accomplish. According to Chung Yung, a person cannot 
even relish the real taste of food before the equilibrium has been properly rectified.
43
 The Great 
Learning expounds the point in greater detail: 
What is meant by, "The cultivation of the person depends on rectifying the mind may be 
thus illustrated:-If a man be under the influence of passion he will be incorrect in his 
conduct. He will be the same, if he is under the influence of terror, or under the influence 
of fond regard, or under that of sorrow and distress. When the mind is not present, we 
look and do not see; we hear and do not understand; we eat and do not know the taste of 
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what we eat. This is what is meant by saying that the cultivation of the person depends on 
the rectifying of the mind.
44
 
Pursuing the status of centrality by means of rectifying the mind became a major theme 
in the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming. It is no coincidence that Wang emphasized action more 
than any other philosophers in China. Centrality and commensurability are just two sides of the 
same coin. Both require rigorous discipline before they can be accomplished. They represent two 
basic modes of the equilibrium that Xiong Shili called opening and closing (开与阖).45 As a 
dialectic set, they are meant to be practiced together. Only when the equilibrium is refined as an 
untwisted mirror, can the suchness of the world be properly reflected. Meanwhile, the 
equilibrium can be rectified as a mirror only by commensurably responding to external occasions. 
Action is the prime word throughout the process. In action, the equilibrium meets the occasion; 
in action, feelings are exercised, whether commensurably or non-commensurably; in action, the 
equilibrium reflects and re-adjusts its responses; in action, the equilibrium refines its tastes or 
distastes. Thereafter follows new rounds of action. As a result of these cycles of action, the 
equilibrium unfolds its malleability, and develops along the way. Most common men achieve a 
certain degree of appropriateness in response to stimuli. Only sages are able to reach a higher 
level. What is perfectly appropriate is, nevertheless, culturally bound. Ideal norms such as 
tranquility and commensurability are merely vague terms awaiting further definition. Even 
though various cultures may propose hypothetical definitions of tranquility and 
commensurability, their validity as general categories, I believe, stands even in this pluralistic 
age.  
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When some of the cultural elites manage to reach a high stage of centrality and 
commensurability, they instruct those who are willing to learn from them. This gives rise to 
education (教) as another important theme in the Confucian tradition. Due to the non-
representational nature of practical knowledge, the relationship between mentor and disciple is 
noticeably different from that of teacher and student. On rare occasions, some few elite figures 
accomplish an enormous degree of centrality and commensurability, and are thus recognized as 
“saints”. When a saint is also a ruler, he then embodies the ideal of humanity for Confucian 
tradition as “Inner Sageliness and Outer Kingliness”. This sort of Sage King usually acts as 
“lawgiver” or “ritual maker”, as King Wen, Duke Zhou and Confucius did in their own time. 
These sage kings exercised profound influence on the development of cultural tradition. Their 
ideal pattern of centrality and commensurability evolved into codified social norms, such as 
rituals, and accumulated enormous cash values on semiotic market.  Peter Berger described this 
mutual creating process between individual and society as internalization and externalization.
46 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
TOWARDS A CONFUCIAN VERSION OF NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 
The Indispensable Role of Medium 
 
Confucian Natural Theology can be summarized as a way of having access to the realm of 
immediacy by means of a variety of media such as the semiotic, the physical, the ritual and the 
mundane.  It is distinguished from natural theology in its traditional sense by shifting the focal 
point from hastening to conclusions regarding the existence and character of the ultimate to 
serious grappling with the media. The assumption behind this definition is that there is no 
immediate access to the ultimate within the current spatiotemporal framework. All immediacy is 
mediated immediacy. Media plays a role that is as essential, if not more important, than the 
results aimed at by natural theology. Without serious engagement with the media, the enterprise 
of natural theology amounts to no more than a bunch of presumptuous preferences tailored by 
the particular taste of its author. Abstract propositions such as the divine omni-attributes can 
never be proved or disproved, and thus bear no empirical relevancy. If theology is to be built into 
an empirical subject, placing the emphasis on the media should be the path that leads it out of the 
labyrinth. As we have seen, the reason the fundamentalists lack the ability to build up, or 
appreciate, natural theology is their faith in the immediate and direct access to the divine realm. 
Such a model is sterile to theology in any real sense.  
The issue of mediacy has always lain at the center of the doctrinal development of Christian 
theology. Jesus Christ as the central figure of the Christian faith can be interpreted as the 
medium through which the divine nature is perfectly revealed. Jesus as the medium defines the 
nature of the Christian faith. The indispensable nature of Jesus as the medium urged the early 
church to develop the doctrine of Christology, and later on the doctrine of the Trinity, as the way 
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of melting down the distinction between medium and immediacy. Jesus as the medium of 
immediacy becomes identical with the immediacy’s breaking into the realm of mediacy. Jesus as 
the medium of immediacy acquires the status of immediacy in the Chalcedon formula of 
Christology. The doctrine of the Trinity can be viewed as a strenuous attempt for the linguistic 
medium to break into the realm of immediacy, with its logic remaining in the realm of mediacy. 
As a matter fact, Christology signifies only the starting point of the puzzling juxtaposition of the 
medium and the immediacy. The shadowy image of the Holy Ghost has never been clearly 
defined due to its lack of concrete expression in the realm of mediacy. Any positive development 
of Pneumatology, I believe, has to work out some functional theoretical model to address this 
dilemma of mediation. Even the Doctrine of God as the Creator has often been dismissed as the 
“God of Gaps”, as a result of the popular misconception of God as direct immediacy. This 
misconception is shared by the fundamentalists and secularists. After all, the perennial topic of 
natural theology regarding the existence of God, in a way, can be boiled down to the issue of 
mediation. If we believe that God is the Creator whose existence and attributes are to be 
meditated only through concrete creation, then it will be absurd to talk about a kind of Ultimacy 
that is beyond mediacy.  
Confucian natural theology is characterized by serious engagements with the media. Its 
central theme is that transcendence can be accessible only within the realm of imminence. The 
secular world is thus endowed with sacred connotations, and the mundane life with ultimate 
significance. According to this model, transcendence is accessible only through the mediation of 
worldly existences such as family, church, society, nature and its myriad entities. There was a 
consensus between Matteo Ricci, Leibniz and the first Jesuit missionaries that Confucianism is a 
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tradition of divine immanence, just as Christianity is a religion of divine transcendence.
1
 This is 
why Herbert Fingarette subtitled his book “The Secular as Sacred”. As Fingarette comments on 
the Confucian ritual ceremony, “instead of being diversion of attention from the human realm to 
another transcendent realm, the overtly holy ceremony is to be seen as the central symbol, both 
expressive of and participating in the holy as a dimension of all truly human existence.”2 The 
Confucian version of transcendence was entangled with the mundane and the existential to the 
extent that Hall and Ames categorically dismissed Confucianism from any idea of transcendence 
that is analogous to the Western sense.
3
 Hall’s and Ames’ total dismissal of a transcendent 
dimension in Confucianism seems to me an overstatement. Yet I cannot agree more with their 
insightful observation that Confucianism operates under “the presumption of radical 
immanence.”4 This radical immanence of Confucianism, as Berthrong points out, is much closer 
to Christianity in its understanding of transcendence than at any other time in the history of the 
two traditions, only that the authentic Christian concept of transcendence is yet to be peeled off 
its Anglo-European imposition.
5
 Following Hartshorne, Berthrong employs Whiteheadian 
Process Thought as the theoretical tool to rescue the original Christian notion of God from three 
erroneous later Western additions: God as an unmoved mover, as an imperial ruler and as the 
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personification of a ruthless moralist.
6
 If we are to believe that the Process version of an 
imminent God restores a more biblical image of the divine, at once more relational and holistic, 
then the advantage of the Confucian notion of imminent transcendence becomes obvious. 
Confucianism, together with Process Thought, makes an ideal theoretical tool to elucidate the 
authentic image of the Christian God. Thus, the whole enterprise of Natural Theology in its 
Hellenistic, Scholastic and rational form turns out to be a misplaced concreteness. It has been 
carried off in a wrong direction as it endeavors to spell out a totally abstract version of God that 
is irrelevant either to the whole process of this world, or to the individual existence in this world.  
Confucian Natural Theology stands for a new direction which stresses the indispensable 
nature of media. It is through a variety of media that we have access to the immediate. What lies 
at the root of most differences between Protestantism and Catholicism is their variant disposition 
of media. Generally speaking, media assume a more positive role in Catholicism than in 
Protestantism. For instance, Mary the Theotokos constitutes an essential part of Catholic faith; 
while in conservative Protestantism she has been severely marginalized due to the fear of Marian 
idolatry. Mary, as a symbol, stands for the medium through which divine grace is administrated. 
It resonates with the divine incarnation in which the immediate assumes the flesh and blood as 
the medium of divine salvation. The Chalcedon creed that defines the hypostatical union as 
“inconfused, unchangeable, indivisible, inseparable” truly catches the imminent nature of 
Christology. It is mournful that most conservative Protestant Christians trivialize the symbolic 
meaning of Mary, which can be interpreted as epitomizing the mediating role of body, nature and 
even the entire first creation. This Confucian standpoint also helps to settle a series of other 
theological debates, for example, the doctrine of the church and the issue of liturgy. The 
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Protestant emphasis on Scripture as the normative source of divine authority carries less 
credibility than the Catholic notion of Magisterium, since church as a medium of divine grace is 
prior to, or more fundamental than, the composition of Christian Bible. In general, churches of 
higher liturgy attribute more significance to the mediating function of sacraments than that do 
churches with lower liturgies.  
Most pertinently, Confucian Natural Theology applies in this project to a variety of media 
that are traditionally considered to be within the realm of common grace. If enforced 
consistently, the boundary that defines natural theology from revealed theology becomes blurry, 
and eventually might be obliviated. A common ground undergirds the grace that is common and 
special, revelation that is overt and esoteric, the territories of both church and society.  
Among the predecessors who recognized the Chinese tradition’s potential value to Christian 
natural theology stands Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the distinguished polymath who specifically 
devoted several of his manuscripts to the natural theology of the Chinese. Leibniz heralded a 
humble spirit that was so atypical amongst the heyday of European colonialism. This respectful 
humility enabled him to hold a high regard for Chinese accomplishments in and of themselves. 
Leibniz believed that China had much to teach Europe: “If we are their equals in the industrial 
arts, and ahead of them in contemplative sciences, certainly they surpass us (thought it is almost 
shameful to admit this) in practical philosophy, that is, in the precepts of ethics and politics 
adapted to the present life and use of mortals.”7 Even though he didn’t have the privilege of 
having direct access to the Chinese classics and had to base his research on secondary resources 
such as the introductory works of Jesuit missionaries, Leibniz was keen enough to perceive in 
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Chinese tradition a superior version of natural theology that is commensurable to that of 
Christianity: 
What we call the light of reason in man, they call commandment and law of Heaven. 
What we call the inner satisfaction of obeying justice and our fear of acting contrary to it, 
all this is called by the Chinese (and by us as well) inspirations sent by the Xangti (that is, 
by the true God). To offend Heaven is to act against reason, to ask pardon of Heaven is to 
reform oneself and to make a sincere return in word and deed in the submission one owes 
to this very law of reason. For me, I find all this quite excellent and quite in accord with 
natural theology… It is purely Christianity, insofar as it renews the natural law inscribed 
in our hearts – except for what revelation and grace add to it to improve our nature.8 
 
Unlike Leibniz who generated insights about Chinese civilization on the basis of secondary 
resources, the Jesuits in the Ming Court, had both first-hand experience and direct access to 
original Chinese classics. Matteo Ricci, along with his colleagues such as Ferdinand Verbiest (南
怀仁) and Joachim Bouvet (白晋), recognized Confucianism as the indigenous Chinese elements 
that are compatible with Christian faith. Ricci singled out specifically the ancient form of 
Confucianism as a theoretical instrument for promoting the missionary cause. Nevertheless, it 
was Ricci who started the dialogue between Christianity and Chinese culture. The Jesuit tradition 
to which Ricci belongs places more emphasis on the indispensable role of media when compared 
to the approaches of other Catholic Orders such as the Dominicans. The Jesuit position was 
consistent with Aquinas’ (1224-1274) view on nature: “gratia naturam non tollit, sed supponit et 
perficit” (Grace does not destroy nature, but supports and perfects it). As it was later on 
commented by Pope John Paul II: 
Just as the Fathers of the Church thought in regard to Christianity and Greek culture, so 
Matteo Ricci was rightly convinced that faith in Christ would not bring any harm to Chinese 
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culture, but rather would enrich and perfect it.
9
 
 
The Thomastic formula of natural theology acknowledges the essential role of media. And, 
when it is applied to the cultural dialogue with the Chinese culture, it employs the indigenous 
cultural and linguistic tools as effective means of conveying the Christian message. One of the 
remarkable achievements that Ricci accomplished was his transliteration of the ancient Chinese 
notion of Sovereign on High (上帝), and identifies it with the biblical God. Innovative 
translations like this lay the foundation for dialogues of ensuing generations. It was by plunging 
himself deep into the original texts that Ricci came to a comprehensive understanding and 
respect of this tradition. The secret of his success lies in pinpointing the right medium. Ricci’s 
outspoken strategy was to rescue original Confucianism from later corruptions and distortions by 
Buddhism, Daoism and Neo-Confucianism. The tacit assumption was that the Christian God was 
the same personal deity honored and worshiped by the Chinese in ancient times. Ricci secured 
his argument with a series of direct quotations and transliterations from the Chinese classics.
10
 
He then declared: “He who is called the Lord of Heaven in my humble country is He who is 
called Shang-ti (上帝) in Chinese.”11  He went on with a conclusion, “When one reads the 
ancient books, one understands that the Sovereign on High and the Lord of Heaven [of 
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Christians] differs in name alone.”12 Ricci endeavored to find conceptual tools from indigenous 
traditions in China. He identified some Chinese concepts such as Shangdi and Tian as 
equivalents to the biblical notion of God. Ricci’s theoretical construction was successful enough 
to sustain the scrutiny of his contemporary Neo-Confucian scholars. Moreover, Ricci and his 
fellow Jesuit missionaries had even converted some Neo-Confucians to Christianity; among 
them were famous court officials such as Xu Guangqi (徐光启), Li Zhizao (李之藻) and Yang 
Tingyun (杨庭筠). On the ceremony that commemorates the fourth centenary of the death of 
Ricci, Pope Benedict XVI spoke highly about Ricci’s practical wisdom, “[He was] gifted with 
profound faith and extraordinary cultural and academic genius, dedicated long years of his life to 
weaving a profound dialogue between West and East, at the same time working incisively to root 
the Gospel in the culture of the great people of China.” The Pope also praised him as “a model of 
fruitful encounter between European and Chinese civilization.”13 Ricci’s strategy is well 
illustrated by a portrait in which he stands besides Xu Guangqi, one of his influential converts, 
both in Confucian gowns.
14
 His humble approach to the spirit of incarnation gave him the 
privilege of being the Western scholar who truly understood the Chinese culture. Thus, Ricci not 
only carried the Gospel message as a missionary, he also became the most effective medium by 
being identified as a Confucian scholar. The Chalcedon model of Christology respects the 
integrity of both divine and human nature. Ricci, too, respected the integrity of both the message 
and the medium. As a missionary, the difficulty usually lies not in the message, but more in the 
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medium. In the case of Chinese culture, the medium demands as much attention as, if not more 
than, the message itself. Ricci’s respectful treatment of the medium made him the most 
accomplished missionary among the Jesuits.   
Not all missionary activities into China were as successful as those of Ricci. When re-
examined through the lens of the above mentioned paradigm of message and medium, the 
mistakes are more likely to fall into two categories—syncretism or obtrusion. Syncretism 
happens when the medium overwhelms and corrupts the message; and obtrusion, when the 
message distorts the integrity of the media. The Nestorian encounter with Chinese culture in the 
Tang Dynasty is a good example of syncretism. Their momentary prosperity soon faded after a 
brief political repression. Harsh social and political environments account only partially for the 
Nestorians’ total withdrawal from China. The calamity was also somehow anticipated due to 
doctrinal defects in their Christology. The Nestorian Christology compartmentalizes the divine 
and human nature of Christ, and renders Christ as a God-inspired human person.
15
 Within the 
Nestorian formula, the divine nature of Christ was compromised or absorbed by the human 
nature. The same mistake persisted in their process of inculturation when they allowed too much 
stiff Buddhist and Daoist terms to disrupt their theoretical reconstruction in Chinese culture. The 
Nestorian case of syncretism happened when the authenticity of the message was compromised 
by the media that were not sufficiently refined.  
Obtrusion in terms of message-media relationship happens when the message assumes a 
condescending attitude and neglects the integrity of the media. Overtly or covertly, such a 
mentality creates obstacles that block genuine dialogues between different traditions, especially 
those with deep roots. Conservative Christian missionaries, out of their concern for doctrinal 
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purity, have been susceptible to obtrusive tendencies that overlooked the integrity of indigenous 
cultures, and reduced them to dispensable tools in spreading the Gospel message. Given the fact 
that eurocentrism was very popular in the colonial ages, it is not surprising that the Vatican, 
along with many non-Jesuit missionaries in the Ming-Qing (明清) court, took an obtrusive 
attitude and acted disrespectfully in the so-called Chinese Rites Controversy. The Vatican’s main 
concern was the purity and authenticity of the Gospel message. It was a very legitimate concern. 
The problem lies, however, in their ignorance of the indigenous cultural media. The Vatican’s 
position reflected the opinions of those Franciscans and Dominicans, whose familiarity with the 
Chinese culture lagged far behind those of the Jesuits. The Ritual Controversy in some way can 
be recapitulated as a conflict between the ecclesiastical power and the power of knowledge. The 
real tragedy was that the former triumphed over the later. The Jesuits should have been endowed 
with more power since they were the ones who embodied both the message and the media. 
Unfortunately, sheer power, as it is usually the case, triumphed. In 1704, Clement XI banned the 
usage of Confucian rites in Christian worship, a papal bull which was reaffirmed by Benedict 
XIV in 1742. Yet the power of knowledge endures as time lapses. It took more than two hundred 
years for the Vatican to realize its ignorance and arrogance. In 1939, Pope Pius XII issued a 
decree which re-assessed the controversy by allowing Chinese Christians to observe the ancestral 
rites and participate in Confucius-honoring ceremonies.
16
  
What Ricci endeavored to do was to discover the Chinese version of natural theology in the 
ancient Chinese classics. He believed the Chinese sages knew and worshiped the true God in 
antiquity, but that knowledge and practice had been subverted by the literati of subsequent ages 
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and especially by the introduction of Buddhism to China.
17
 Ricci’s evidences were quite strong, 
and his argument convincing. The ancient Chinese, in fact, did worship a personified sovereign 
deity with moral characters that are comparable to the biblical notion of God. Ricci’s project of 
constructing an indigenous version of natural theology from Chinese classical resources turned 
out to be successful and fruitful. Ricci laid the foundation for further dialogue between 
Christianity and Confucianism.  
With the papal restrictions in place, Catholic missionaries in the Qing court no longer had the 
freedom to construct natural theology at the conceptual or doctrinal level. They had to take a 
more technical route, which led to a unique version of natural theology called Figurism. During 
the years of Kangxi (康熙 1662-1722), there was a very active group of Jesuit missionaries in the 
imperial court, among them were representatives such as Joachim Bouvet (白晋 1665-1730), 
Joseph de Premare (马若瑟 1666-1736), Jean Francoise Foucquet (傅圣泽 1665-1741), Jean-
Alexis de Gollet (郭中传 1664-1741). Unlike Ricci, who devoted himself mainly to pinpointing 
the conceptual affinity between Christian doctrine and ancient Chinese tradition, these Jesuit 
missionaries attempted to find the affinities between the two traditions on a linguistic and 
semiotic level. The underlying belief was that all nations shared a common origin; if traced back 
far enough, there would be residual evidence that led to a primordial common memory. Figurists 
deployed their arguments mainly in three directions. First, they considered Chinese hieroglyphics 
as etymological evidence that encode divine revelation. For example, the Chinese character of 
ship (船), was disassembled according to its three component radicals—舟 (ship), 八 (eight) and 
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口 (mouth); and then it was applied to the biblical story of Noah—a family of eight people being 
called into a ship. Other etymological analyses includes righteousness (義) as me (我) being 
covered by the lamb (羔), and greed (婪) as a female figure (女) stands under two trees (林). The 
former refers, obviously, to the concept of scapegoat and the biblical notion of atonement, and 
then later to the story of Eve been tempted in the Garden of Eden.
18
 Second, the Figurists 
searched through ancient Chinese folklore and myths for legendary tales that are comparable to 
biblical accounts. Among the tales they found were the Matriarch Patches up the Sky (女娲补天
), the Creation of Human Beings out of Yellow Mud (黄土造人), and Great Yu’s Regulating of 
Floodwater (大禹治水), to name but a few.19 According to them, these popular legends, which 
had been carried down from antiquity as oral traditions, had a better chance to survive the book 
burning at the time Qin Shi Huang (秦始皇). Third, they also sought to reconstruct the ideal 
model of humanity by assembling character traits that were scattered in the ancient classics such 
as Yi Jing (易经) and Spring and Autumn Annals (春秋). Their argument was that the Chinese 
ideal type of sagehood was modeled after the perfect person, namely the Messiah.
20
  
Under the assumption that all cultures shared a common origin in antiquity, these Jesuit 
missionaries endeavored to stretch the Chinese culture, classic Confucianism to be more specific, 
backward and upward, with the hope of establishing connections with ancient biblical history, as 
well as conceptual affinities with Christian doctrines. Whether on the ideological level or on the 
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linguistic level, they all found rich elements of natural theology in traditional Chinese culture. As 
sporadic and piecemeal as their findings may appear to be, they pointed out a direction in which 
systematic study and research might be fruitful. Following the steps of these Jesuit missionaries, 
this project ventures to reconstruct a version of natural theology in the context of the Chinese 
axiological cosmology, with concrete steps being schematized for natural values to be discerned 
and assimilated by the human subject. It is a modest natural theology under the premises of an 
axiological supernal, whose nature and character can be apprehended aesthetically, semioticly 
and physically. We will expand this argument with more details in the following section.  
The Public Nature of Axiological Natural Theology 
 
An Axiological approach to Natural Theology: the Confucian version of Natural 
Theology, in comparison to the traditional one, places emphasis on the axiological nature of the 
ultimate. When traditional Natural Theology makes arguments for the existence and character of 
the supernal, it is often critiqued by modern scholarship as futile in proving, or disproving, those 
claims of transcendency about the supernal, since the existence/being of the ultimate is not 
qualified by any definitive content. Moreover, those so-called natural characters of the supernal, 
for instance the divine Omnis, rooted more in Platonic philosophy and the human imagination, 
lacked any real credibility when scrutinized empirically. The axiological approach, 
notwithstanding, argues pragmatically. It starts from the result and consequence of values being 
apprehended by the human equilibrium, and then retrospectively argues for a version of the 
supernal that is axiological in nature. Arguments in this line cannot be dismissed so easily 
because of human perceptibility and transformation in the context of an axiological cosmos. 
Axiological sensitivity as an essential strand of Imago Dei serves as an empirically verifiable 
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foundation upon which an axiological version of the supernal can be established. The major 
thrust of the theoretical construction is not made up of abstruse efforts to fabricate ethereal 
claims about the existence and nature of the supernal, but consists of practical arguments 
building from the bottom up. This method is unconventional in the sense that it sets aside the 
intellectual imagination by refraining from making speculative or abstract claims. Instead, it 
starts from the undeniable ubiquitous existence of values as empirically verifiable facts, and then 
comes to the arguments for the transcendent such as the axiological nature of the supernal. 
Rooting arguments in the empirical realm helps axiological natural theology to avoid the old 
mistakes made by the traditional natural theology. The vulnerability of traditional natural 
theology comes from its unbalanced structure of loading heavy arguments on top of insubstantial 
empirical arguments.  
Moreover, by relocating the major construction site within the empirical realm, the 
axiological approach attempts to redefine natural theology from the medieval towards a modern 
formulation re-cast according to scientific criteria. Natural Theology, as fallible human 
construction, should not assume the inerrant authoritative position of the sacred texts. All 
theological propositions, especially those of natural theology, should be considered fallible, and 
thus are susceptible for real improvement and growth. The theoretical improvement of an 
axiological hypothesis is accompanied by personal transformation as the result of value 
apprehension and assimilation. The equilibrium’s refinement of taste stands as ensuing fruits that 
attests to the efficacy of the axiological hypothesis. Axiological natural theology does not make 
arbitrary authoritative statements about the divine, and then demand proofs that are usually 
tautological, as traditional natural theology did. Rather, it starts from things at hand, by 
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proposing hypotheses on the basis of sensible data, trivial and piecemeal as they may appear to 
be, and improves itself as the hypothesis refines and accumulates. In other words, axiological 
natural theology should be categorized as a human enterprise -- humble, limited, and prone to be 
mistaken-- yet growing and expanding under the persistent efforts of researchers and 
practitioners.  
Axiological natural theology is truly “natural” in the sense that it is equally accessible for 
all religions and ideologies. Just like any language provides communicates but does not 
determine the content of that communication, axiological natural theology, too, provides a 
linguistic and semiotic matrix that bridges the external natural entities with the internal human 
equilibrium where values are to be discovered and transferred. This linguistic and semiotic 
bridge does not dictate the content of value that it travels upon, even though it is not void of 
value preferences. After thousands of years of development, this Confucian axiological media 
has been rich and diversified enough to engage a great variety of values. For instance, the classic 
Confucians generated sufficient terms and categories to operate discussions on human nature, 
whether the human nature is considered benign, as in Mencius theory, corrupted as asserted by 
Xun Zi, or void of determined nature as Gao Zi thought.
21
 Likewise, multiple versions of the 
ultimate also find apt expression in systems of Confucian philosophical symbols, especially 
those of Neo-Confucianism after having been challenged by and having evolved in dialogue with 
Buddhism. In a religiously pluralistic era, it is vitally important for a qualified version of natural 
theology to be equipped with resources that are publicly accessible to various religious ideas. 
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Axiological natural theology provides public semiotic and methodological resources for all sorts 
of ideas, just as fertilized soil nourishes seed of all kinds.  
Axiological natural theology is also a “general” theology as in contrast to traditional 
Christian theology that centers upon “special” revelations of the divine. Natural theology in its 
traditional sense has often been marginalized as supplementary to a revealed core message. It has 
been limited to a secondary, corroborative role of reinforcing the major claims of doctrinal 
theology, in the same way a good maid deferentially attends to the bride without attracting too 
much attention. Axiological natural theology vastly broadens this scope to the extent that it no 
longer serves as a maid to the bride, but as the mother that nourishes the bride. In other words, 
axiological natural theology functions as the general environment within which any particular 
type of theology, specifically Christian theology included, conceives, germinates and grows. 
Natural theology, as defined, came into existence chronologically prior to special theology. 
Before the emergence of major religions, elements of natural theology existed in all human 
interpretations of nature and its myriad entities. As a cultural transmitter, Confucius didn’t invent 
this axiological approach. Rather, along with other prominent figures such as Fu Xi (伏羲), King 
Wen (文王) and Duke Zhou (周公), Confucius sorted out and systematized the axiological 
practice in ancient China. Axiology, the attempts to read values into nature and its myriad 
entities, exists in all civilizations. What made the ancient Chinese mindset special was that it 
processed natural data consistently through the axiological lens. The axiological approach 
became the dominant way of thinking that overshadowed other ways such as a mystical religious 
approach, a rational scientific approach, or a mechanistic instrumental approach. This probably 
explains why Chinese civilization didn’t develop either along the typical religious line, or the 
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rational scientific line. The axiological approach seems to be profound and satisfying enough to 
occupy the intellectual interest of this civilization. As the modern world attests to the limitation 
of a rational instrumental approach and, sometimes, its debilitating influence on nature, it would 
be rewarding to re-examine the axiological approach with due attention.  
Confucian Axiology’s Contribution to Christian Theology 
 
What Confucian axiology can contribute to Christian Theology is a whole world of 
symbols. This Confucian world of symbols can be fused with the Christian doctrine of Creatio ex 
nihilo, advancing the theory by advocating an axiological trait of the divine Creator. On the one 
hand, values that exist ubiquitously in nature and its myriad entities can be traced back to the 
axiological nature of the Creator, who is the source of all possible values. On the other hand, 
human subjects as bearers of imago dei have been endowed with keen value sensibility, and are 
naturally driven and equipped for value discovery and apprehension. Christian theology thus, 
through its encounter with Confucianism, rediscovered the axiological dimension which was 
hitherto hidden in anthropology and its doctrines of God. Confucian axiology also helps to 
redirect Christian theology from its reductionist obsessions about God and human beings which 
occur due to direct soteriological concerns by inserting the whole realm of nature and reality 
between God and human being. Nature and reality, as fallen as they may be, are indispensible in 
redemptive history. Nature and its entities had been marginalized or neglected by Christian 
theology in the past partially due to the lack of an axiological cosmology. Nor was there a value 
digestive system available in Christian theology to process natural values. Such deficiency in 
Christian theology, especially Protestant versions, led to the Kantian dichotomy which signed 
nature off to reason and science. It also accounts for the troublesome relationship between 
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natural science and Christian theology-- an issue that persists even until today. Confucian natural 
theology puts nature and its entities back in the formula. Nature and natural entities, according to 
Confucian axiology, are indispensible media that Christian theology cannot afford to bypass. 
Only through serious engagement with natural media can the Christian message be fully 
unfolded and apprehended. Divine knowledge cannot be perceived immediately by abstract 
rational propositions as was the case in classic Christian natural theology. It is through nature 
and its entities as divine creation that we have access to knowledge about the Creator. Apart 
from nature and its entities, natural theology is no resource in any discussion of God.  
Nature and its myriad entities have been reinstalled as indispensible media in axiological 
natural theology. Nevertheless, before axiological natural theology can function properly, other 
sets of media have to be invented between nature and the human subject. Values scattered all 
around are just like raw materials that wait to be harvested, treated and digested. It took many 
generations for human civilizations to come up with good diets to feed the body. Similarly, it 
takes time for any cultural and linguistic system to develop mature value processing systems. As 
one of the few civilizations privileged with no major discontinuity, the Confucian tradition has 
developed an amazingly comprehensive system for value processing and practicing. Both 
Confucianism and Daoism presupposed a naturalistic version of ontology, which entails a 
deferential, or even pietistic, attitude towards nature and its entities. Nature, with its numinous 
power, inspired the ancient Chinese sages toward moral renderings and interpretations. The kind 
of power and character that were attributed to divinity in theistic religions has been attributed to 
nature and its entities. The ancient Chinese didn’t end up with some kind of pantheistic religion, 
even though there were plenty of pantheistic elements in the tradition. Rather, the major 
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innovative impulse had been directed towards the invention of a comprehensive semiotic system 
which consists of pictograms, hieroglyphs and, most of all, logograms. Consistent efforts had 
been made to encapsulate nature and its entities’ moral values with semiosis. What is left is a 
vast semiotic system that is axiological in nature. This axiological semiotic system should be 
regarded as one of China’s major contributions to the world civilization. It is true that there are 
plenty of axiological interpretations of nature and its entities in other civilizations, for instance, 
the native Indians read a lot of spiritual and moral implication into eagles. What distinguish the 
Chinese logogram system are its scope and the consistent interpretation of nature from the 
axiological perspective. No wonder many Jesuit missionaries, as mentioned in the previous 
section, were able to make fruitful theological discoveries in many Chinese characters by means 
of figurism. Other than sporadic studies carried out by those Jesuit missionaries, the Chinese 
logogram system has not yet become an object of formal theological study. Etymological studies 
on Chinese logograms should qualify as major resources for axiological natural theology.  
Confucian tradition recognizes three loci of creativity—Heaven, Earth and Humanity. 
Within the Confucian tradition, the ontological creativity of Heaven resonates with the Christian 
notion of Creatio ex nihilo. Christianity, as a theistic faith, lays emphasis on ontological 
creativity, to the extent that the cosmological creativity of the Earth and Humanity have seldom 
been discussed independently. Contemporary process thinking in the West, with its innovative 
categories, helps to remedy the deficiency in Christian theology. Alfred N. Whitehead, the 
founder of Process Thinking, had some vague awareness of the congruence between his 
philosophy and the eastern way of thinking: “In this general position the philosophy of organism 
seems to approximate more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, though, than to western 
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Asiatic, or European, thought.”22 Whitehead’s intuitive comment finds a perfect illustration in I-
Ching, a book revered by both classic Confucianism and Daoism that is similar to Genesis of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition. Axiological natural theology at the stage of I-Ching had evolved to a 
systematized form. Taiji  (太极), as the holistic system, is made of the paired polarities of Yin 
and Yang (阴阳). Yin and Yang, after being paired up in three, are permutated and combined into 
eight trigrams, with each representing one basic natural element. Then, these eight trigrams are 
paired with each other and combined into sixty-four hexagrams. Even though I-Ching stops at 
the level of sixty-four hexagrams, its general tendency anticipates more doublings that may result 
in infinite sets of symbols that correspond to the myriad of entities in nature. The perennial 
philosophical question of one and many found a unique solution in the Chinese tradition, with 
Taiji on the end of oneness and myriad entities on the end of multiplicity. When this 
comprehensive system is set into motion, it functions as a semiotic replica of the entire cosmos. 
Using Whiteheadian terminology, each line in the hexagram is comparable to an actual entity, 
with the associated hexagram as its immediate society. Each line prehends and participates in the 
entire system from its actual location. What Whitehead called the initial aims were provided by 
Dao as the ultimacy that follows pervasively within the semiotic cosmos. I-Ching, with its binary 
system, united the sporadic semiosis into a dynamic and holistic system, which bears much 
resemblance to the Whiteheadian philosophy of organism.
23
 What axiological natural theology 
provides is not merely a bunch of scattered signs, but an organic dynamic semiotic system. When 
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paired up with Process thoughts, it supplies apt linguistic and theoretical tools for theological 
discussion.  
Axiological natural theology’s emphasis on media does not stop at the semiotic level. It 
goes further to the physical and psychological level of the human subject as a value processing 
center. The Doctrine of the Mean proposed the human subject as an equilibrium of structured 
continuum endowed with sensible feelings that constantly interact with stimuli from the 
environment. Centrality (中) and Commonality (庸), as the Chinese title of the Doctrine of the 
Mean, denotes the human subject as a center (中) ready to respond to the common natural 
entities (庸). The concept of selfhood emerges in the dynamic interactions between the two. The 
equilibrium situated inside the human body as a physical medium that take grasps on nature and 
its entities with its sensory organs and nervous system. With an innate semiotic nature, the 
equilibrium discovers values of natural entities through sign-making activities. As a matter of 
fact, most of the interpretants generated in the Confucian tradition were of an axiological and 
moral character. Moral values, termed De (德) in the Chinese logogram, were encapsulated with 
semiosis and carried to the equilibrium. The equilibrium with its semiotic nature processes the 
afferent values by means of reconfiguring and refining its existent structure. This value 
apprehension process enhances the equilibrium’s ability to harmonize the external stimuli with 
better emotional patterns. As a result, the equilibrium itself evolves into a more sensible and 
refined center, apt for sign-making and value-generating. This has been the Confucian way of 
journeying towards sagehood through self cultivation. In a way this journey is quite common in 
all cultures and traditions, whether articulated explicitly or implicitly. But what distinguishes the 
Confucian axiological tradition is, again, its emphasis on media. The physical body of the human 
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subject is wired with sensory organs, a nervous system, feelings and emotions all of which are 
indispensable elements for this value transaction process, both afferent and efferent. Wang Yang-
ming (1742-1529), the Neo-Confucian philosopher in the Ming Dynasty, advocated the doctrine 
of the Unity of Knowledge and Action as a practical way of training the physical body in light of 
axiological knowledge.
24
 The repetitive drill conscientiously practiced forces values into the 
equilibrium over and over again, until they take the form of habit. The anatomy of habit, 
according to William James, indicates physiological traits of nerve paths and muscle memories 
that have been developed and perpetuated by intentional repetition.
25
 As a variety of habitual 
traits make their way down to the subconscious level as second nature, the human subject 
establishes himself as Junzi (君子) – the physical manifestation of value embodiments.   
Thus far, we have identified in Confucian axiology a series of tangible steps that enable 
values to be recognized by and channeled to the human equilibrium. This axiological highway 
was constructed by seriously engaging various particular media. First, we restore nature and its 
myriad entities as an indispensable in theological discussion. A thorough reconstruction of 
natural theology has to shift from the classic formula of abstract speculation on divine nature, 
towards a paradigm shift of reinstating nature and its entities as essential media. Unmediated 
theological discussion usually ends up in meaningless tautology. Second, a whole system of 
linguistic and semiotic media need to be developed between nature and the human being as 
interpreting subject. The semiotic nature of human equilibrium necessitates the stage of 
axiological semiosis before value can be properly recognized and apprehended. We may 
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compare this with agricultural endeavors that transform natural ingredients into nutritious 
elements that are absorbable to the human body.  Third, the physiological medium of the human 
body also needs to be mobilized for value transaction. With its sensory organs, nervous system, 
feelings and emotions, natural values are comported to the human equilibrium as meaningful 
stimuli. The most comprehensive medium in Confucian axiology, however, is not natural, 
linguistic or physiologic. It is ritual as defined by Confucius and Xun Zi.  
According to some prominent Confucian thinkers, ritual is the medium in which we 
human beings live and have our beings.
26
 Ritual to human existence is like air to the bird or 
water to the fish. As Neville points out, “Without ritual there is no family life, only procreation, 
no division of family responsibilities, only the desire to get free as soon as possible, no political 
life, only strongman rule, no loyalties to a political entity larger than proximate community, only 
clan-based self-serving.”27 Ritual is the womb that shapes individuals and communities, and 
through which human civilization evolves. Ritual is a dynamic concept with two parts. It 
involves the accumulation and disposition of traditional behavior patterns that are ready to be 
called into operation. Following Spinoza’s definition of nature, we may call this kind of ritual 
Ritual Ritualized, as opposed to the paired notion of Ritual Ritualizing, the kind of ritual that’s 
actively functioning and evolving. Ritual Ritualized is significant for two reasons. First, it stands 
for natural values that have been apprehended and assimilated into the tradition as the 
foundation, or the context of, the rituals that are currently functioning. Second, this part of ritual 
may constitute the gene traits or muscle memories that have been precipitated with physiological 
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embodiment prior to the active engagement of consciousness. Ritual Ritualizing, on the other 
hand, refers to the dynamic media that are actively functioning in value transaction. It assembles 
the semiotic encapsulation and physiological embodiment of natural values, and sets them in 
motion. Ritual, as actively functioning media, synthesizes the tradition, the subject and the local 
context into dynamic occasions for the value transaction process. If we regard signs as semiotic 
currencies circulating in the axiological market with “cash values”, then the actively functioning 
rituals are comparable to trading activities that allow values to be exchanged and created in the 
process. One can hardly overstate the molding power of ritual practice. Every human being was 
born into a certain ritual context. Just like our physiological body takes form inside the mother’s 
womb, the ritual context, too, functions as the molding matrix within which our inner being is 
shaped. As a powerful and comprehensive medium, ritual is practical, collective, transformative 
and performative. As conventional behavior patterns, ritual is meant to be put into practice, often 
in the form of repetitive drills, until it reaches the stage of becoming habit. The collective nature 
of ritual refers both to its origin and its function. Ritual as social convention is usually invented 
collectively by its embodying social group, though some legendary genius such as Confucius 
may play a pivotal role in the course of its evolution. Ritual also functions collectively as 
practical rules that orchestrate social activities which otherwise might be chaotic and 
confrontational. The transformative nature of ritual requires deep and important changes in the 
interpreter. In the Mencius tradition, ritualistically repetitive behavior patterns play an important 
role in actualizing innately good potentials. Ritual occupies an even more essential position in 
the Xun Zian tradition where the depraved human nature has to be tamed and transformed by the 
sages’ conscientious effort to inculcate virtues that are artificially designed. The performative 
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nature of ritual may not function in a magic way as thought by Herbert Fingarette.
28
 Rather, the 
real power of ritual lies in its potential capability of invoking the appropriate emotional 
responses pertinent to shared values commonly held dear among certain societies.  
In conclusion, Confucian axiology provides a series of media that enable natural values to 
be recognized, encapsulated and assimilated in value transactions. These media consist of 
natural, semiotic, physiological and ritual types. They are public in nature, ready to be employed 
by any axiological discussion. Christianity as an ideology with particular value disposition 
encounters in Confucian axiology a most practical and systematic version of natural theology, 
through which the core values of the Christian faith can be effectively conveyed and 
apprehended.  
Christian Theology’s Contribution to Confucian Axiology 
 
Thus far, we have constructed an axiological pathway between nature and human 
equilibrium. This pathway was materialized by a series of media which include nature and its 
entities, semiosis, the physiological media of the human body and ritual. Public as it is, this 
pathway can be employed by all sorts of values. Historically, the efficacy of this system had been 
tested by the entry of Buddhism since Western Han (206BCE-8CE).
29
 As a matter of fact, 
Buddhism with its general tone of negation is somewhat incompatible with the affirmative 
orientation of Chinese tradition. The translation of Buddhist literature, along with its expansion 
in China, put the indigenous media system to a harsh test by subjecting it to a task for which it 
was ill-suited. The thriving of Buddhism in China attests to the excellent qualification of this 
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media system. Moreover, both Buddhism as the message and traditional media as the tool 
unfolded creativity in the formation of Chinese Buddhist branches, such as Huayan, Tiantai, 
Chan and Pure Land Buddhism. In addition, numerous neologisms were invented in the midst of 
this process. If, as we believe, the media system of Confucian axiology is by and large public, 
and ready to be employed by all sorts of values, then Christianity is certainly entitled to engage 
this system. It is obvious that, with its generally affirmative worldview, Christianity’s encounter 
with Confucian axiology should be more friendly and fruitful than that of Buddhism. With 
today’s tens of millions of Chinese Christians, Christianity’s entry into China is already an 
historical and existential fact. Yet, let us set aside the current situation and ask an imaginative 
question: what kind of differences would Jesus make had he been born into this media system? 
Would he still be crucified in the Chinese context? If crucifixion and resurrection have to happen 
since they were essential for human salvation, who would send Jesus to the Cross? Would it be 
the ancient sages and their teachings that condemn Jesus to execution? That is less likely the 
case. It is unimaginable that wise figures such as Duke Zhou (周公), Confucius, Lao Zi, Xun Zi, 
or Mencius would do any harm to Jesus. On the contrary, Jesus might respect their teaching 
authority the way he respected Moses, Elijah and other prophets of the ancient Israel. Then, who, 
in the Chinese context, would be the chief priest and the teachers of the law (Mark 8:31) to reject 
Jesus and eventually put him to death? Surely the depravity of the Chinese was as severe as that 
of the Jews and Romans at Jesus’ time. That is why sages like Confucius devoted their lives to 
the invention of rituals as remedies for corruption and chaos. Most likely, Jesus would still be 
executed in the Chinese context by hatred, jealousy, bigotry, ignorance, blind patriotism, or dark 
powers similar to his own time.  
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What Jesus would have brought into Chinese culture had he been born into the Chinese 
context. Some conservative Christians may dismiss this question as purely hypothetical since the 
life story of Jesus Christ in the Hellenistic and second temple Judaic culture is a historic fact. 
However, if we take the Great Commission (Matthew 28:18-20) seriously and truly believe that 
the Gospel is meant to encounter every culture, then we have to answer the question: What kind 
of differences will Jesus and His Gospel make when encountering Chinese culture. In a sense, 
both missionaries from the West such as Matteo Ricci and Joachim Bouvet, and Chinese 
Christians such as Yang Tingyun (杨庭筠) have contrived to give answers to this question. As 
Christianity is currently expanding rapidly in the Chinese culture, the question is becoming more 
pressingly urgent. Though much ink could be spilled on this topic, I plan to focus on three 
aspects of the question. First, Christianity might cure the Confucian culture of its elitist tendency. 
With its capability of penetrating both the upper class and the grass-root groups, Christianity is 
an ideal ideology, or religious faith, to unite the parting social groups in China. Second, the 
Christian concept of grace will offer a remedy for the rigid moralistic core of Confucianism. 
Grace conceived as more fundamental than morality will deepen ethical discussion in 
Confucianism. Third, divine incarnation as instantiation will not only revive anthropomorphism 
in ancient China, but also shed new light on the Confucian doctrine of imminent transcendence.  
Confucian Elitism and the Christian Faith 
 
Allegedly there is an elitist tone built in Confucianism.
30
  Ru (儒) as the original Chinese 
character of Confucians refers to a special social group privileged with certain educational and 
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moral resources. It stands in contrast to Min (民) which, in general, consists of commoners that 
are preoccupied by mundane life. Even though Ru (儒) was not a social class by birth, becoming 
a Ru member requires special education and training. Ever since Confucianism was adopted as 
the state ideology in the early Han (135 BCE), Ru (儒) had grown into an elitist group that 
monopolized most of the privileges in administration, academia and education. Even most 
dissidents after Han belonged to the Ru group. Confucius himself was not born into a politically 
or socio-economically privileged family. In fact, his childhood was quite difficult: “When I was 
young, my condition was low, and therefore I acquired my ability in many things, but they were 
mean matters.”31 Confucius’ elitist mindset was exposed when he referred to mundane 
occupations as “mean matters”. Numerous other occasions in Analects affirm his elitist 
inclination. For instance, when Yen Yüan (颜渊), Confucius’ favorite student, died, Yen Lû, Yen 
Yüan’s father, begged the Master to sell the carriage and get an outer shell for his son's coffin. 
Confucius declined with the following statement: “… I would not walk on foot to get a shell for 
him, because, having followed in the rear of the great officers, it was not proper that I should 
walk on foot.”32 In fact, elitism permeates the ideal vision of Confucian social political 
reconstruction. His chief goal was to establish a hierarchical community characterized with 
perpetual and spontaneous harmonies by means of mechanisms such as ritual and music. Within 
this Confucian ideal society, rights are unequally distributed proportional to the inequality of 
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moral merits. Public decisions are to be placed in the hands Junzi (君子), a Confucian term for 
moral elites. This Confucian “elite” later found a prototypical expression in the Sage King   (圣
王), personified by Duke Zhou (周公) and Confucius himself. With a bureaucracy of scholar-
officials headed by a Sage King, the Confucian utopian can be perceived as a meritocratic state 
governed by a group of moral elites. Education serves as the social ladder through which 
ordinary min commoners (庶民) transform themselves by self-cultivation before they may 
qualify as Ru (儒), which, in turn, serves as stepping stone that leads to the elite circle. This 
explains why education has extraordinary significance in the Confucian context. When it 
functions properly, education as a social mechanism deflates tension between the elites and the 
commoners. Nevertheless, this social ladder was not broad enough to defuse accumulating 
pressure among the grass-roots. As a result, Chinese social political history has suffered from 
chronic traumatic upheavals. The elitist tendency of Confucianism made it impotent to satisfy the 
spiritual needs of those uneducated or illiterate petty commoners (xiao ren 小人). Social schism, 
whether explicit or implicit, has been a constant threat to societies organized according to 
Confucian principle.  
Christian faith may serve as an antidote to Confucian elitism. If Jesus were born in the 
Confucian context, his Nazarene origin indicates that he would most likely choose to be born in a 
town that is geographically and culturally peripheral. The divine incarnation plunged himself in 
the depth of existential limitations. Jesus, as the Nazarene, would readily identify himself with 
those marginal towns as indicated in the biblical record: “Land of Zebulum and land of Naphtali, 
the way to the sea, along the Jordan, Galilee of the Gentiles”, and with “the people living in the 
darkness” and “in the land of the shadow of death” (Matthew 4:15-16). His sermon on the 
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mountain started with a series of beatitudes that comfort the disadvantaged groups—blessed are 
the poor, the mournful, the meek, the hungry and the thirsty. That was just the starting point of 
his descending journey, only to continue to identify himself with the mistreated, the suffering, 
the humiliated, the victimized, and with those who were deprived of basic rights, or even life. 
Without decent formal education, Jesus wouldn’t qualify as a member of Ru (儒). His initial 
followers were all undereducated or illiterate commoners such as fishermen, housewives, and 
even political dissidents. His ethereal teachings about the Kingdom of God run against the 
world-affirming mentality of Confucianism, and would very likely be dismissed by the elitists 
with contempt, or even be condemned by them as irrelevant and heretical. All in all, had Jesus 
been born into the Confucian culture, he wouldn’t be considered as a privileged elite, but rather 
as a member of the grass-root, a  Min (民), or a petty commoner. Such a socio- economic 
location would help to secure Jesus and his teachings a firm foothold among the disadvantaged 
non-elite groups. Simply siding with the underprivileged won’t help to alleviate the tensions of a 
polarized society. What makes Christianity unique is its dual capacity of both descension and 
ascension. Just as Confucius came from a noble bloodline, Jesus was a descendent of King 
David, or even a nobler divine origin. While Confucius had been struggling throughout his life to 
move upward, morally and socio-politically, Jesus descended from heaven to earth, from earth to 
cross, from cross to tomb, from rich to poor, from life to death, and then ascended from death to 
life, from humility to glory, from victim to judge. The life story of Jesus comes with dynamic 
unifying power that melts down the barricades between the nobility and the commoners, the elite 
and the petty person, the Jews and gentiles, males and females, the haves and have-nots 
(Galatians 3:28). Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) presented probably the most convincing case for 
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Christianity’s capability of adapting itself to various social contingencies. In The Social 
Teaching of the Christian Churches (1912), after surveying the church’s social teachings in five 
periods-- the Early Church, the Mediaeval Synthesis, Lutheranism, Calvinism, and the Baptist 
Movement, Troeltsch singled out the Mediaeval and Calvinist syntheses as the most imaginative 
and satisfactory harmonization of Christianity and culture.
33
 Although Troeltsch considered his 
project a failure because he was not able to find the permanent ethical content of Christianity,
34
 
his research was dense and broad enough to be re-interpreted in light of the issue we are tackling 
in this project. It seems that, according to Troeltsch, Christianity is endowed with a tremendous 
capacity for adaptation, which enabled it to survive and thrive in all kinds of conditions. It 
inspired the oppressed grass-root followers of the early church. Rather than being crushed under 
the iron wrist of the Roman Empire, it spread all over the known civilized world, flourished to 
the point of becoming the state religion of the Empire. The extended history of Christendom, 
especially that of the Byzantine Empire, attests to Christianity’s ability to serve as ideological 
backbone for grand scale civilizations. When European feudal society evolved through the 
dynamic processes of the Reformation, Enlightenment, scientific revolution, industrialization, 
along with the expansion of the European civilization throughout the world with Colonialism, 
both Europe and the world went through dramatic changes. Christianity, once again, survived 
and thrived in its modern branches, including Lutheranism, Calvinism and Baptist. Thus far, 
Christianity has successfully overcome many kinds of barriers. It has demonstrated extraordinary 
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power in unifying social groups that are separated by such things as gender, social classes, 
education, and ethnicity. When applied in the Confucian context, Christianity will definitely help 
to resolve the perennial alienation between elites and commoners, a problem that has prevailed in 
the Chinese society for thousands of years. The descending dimension of Christian faith makes it 
attractive to social outcasts, the poor, and marginalized groups, as well as other vulnerable 
groups.    
Divine Grace vs. Self-cultivation 
 
The concept of grace lies at the center of the Gospel message. To put it into terms of Pure 
Land Buddhism, Christianity characterizes itself as a typical tariki faith, in which salvation can 
only be accomplished with outside help. The Confucian sagehood of self-cultivation, on the 
contrary, is typical of a jiriki faith, where enlightenment or salvation comes only as a result of 
self effort.
35
 The Catholic Church has a more balanced doctrine between divine grace and human 
effort. Nevertheless, the Catechism of the Catholic Church defines “grace as favor, the free and 
undeserved help that God gives us to respond to his call to become children of God, adoptive 
sons, partakers of the divine nature and of eternal life.”36 The Catholics also emphasize 
sacraments as a means through which divine grace is infused. Sacraments as a means of grace 
are available to those within the church. Catholic doctrine, thus, runs against the Confucian 
notion of acquiring sagehood through constant individual practice of self-cultivation. The 
Protestant movement was initiated, in some sense, as a radical reaction against the Catholic 
practice of merit theology. Historically, the direct cause for Luther to post the Ninety-Five 
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Theses to the church door of Wittenberg in 1517 could be boiled down to an indignant rebuttal 
against Johann Tezel’s selling of indulgences in his vicinity. Luther considered it a betrayal of 
the core Gospel message—salvation by grace through faith. Luther’s vehement reaction set the 
swing of the pendulum back towards the Pauline notion of grace, as in contrast to that of James. 
Luther called this kind of unmerited grace as “alien righteousness”, “that is the righteousness of 
another, instilled from without. This is the righteousness of Christ by which he justifies through 
faith….” “[It] is given to men in baptism and whenever they are truly repentant.”37 As historical 
contingencies died down, the Lutherans found themselves not far from the Catholics on the 
notion of divine grace. The 1997 joint confession between the Lutheran World Federation and 
the Catholic Church declares, “We confess together that sinners are justified by faith in the 
saving action of God in Christ. By the action of the Holy Spirit in Baptism, they are granted the 
gift of salvation, which lays the basis for the whole Christian life.”38 Theologically speaking, the 
Reformed tradition is more pertinent to the doctrinal stances of those Protestant churches with a 
Chinese background. The tension between divine grace and human effort in the Reformed 
tradition is by no means diminished. Rather, with its conviction of the total depravity of human 
nature, the Reformed Theology quintessentially dissociates salvation from any substantial human 
contribution. The human effort of self-cultivation was thus unequivocally overshadowed by 
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divine grace. The absolute dominance of divine grace finds a systematic expression in Reformed 
Theology in terms of the five solae.
39
  
The Confucian tradition has developed throughout history as a mature theory of self-
cultivation. As indicated above, the Confucian project of self-cultivation consists of a series of 
steps, which include aesthetic appreciation, investigation of things, rectifying the names, habit as 
repetitive practice, eventually leading to ritual as powerful social mechanism. Classic 
Confucianism took shape in the midst of disenchantment from ancient belief of the Lord on High 
(上帝). There has been a built-in tendency in the Confucian tradition to deliberately keep 
distance from any personified version of deity. Dao as the Confucian Ultimate is perceived to be 
natural, impersonal, objective and, in some sense, passive. Confucius once mentioned the Dao as 
the one that can be enlarged by people, but is not capable of enlarging people.
40
 The Christian 
version of a personal loving God who is eager to proactively lavish abundant grace with no 
special moral requirement of the receiver is quite an alien concept to anyone within the 
Confucian tradition. The sharp contrast between the two partially explains the difficulty 
Christian missionaries encountered in the Confucian context. Scholars with substantial 
knowledge in both traditions realized the complicated nature of this issue. Several of them 
devoted monographs for deep discussions. This issue was analyzed directly by Arne Redse in his 
2005 book “By Grace Alone” in context of “Self-cultivation”: An attempt at contextualizing the 
Lutheran doctrine of justification to Chinese context as influenced by New Confucianism. Redse 
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stated the purpose of his study as “… to examine what Western churches and theology may learn 
from an endeavor to contextualize the doctrine of justification in Chinese context.”41 Redse’s 
major contribution was to pinpoint a series of themes and elements that are divergent between 
the two faiths. Paulos Huang, another Lutheran scholar with fine Confucian sensitivity, fueled 
the Confucian-Christian dialogue with a doctoral dissertation, focusing specifically on the 
Confucian appropriation of the Christian doctrine of soteriology. The purpose of his work was to 
sort out his existential and spiritual struggle with “How a self-cultivation-seeking-Confucian be a 
Lutheran Christian?”42 Huang found himself caught in a constant struggle between his Lutheran 
identity and Confucian upbringing, “As a Lutheran Christian, theoretically I understand well that 
‘salvation’ is absolutely the work of God rather than the result of human merit. Nonetheless … 
Confucian self-transcendence seems so natural and normal to me and for many other Chinese 
Christians.” Huang’s inner struggle was rather intense, to the point that he raised a provocative 
question “Can China accept Christianity?”, which served as the initial title for his dissertation. 
Huang’s analysis indicates that Confucianism has the theological and philosophical conceptual 
structure to understand and even to accept a Christian position.
43
 He supported his argument with 
five affirmative elements in the Confucian-Christian dialogue.
44
 Huang’s experience as a 
Confucian Christian is representative, and honest. His conclusion, though it may not be that 
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appealing to many contemporary New Confucianists, it is certainly inspiring for Christians with 
a Confucian background.  
Unlike Huang who aims at bridging the Christian soteriology into a Confucian context, 
the current project focuses on possible contributions the Christian concept of grace may make 
when unfolded in communities with Confucian traits. If rendered in Derridean terms, the 
Christian concept of divine grace and the Confucian notion of self-cultivation are a set of 
elemental oppositions that await destruction in both contexts. Within the Christian context, the 
idea of divine grace stands at the upper hand of the hierarchical structure, and overwhelmingly 
dominates any human effort. Many of the previous chapters can be regarded as interpretive 
efforts to reinstall human self-cultivation as an indispensable means through which divine grace 
is administrated and accomplished. However, when shifting into the Confucian context, another 
kind of deconstruction is needed. In the Confucian tradition, human self-cultivation dominates 
the power structure, with divine grace being marginalized and depleted of any practical or 
theoretical significance. Deconstruction in this area recognizes at least two positive influences 
that the concept of divine grace may contribute in a Confucian context, namely, the priority of 
divine grace and the frailty of human nature.  
There was a time in ancient China when divine grace took priority over human self effort. 
That was before the Duke of Zhou (born 1100 BCE) invented the concept of De (德) as 
ideological mechanism to legitimize the regime change. During the pre-Zhou dynasties such as 
Xia (夏 c. 2070 BCE- C. 1600 BCE) and Shang (商 1600-1046 BCE), Tian (天) as an ultimate 
concept was understood as a theistic figure with personal preference. As a matter of fact, the 
divine preference of pre-Zhou time was not merit based. Rather it was believed that the rulers 
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were chosen due to some a priori relationship with the Lord on High (上帝). In other words, 
grace in polity preceeded the concept of De (德) as merited by self-cultivation. Confucius, as a 
child of East Zhou (东周), inherited much theistic sensitivity. Many sayings in the Analects refer 
to a theistic ultimate with whom Confucius assumed that he had some special connection.
45
 
Grace is thus not a completely alien concept in the Chinese tradition. The Christian notion of 
divine grace may cooperate with the ancient resources of the theistic ultimate, and then 
advancing the concept as a foundation deeper than that of human endeavor. Relatively speaking, 
the priority of divine grace can be argued more easily under a cosmogonic hypothesis, where the 
universe is believed to have an abrupt origin. The most widely accepted hypothesis has been the 
Big Bang theory, which aptly joined with the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo as a novel 
theory that explains the origin of the universe. Modern cosmogonic hypothesis also entails a 
linear model of the universe, in contrast to the naturalistic cyclical model of Confucian 
cosmology. If, as modern science suggests, the primary structure of the universe is actually 
linear, then the biblical concept of God as the Creator who brought all into existence ex nihilo 
could be postulated as a logical necessity. This Creator “stands” beyond the space-temporal 
realm, and as antithetical to the entire creation, whether symmetrically or asymmetrically. 
Strictly speaking, there was a point hitherto when nothing existed. All spatial-temporal 
existences are thus utterly dependent upon the Creator. No existence is then entitled the status of 
qualifying itself to be brought into existence by means of self-cultivation. In other words, some 
of the most fundamental features of any existence are bestowed unconditionally by the Creator as 
an unmerited free gift. In the case of humans, no individual subject is morally qualified for initial 
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existence of the subject by means of self-cultivation, since there was no self to cultivate prior to 
its own existence. In this sense, grace is a concept more fundamental than self-cultivation. Self-
cultivation can be significantly powerful, yet no cultivation can produce the self. We were 
brought to existence by efforts antecedent to the formation of our subjectivity. This kind of 
antecedent effort was unconditional, and completely independent of moral act of our own. As the 
Psalmist said,  
For you created my inmost being; you knit me together in my mother’s womb. I praise 
you because I am fearfully and wonderfully made. Your works are wonderful, I know 
that full well. My frame was not hidden from you, when I was made in the secret place, 
when I was woven together in the depths of the earth. Your eyes saw my unformed body; 
all the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them came to be. 
(Psalm 139: 13-16 NIV) 
 
Similarly was the divine calling of Jeremiah the prophet, ““Before I formed you in the 
womb I knew you before you were born I set you apart; I appointed you as a prophet to the 
nations” (Jeremiah 1:5 NIV). Divine grace is thus the a priori condition through which we 
creatures were formed, and in which we all partake. There is an absolute dimension of divine 
grace that transcends all human effort of self-cultivation.
46
 A doctrine which purports that divine 
grace accepted us and loved us with no contingency upon our own performance, brings relief and 
assurance that a humanistic moralist will never experience. This kind of divine grace constitutes 
not only the essential element of the doctrine of creation, but also of salvation. We will unfold 
more on its soteriological manifestation in the next section on incarnational instantiation. Divine 
grace as a transcendent category also posits God as the wholly-other. As Barth suggests, there is 
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an infinite qualitative distinction between God and man.
47
 God as the Holy One dwells in light 
unapproachable.
48
 God as the source of divine grace is believed in the Christian tradition to exist 
objectively with definite moral content. The divine moral character provides both norms and 
directions for human self-cultivation. Within the Christian tradition, human beings as bearers of 
imago Dei cannot freely fabricate or manipulate moral content according to their own desires, 
especially since the Imago Dei assumed concrete historical and existential expression in the 
divine incarnation. This imposes limitations on the Confucian project of self-cultivation, which, 
without objective moral content, can degenerate to mere assertions of human desire.  
The conviction of the frailty of human nature is another contribution Christian faith may 
make to Confucian tradition. There were pessimistic views of human nature in Confucian 
resources, e.g. the Xun Zian view of human nature as evil. Yet the general tone of Confucian 
anthropology is more inclined to emphasize the continuity between the Ultimate (Tian 天) and 
humanity (Ren 人). Concepts of a radical fall and original sin were unheard of to Confucian 
thinkers. The Confucians believe that the path to humanity and enlightenment is no other than 
Cheng (诚), which means “be truthful to oneself”. Underlying this belief is the supposition that 
original human nature remains pure and intact, and that pure nature is inherent in every human 
being. The profound person, as Tu Wei-ming asserts, recognizes the possibility of a complete 
realization of the ideal of the unity of man and Heaven.
49
 Chung Yung makes it explicit that “the 
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profound person’s knowledge of the Dao is initially shared and practiced by men and women of 
ordinary intelligence; yet when comes to its finest point, it manifests throughout Heaven and 
Earth.”50 The problem for humanity, as diagnosed by the Confucians, is ignorance, and education 
is sufficient to amend the problem. It is within this ontological and anthropological framework 
that self-cultivation is identified as the primary manner of transformation in the Confucian 
context. Christianity, on the contrary, depicts a completely different picture. As an hourglass 
allows only one tiny spot of continuity between the upper and lower chambers, Christianity 
assigned Jesus Christ the absolutely unique position of being the one and only continuous point 
between the divine and the humanity, between transcendence and immanence. The divine 
incarnation was formulated as uncompromisingly transcendent, and, at the same time, 
uncompromisingly immanent. The essence of Nicaea-Chalcedon Christology is to affirm 
simultaneously the complete divinity and the complete humanity of the second Person of the 
Trinity. Only in the life of Jesus Christ, can transcendence and immanence, divinity and 
humanity coexist in perfect harmony.  As Barth stated definitively, “… above all, the famous 
'wholly other' breaking in upon us ‘perpendicularly from above,’ the not less famous 'infinite 
qualitative distinction' between God and man, the vacuum, the mathematical point, and the 
tangent in which alone they must meet.”51 Other than Jesus Christ as the perfectly sinless divine 
incarnation, the rest of human beings are believed to be subjected to the status lapsae, a 
condition infected by original sin. Even though Original Sin as a term was coined by Augustine 
of Hippo (354-430 CE), it does have biblical roots, especially in Pauline literature; and it 
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prevailed in church history as the normative position of Christian anthropology. Luther resonated 
it with the Bondage of the Will (December 1525), wherein he refers to the natural human 
condition as being captured in slavery because of original sin. Calvin, to the most extreme, 
denounces human nature as totally depraved.  
We may interpret the Christian doctrine of original sin as a logical postulate to central 
doctrines such as Christology and Soteriology. Its practical significance, when applied in the 
Confucian context, is worth taking seriously. Just to mention a few positive influences, the first 
is that this concept of original sin puts an end to the elitist mentality. Elitism has long been a 
problem for Confucian society. If education and self-cultivation is all that matters, then the gap 
between the noble and common person may become ever-wider, since the already privileged 
group tends to have more chances at and resources in education. As a result, Confucian society 
tends to be vulnerable to chronic social disturbances due to stratification and polarization. The 
Christian doctrine of original sin places everybody on the same level, both the elites and the 
lower classes, in light of an absolute holy standard. The unconditional equality implied in this 
doctrine helps to deflate the self-aggrandizement of the elites, and makes democracy a more 
feasible choice. A second positive influence is that, the monistic continuity between Heaven and 
humanity leads to overconfidence in the self-regulatory abilities of those sages, who usually are 
also guardians and public officials of the society. Because of this optimistic view by the educated 
elites, supervisory mechanisms, such as the rule of law and the political structure that favors 
check and balance, have never been seriously enforced in Confucian society. The society hence 
suffers from corruption and abuse of public resources. Third, divine grace in its concrete 
historical expression of incarnational instantiation supplies Confucian self-cultivation with 
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external objective content and criteria that lie beyond the manipulation of the human 
imagination. On many occasions, obsession with self-cultivation may agitate the mental and 
psychic faculties into hyper status, which, often, leads the faculties into idealistic roundabouts 
that disengage objective reality.
52
 The concept of divine grace that stands externally beyond the 
reach of self-cultivation may help the Confucian mind to cool down, and to reorient itself in a 
direction that is more empirical and more objective.  
Incarnational Instantiation vs. Immanence Transcendence 
 
One striking feature of Christianity is the concrete instantiation of the Ultimate in the 
incarnational existence of the second person of the Trinity. All classic Christological formulae 
repudiated any degree of compromise, either from the side of divinity or humanity. Jesus Christ, 
uncompromisingly divine, plunged into concrete existence as a historical figure, penetrated 
through all level of conditions, and eventually transcended triumphantly in his resurrection and 
ascension. Christianity hence echoes unambiguously the Confucian affirmation of the profound 
meaning of life and of the mundane. The difference between the two is that, while Confucians 
starts from the things at hand and strive for sagehood as a form of transcendence, Christianity 
centers on the divine incarnation as the unambiguous revelation of the Ultimate and attempts to 
assign meaning to all existence in light of this event. In Confucianism, Dao is scattered diffusely 
in the myriad of existence. It is the sage’s duty to discover the Dao, to internalize it through self-
cultivation, and to incorporate it into rituals. In contrast, in Christianity, the epiphany of logos 
clustered in the life and death of Jesus as a historical event. Revelation thus was not distributed 
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equally along the historical timeline. Rather, it is only in the divine incarnation that the divine 
revelation manifested itself in its most perspicuous form. Confucianism and Christianity stand 
for two different kinds of revelatory models, with Confucianism as the prototype of natural 
revelation and Christianity representing the standard type of special revelation. What will happen 
if we apply the Confucian axiological protocol onto the incarnational instantiation of 
Christianity? Splendid insights flare up as a result.   
The essential point of the current project is to lay out a series of tangible steps for 
external natural values to be apprehended and transferred to the innate human equilibrium as the 
value processing center. Any natural entity or historical event can be semioticized as a variety of 
symbols that allows meanings to be generated and transferred. Symbols can be regarded as 
media in which subjective feelings and concrete existences meet with each other. The content of 
Christology is no other than Jesus Christ as the Symbol of God being interpreted and engaged in 
light of human existential concerns and struggles. Christology will certainly evolve with radical 
novelties when engaged with the dynamic procedures of Confucian axiology. Now, there is a 
heated debate between high and low Christologies. High Christology affirms the unparalleled 
uniqueness of Christ as the only divine incarnation, an event that is both unprecedented and 
unrepeatable in this universal course. It affirms uncompromisingly both the full divinity and full 
humanity of Jesus Christ, without losing the concrete historicity of this event. High Christology 
also views Christ as the universal logos through which all existences were created ex nihilo. Low 
Christology, or modest Christology, on the contrary, emphasizes the historical continuity of the 
Christ event, recognizing no difference between this event and other historical events. Modest 
Christology treats Christ and his teachings equally with other inspirational teachers in a 
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religiously pluralistic context. I personally adopt the classic formulation of high Christology. 
There are difficult tensions between some doctrines that are considered as supernatural and the 
overall scientific view of the modern or late-modern cosmology. Some of the tension, I have to 
confess, is still a part of my knowledge and belief system even today. For instance, doctrines 
such as the resurrection and ascension broke the natural flow of historical continuity and 
disrupted normal affinities with the historical context. Presently, it is hard to fix doctrines of this 
kind squarely into a naturalistic worldview. Nevertheless, my pragmatic hypotheses about reality 
allow for such tension and for room to improve. As the horizon of human creativity expands, 
technologies that were unbelievable to people in the past, such as telecommunication and 
cloning, are no longer mystical in the modern age. Similarly, the development of science and 
technology may prove one day that resurrection is not at all super-natural or mystical. This is 
part of my faith that is seeking understanding, and is yet to be understood. This does not mean 
that I blindly adopt the pre-scientific cosmology of antiquity, which to me is no longer a viable 
option. I concur with Professor Neville that, even though the metaphysics of antiquity is no 
longer viable, there are biblical metaphysical assumptions that are compatible with a late-modern 
worldview. For instance, the biblical assumptions that the universe has a beginning and an end, 
as well as the communicability among parts of the universe, are ideas that are perfectly 
compatible with contemporary metaphysical theory.
53
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The theoretical invention of this project is that it delineates a series of steps as essential 
elements of the Confucian axiological mechanism. When this mechanism is applied to the rich 
resources of Christological symbols, a new version of Christology with vast capacities and 
potentials emerges. With the aid of Peircean semiotic theory, Confucian axiology is capable of 
engaging the infinite aspects of the Christ event, and inducing infinite layers of feelings, signs 
and significance from this event. The result of this process will transform both Christology and 
Confucianism. Due to volume limitations, this project won’t be able to unfold many dimensions 
of this axiological Christology. The following discussion will focus on three aspects that, if 
properly applied, may be beneficial to the Protestant churches with a Confucian cultural 
background.  
First, the Confucian axiological Christology may cultivate an ecumenical spirit that is 
genuine and inclusive. According to Peircean semiosis, a sign, or representamen, is something 
which according to somebody stands for something in some respect or capacity.
54
 Hence, any 
object or event can be interpreted into an infinite number of representamens, depending on the 
interpreter’s feeling, attention or mental condition at that particular moment. No particular 
representamen is entitled to make any exclusive claim as the only authentic sign-making activity 
that the interpreter is supposed to engage. In other words, every representamen is legitimate as 
long as it serves its function. Of course, those representamens with perceivable connections with 
the object will have better chances to be accepted by the community of interpretation and gain 
public credibility. When this theoretical model is applied to classical Christological symbols, 
most of the conflicts and disputes between different denominations can be boiled down to the 
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plurality of semiosis. When the Christ event is engaged as a sign and enters into the 
interpretation process, it works as a diamond with multiple facets, ready to be observed and 
engaged by interpreters from different angles and various existential conditions. It is completely 
normal that multiple versions of Christology were produced along the course of church history. 
Just as no particular interpretation is entitled to exclusive claim of authenticity, every version of 
Christology serves some particular purpose at a particular historical stage among a particular 
group of people. This does not mean that the Christ event can be semioticized with wild 
subjectivity to an extent that brute fact no longer matters. Truthfulness in the form of 
correspondence to historical facts does serve as a criterion that judges the validity and value of a 
particular Christology. However, most of the widely circulated models of Christology are 
soundly rooted in historical details. In this sense, all of these versions are authentic. Yet none of 
them qualifies as exclusively authentic. Denominations with different theoretical models are 
supposed to respect each other, and to learn from each other, rather than dispute and fight against 
each other. This constitutes the essence of the ecumenical spirit. In order to better illustrate this 
point, I will hereby engage some discussions on several symbols of the Cross that are popular 
among some denominations.  
1 2 3
4 5 6  
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The Cross at the upper left corner is a Crucifix (number 1), which served as principal 
symbol for many Christian denominations, especially that of the Catholic Church. The symbolic 
meaning of this Cross emphasizes the passion, the death and the sacrifice of Jesus. The Crucifix 
stands for the divine integration with the material world. The anguishing image of the Savior 
comforts empathetically all believers who are suffering and struggling in existential conditions. 
The Cross with flame (number 2) is the registered official symbol for the United Methodist 
Church. It represents Christ (Cross) and the Holy Spirit (flame). The flame may also refer back 
to the Aldersgate experience in which John Wesley, the founder of the denomination, felt his 
heart was “strangely warmed”.55 The third image, the Pentecostal Cross symbolizes the tongues 
of fire that descended upon each of the disciples at Pentecost. This symbol is infused with 
explosive creativity, and carries also with it some spirit that is dynamically democratic. The 
Eastern Orthodox Cross (number 4) makes a rich and balanced symbol that denotes multiple 
layers of meanings. Three horizontal beams represent details of the crucifixion. The slanted 
lower beam indicates the writhing of Jesus in intense agony. The lower beam is raised to the left 
side, the side of the criminal who confessed to the Savior before last breathe. The beams were 
enclosed in the budded Apostles’ Cross, which signifies the orthodox line of apostolic 
succession. The fifth symbol stands for the Protestant faith that puts an accent on triumphant 
resurrection and ascension. This symbol can also be interpreted in light of hope and parousia. 
The last image on the lower right corner (number 6) depicts the scene of Holy Saturday. It can be 
rendered as a symbol that resonates deeply with traumatic experience, when all hopes are gone 
and death seemingly overcomes life. These six symbols are just representatives of a large 
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number of Cross images that were coined along the course of church history. Even though many 
of them came with a particular denominational background, or were affiliated with a particular 
cultural group, they all served their purpose in the past, and present themselves to us as resources 
that inspire us to creatively interpret the Christ event from our unique existential perspective. 
With the Christian faith being increasingly integrated into the Confucian context, it is expected 
that new symbols of the Cross will be invented as semiotic tools that help to uplift the devotional 
life of those with Confucian sensitivity.  
The second result of feeding the Christological symbols into the Confucian axiological 
mechanism is the sharpening of the concepts of both transcendence and immanence. 
Confucianism is known for its notion of immanent transcendence. Some philosophers even argue 
that the notion of transcendence was alien to the original Confucianism, and was artificially 
imposed upon the system by Western mindsets.
56
 While it is obvious that Confucianism does not 
lack transcendent concepts such as Heaven, Earth, Humanity, Dao, and Taiji, it does make a 
unique relational model between immanence and transcendence. According to The Doctrine of 
the Mean, the major Confucian document that elucidates the topic, Confucianism knows no 
abrupt rift between immanence and transcendence. The opening line of the text defines 
decisively the affinity and continuity between Heaven and humanity: “What Heaven imparts to 
humanity is called human nature”. What follows is a line that seals the inseparability of Dao 
(Way), “The Way cannot be separated from us for a moment. What can be separated from us is 
not the Way.” 57 Even though Chung Yung denies any qualitative difference between the sage 
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and the commoner, the quantitative discrepancy between the two can be enormous. Furthermore, 
the unfathomable mystery of Dao lies beyond the reach of even the wisest of sages. “The Way of 
the superior man functions everywhere and yet is hidden. Men and women of simple intelligence 
can share its knowledge; and yet in its utmost reaches, there is something which even the sage 
does not know.”58 Generally, Chung Yung gives the impression that the Confucian pair of 
immanence and transcendence was not well differentiated. Both concepts are diffused and 
diluted. They are everywhere, and nowhere. It is not true that the Confucian philosophers were 
not aware of this deficiency; it is precisely because of their knowledge of the elusiveness and 
subtlety of the Dao that they concentrate the whole Confucian project on the cultivation of the 
Dao. As Zhu Xi stated in the Prologue of Chung Yung, the reason of the listing of this text as a 
classic to be studied by every pupil is because “The human heart-mind is constantly endangered; 
and the incentive for Dao is elusively subtle.”59 
The incarnational instantiation of the Christ event epitomizes a theoretical model that is 
uncompromisingly immanent and, at the same time, uncompromisingly transcendent. It took the 
Christian church almost four centuries to come up to a doctrinal formula that affirms both the full 
deity and full humanity of Jesus Christ. Such a doctrine dispels simultaneously any opaqueness 
in immanence and in transcendence. The historical Jesus with his concrete existential incarnation 
had become fully immanent in the natural order; and the cosmic Christ as homoousian to the 
Father God is fully and infinitely transcendent. Unlike the Confucian model of immanent 
transcendence that is scattered diffusely all around the universe, the incarnational instantiation of 
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the divine logos strives for a level of immanence and transcendence with direct perspicuity. The 
gap between the sage and the Dao will be overcome once the Christ event becomes the center of 
the Confucian symbol system. Confucianism provides the best version of a symbol processing 
mechanism; and Christianity coined Jesus as the symbol that transcends essence and existence. 
When Jesus as the symbol of God is fully engaged by the Confucian axiological mechanism, we 
have reason to anticipate that both the Christian doctrine of Christology and the central values of 
Confucianism will be remarkably transformed.  
The third result of feeding the Christological symbols into the Confucian axiological 
mechanism is the revitalization of the concept of a personal deity, a concept that is often relevant 
and engaging. Christianity distinguishes itself from most primitive anthropomorphic religions by 
having been shaped in an anti-idolatrous, Jewish social context from its very initial stage. In fact, 
it took Christianity more than three centuries to develop enough doctrinal idiosyncrasies to stand 
on its own feet. In contrast to the Jewish, abstract, transcendent and elusive version of the 
personal deity in the image of the Creator God, Christianity posited Jesus Christ as the personal 
deity in its most instantiated historical form. The blatant concreteness of this personal deity runs 
directly against the anti-idolatrous sensitivity of the Jewish faith. It is the uncompromised 
version of this pivotal doctrine that cost Jesus his life, as well as causing the ensuing persecution 
that the early church suffered in the following centuries. Nevertheless, Christianity did inherit the 
Jewish anti-idolatrous tradition with the exception of assigning Jesus Christ the exclusivity of 
being the only concrete embodiment of full divinity. In other words, the doctrine of Christology 
is meant to be interpreted in the Jewish non-imagery context. Unless one recognizes the Jesus 
event as purely a divine act, there is no way to account for this awkward doctrine. Christianity at 
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its very beginning came with an in-built pervasive non-imagery version of the ultimate. It is only 
on this ground that the doctrine of Christology can be properly interpreted. In its ancient time, 
China did envision some personal ultimate with volitional traits, which was often revered as the 
ancestry of the ruler. This personal deity, however, quickly depleted its credibility after a few 
rounds of regime change. Since then China has been dominated by diffuse, impersonal concepts 
of the ultimate such as Dao, Heaven, Ziran, and Taiji, even though there was still a residue of the 
concept of divine volition, such as the mandate of Heaven. The general tone of Confucianism 
and Daoism has no expectation of a direct epiphany of any personal deity, much less a radically 
concrete historical figure like Jesus. In this sense, it is as difficult for a Confucian scholar to 
accept Christianity as it is for those from a Jewish tradition. Both require a paradigm shift. 
However, Christology as a doctrine was formulated with an anticipatory antidote to challenges 
from traditions that opt for a diffuse impersonal image of the ultimate. It is both possible and 
necessary for the radical instantiation of the historical Jesus as a personal deity to be interpreted 
and inculcated in the Confucian context.  
There is no way to evaluate abstractly the function and validity of the personal and 
impersonal symbols of the ultimate. Personal symbols decline mostly because it is difficult to 
establish their plausibility especially among sophisticated social groups. However, if certain 
personal symbols pass the plausibility test, they can be extremely powerful in personal devotion 
and social life. The Christian doctrine of Christology is crafted in a way that is both ultimately 
ontological and concretely anthropomorphic. When applied in the Confucian context, the 
anthropomorphic character of this symbol may drive the core values of Confucian system in new 
directions. The concrete incarnational instantiation of the historical Jesus as the fully deified 
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Messiah may help to revitalize the personal element in the pervasive Chinese version of the 
ultimate. Personhood as the most essential element of humanity should have a unique share in 
the divine essence, as claimed by many Personalists about a century ago. It resonates powerfully 
with the Confucian affirmative attitude toward the world and mundane events. It also provides 
the equilibrium in Chung Yung with an absolute stance that is believed to be directly divine. 
Human feelings in Christian tradition since then were privileged with the possibility of 
empathizing with the divine in a concrete historical setting.  Furthermore, human creativity as a 
pole of the Confucian trinity (Heaven, Earth and Human being) is most forcefully affirmed in the 
incarnational instantiation of Jesus Christ as the second Person of the Christian Trinity.  
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